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References · Albert Max, 2003, ‘The Voting Power Approach: Measurement without Theory’, European Union Politics, IV(3): 351-366. · Albert Max, 2004, ‘The voting Power Approach: Unresolved Ambiguities’, European Union Politics, V(1): 139-146. · Baldwin Richard and Widgrén Mika, 2004, ‘Winners and losers under various dual-majority voting rules for the EU’s Council of Ministers’, CEPS Policy Brief, 50, 1-35. · Banzhaf John F., 1965, ‘Weighted voting does not work: A mathematical analysis’, Rutgers Law Review, XIX(2): 317-343. · Barry Brian, 1980, ’Is It Better to

Abstract

Existing literature has not yet defined a clear-cut relationship between ownership structure and capital structure. This study aims to contribute to this controversial argument by examining the impact of internal (managerial) ownership and external ownership on financing preferences using the case of non-financial firms listed on Karachi stock exchange during the period of 2008-2012. Our results suggest that the external ownership has a significant effect on capital structure in accordance with the presence of blockholders. In contrast, the internal ownership has a complicated effect; it shows significant positive and negative relationship to leverage at lower and certain higher proportion of managerial shareholding respectively. Besides, the combined analyses suggest that the presence of blockholders negates the impact of managerial ownership on capital structure. This implies that the presence of large and dominant shareholders in Pakistani firms may have caused a bias for debt financing to protect their voting power and returns.

. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSgMl+REPORT+A6-2007-0351+0+DOC+PDF+v0//EN Ramírez-González, V. (2010). Degressive proportionality. Composition of the European Parliament. The parabolic method. ... Voting Power in the European Union .... Retrieved from http://ejournal.narotama.ac.id/files/Degressive proportionality. Composition of the European Parliament. The parabolic method.pdf Ramírez-González, V., Palomares, A., & M´arquez, M. (2006). Degressively proportional methods for the allotment of the European Parliament seats

), The Measurement of Voting Power , Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Gerling K., Grüner H.P., Kiel A., Schulte E. (2005), Information Acquisition and Decision Making in Committees: a survey , ‘European Journal of Political Economy’, vol. 21, iss. 3 Hahn V. (2012), On the Optimal Size of a Committee of Experts , ‘Department of Economics Working Paper Series’, No. 2012-24, University of Konstanz Holler M., Owen G. (2001), Power Indices and Coalition Formation, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston/Dordrecht/London Kirchgässner G. (2008), Direct democracy: obstacle to reform

, International Monetary Fund Factsheet, ttps:// www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/07/27/15/24/How-the-IMFMakes-Decisions (viewed on 18 November 2018). 42. ***‗A Guide to Committees, Groups and Clubs, International Monetary Fund Factsheet, https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/A-Guide-to-Committees-Groups-and-Clubs (viewed on 20 November 2018). 43. ***‗IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power, https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.aspx (viewed on 20 November 2018). 44. ***IMF Finance Department, Quota and Voting Shares Before and After Implementation

were open to exploring alternatives to the FU, such as the RAC 4 . The 2015 review of the SDR basket may not adopt the RAC because it might need an eighty-five percent majority of the total voting power according to our understanding of Section 2 Articles XV of IMF’s articles of agreement 5 . So we will assess whether the RMB meets IMF’s criteria in terms of the revised FU indicators. Does the RMB meet the FU? In terms of official reserves, more and more countries (or regions) are considering making or already have made the RMB one of their reserve assets

, ed. H.W. Kuhn, Princeton University. [26] Gillies, D., 1953b. Some Theorems on N-person Games, Ph. D. dissertation. Department of Mathematics, Princeton University. [27] Holler, M., 1982. Forming Coalitions and Measuring Voting Power. Political Studies, 30(2), pp.266-231. [28] Holler, M., Packel, E., 1983. Power, Luck and the Right Index. Journal of Economics (Zeitschrift fur Nationalekonomie), 43(1), pp.21-29. [29] Holler, M., 1984. A Public Good Power Index. In: Coalitions and Collective Actions, ed., M. Holler. Wurzburg and Wein: Physica-Verlag, pp.51

that, without that agreement, an alternative framework is adopted, shifting the issues to new bodies. This reform (which requires an 85% majority of the total voting power) was blocked for some time by the US Congress. The US Congressional approval of the 2010 Quota and Governance reforms, announced in December 2015, was therefore welcomed by the IMF Managing Director as “a crucial step forward that will strengthen the IMF in its role of supporting global financial stability […] enabling us to respond to crises more effectively, and also […] better

/Schlossinsel as well as seven politicians (the latter without voting power))" are a fixed part of the body ( Internationale Bauausstellung Hamburg 2010b ; own translation). is perceived rather as a one-sided flow of information. As far as accompanying the process is concerned, few possibilities for interaction are available and little influence can be brought to bear on the work of the IBA. Wilhelmsburg residents thus frequently see themselves as the passive recipients of measures, not as their designers: "[I]n the end it started as [a] ... bottom up process and then

ownership groups did not increase their wealth in real terms. It appeared feasible to combine strong economic development and a tax system that de facto barred the emergence of new individually owned entrepreneurial firms. Over time, the old industrial families were phased out and ownership and control in the Swedish business sector grew more and more concentrated ( Glete (1994) ). In other words, the vision of “capitalism without capitalists” appeared to be practically realizable. Through dual-class shares (A and B shares with different voting power, sometimes