, ‘Integration without supranationalisation: studying the lead roles of the European Council and the Council in post-Lisbon EU politics’, Journal of European Integration, XXXVIII(5): 481-495. · De Fine Licht Jenny, Naurin Daniel, Esaiasson Peter, and Gilljam Mikael, 2014, ‘When Does Transparency Generate Legitimacy? Experimenting on a Context-Bound Relationship’, Governance, XXVII(1): 111-134. · Føllesdal Andreas and Hix Simon, 2006, ‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market
regional dimension in the European Union. in: Weatherill, Stephen and Bernitz, Ulf (eds.): The role of regions and sub-national actors in Europe 2005, Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp.1-31. Weiler Joseph. Europe in crisis—on ‘political messianism’, ‘legitimacy’and the ‘rule of law’. Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, December 2012, pp. 248-268.
In recent years, public participation has been a frequent object of research, especially in relation to rulemaking procedures. The aim of the paper is to verify a common thesis, that public participation is a means for enhancing democratic legitimacy in rulemaking. In order to do so, the author defines legitimacy and legitimation, presents models of the democratic legitimacy of the executive and compares monistic and pluralistic understanding of democracy. The author then analyzes standpoints of American, English and German legal theory and case law and proposes a possible solution to the main research question.
Erik Thorstensen, Ellen-Marie Forsberg, Anders Underthun, Pavel Danihelka and Jakub Řeháček
.  Dax, T., Strahl, W., Kirwan, J., & Maye, D. (2016). The Leader programme 2007-2013: Enabling or disabling social innovation and neo-endogenous development? Insights from Austria and Ireland. European Urban and Regional Studies , 23 (1), 56-68. DOI: 10.1177/0969776413490425.  Deephouse, D. L. & Suchman, M. (2008). Legitimacy in organizational institutionalism (pp. 49-77). The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism , 49 .  Delin, M. (2012). The role of farmers in Local Action Groups: The case of the national network of the Local
In the European Union language regime debate, theorists of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism have framed their arguments in reference to different theories of justice and democracy. Philippe Van Parijs advocates the diffusion of a lingua franca, namely English, as means of changing the scale of the justificatory community to the European level and allowing the creation of a transnational demos. Paradoxically, one key dimension of democracy has hardly been addressed in this discussion: the question of the democratic legitimacy of language regime choices and citizens’ preferences on the different language regime scenarios. Addressing the question of the congruence of language policy choices operated by national and European elites and ordinary citizens’ preferences, this paper argues first that the dimension of democratic legitimacy is crucial and needs to be taken into account in discussions around linguistic justice. Criticizing the assumption of a direct correspondence between individuals’ language learning choices and citizens’ language regime preferences made by different authors, the analysis shows the ambivalence of citizens’ preferences measured by survey data. The article secondly raises the question of the boundaries of the political community at which the expression of citizens’ preferences should be measured and demonstrates that the outcome and the fairness of territorial linguistic regimes may vary significantly according to the level at which this democratic legitimacy is taken into account.
Katrin Nyman-Metcalf and Ioannis Papageorgiou
Recently there have been several examples of different regional integration systems intervening to prevent unconstitutional events. The interventions can be based on explicit powers or be developed in response to events. This happens despite most regional integration systems having economic cooperation rather than explicit democratisation aims. Organs that issue laws or take constraining decisions must have a clear right to do this and a basis for exercising power-in other words, be legitimate. Where legitimacy comes from is debated, but as most countries today are democracies or purport to be, it somehow emanates from the people. National governments have a higher degree of legitimacy than regional integration organisations, possibly except the European Union. Regional integration organisations have to prove their legitimacy. The article examines if, to what extent, and on what basis regional integration systems have the right to exercise an independent role on the global stage. Legitimacy is a precondition for effective application of decisions of the organisation. Given the frequent lack of strong enforcement mechanisms, the question of legitimacy becomes even more important. With strong legitimacy, decisions taken by the regional integration organisation will be followed to a large extent even despite absence of effective enforcement mechanisms.
Ekaterina R. Rashkova
Political Parties in Common Law Democracies”, International Political Science Review, 35 (3): 339-354. Gherghina, Sergiu. 2014. “Shaping Parties’ Legitimacy: Internal Regulations and Membership Organizations in Post‐Communist Europe”, International Political Science Review, 35(3): 291-306. Gilley, Bruce. 2006. “The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 countries”, European Journal of Political Research, 45: 499-525. Gilley, Bruce. 2012. “State Legitimacy: An updated dataset for 52 countries”, European
References ‘Ansipi majandusime…’ (2012), ‘Ansipi majandusime õitseb tänu eurorahale’ [Ansip’s economic miracle blossoms with EU subsidies], Eesti Päevaleht , 12 Jan 2012. Beetham, D. & Lord, C . (1998), Legitimacy and the European Union , London & New York: Longman. Berg, E. (2007), ‘Where East Meets the West? Baltic States in Search of New Identity,’ in T. Hayashi & H. Fukuda (eds.) Regions in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present , Sapporo: Slavonic Research Centre, pp. 49
State leadership in Russia is determined by historical and cultural as well as by legal and institutional premises. The analysis of ways of obtaining legitimacy by state leaders of the Russian Federation is a borderline issue of political science, sociology, and history. The conditions that favor the creation of the archetype on the Russian ground are undoubtedly: extremely centralized political power in Russia (one central decision-making center whose decisions were arbitrarily arbitrary), the problem of the enforcement of the rules of the trilateral division of power (the legislative sphere dominated the legislature), the low level of control Social rulers (lack of effective legal mechanisms to verify the effects of their activities), paternalism of the leadership system and low participation of representative institutions in public life. The aim of the article is to situate in the field of considerations about the archetype of Russian power the concept of Yuri Pivovarov, according to which not only civilization baggage and the immaturity of civil society have decided the legitimacy of the state leadership of the Russian Federation. According to him, the problem of the participation of the political elite in the redistribution of goods (and the low level of participation of citizens in the process of ownership separation) is of significant importance. According to the theory of the Russian political scientist, the basis for understanding the phenomenon of Russian state leadership is the combination of elements of archetypal leadership with a proper interpretation of the relation of freedom – property.
(reviewing Eric Heinze. Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)
Should democracies punish hate speech? Eric Heinze, Professor of Law and Humanities at Queen Mary, University of London, has written an important new book on this subject, Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship. At the center of Heinze’s book is a revolutionary idea: Instead of debating whether democracies per se can or cannot legitimately ban hate speech (which assumes all democracies are the same), we should only condemn hate speech as illegitimate in those democracies that are longstanding, stable and prosperous. In this essay, I show how Heinze’s idea frees the debate over hate speech regulation from the Europe vs. America dichotomy that has haunted it for years, while carrying a special poignancy for the United States in the age of Trump.