culturally support or influence American foreign policy in the specific country and region. Such memorialization can be interpreted to serve a number of purposes. On one level, it enshrined in bronze and stone the memory of a specific period of transatlanticrelations, marked by U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s leadership and alliances – the late phase and end of the Cold War. This unique historical era had not been memorialized transatlantically in such a consistent and permanent manner. This period was characterized by the hardening of anticommunism on the U.S. side and
The present article deals with the problem, often discussed in the public sphere, of the decreased attention that the USA gives to Lithuania and to the region of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) on the whole, discusses the changing international environment, USA’s “pivot to Asia” and possible changes in the US foreign policy during the time of President Obama’s second term of office. The article states that Lithuania, being interested in the vitality of transatlantic relations, should consider the issue of “winning back” the USA’s attention to the region and to Europe as a whole, by assessing the issues of security to be solved. The research shows that even with a decade of its membership in Euro-Atlantic structures, Lithuania has not been fully integrated into the transatlantic security community. On the basis of a theoretical perspective of a small state and neoclassical realism, the article deals with the external and internal factors explaining the state’s foreign policy, analyzes Lithuania’s possible behavior in an international space, including the North Atlantic Alliance. In recent years NATO has been confronted not only with the global threats of the 21st century but also with a “burden share” problem that is becoming ever more acute. The situation of Lithuania’s security as to the guarantees of collective defense provided by the Alliance is assessed as the best one since the restoration of Independence; however, this does not release it from the necessity to widely develop its own defense capacities. Even though Europe constantly underlines the importance of transatlantic relations and intensive economic-trade relations with the USA, it has not developed a common attitude to its relations with the USA. Taking into consideration the present-day challenges, Europe needs a more global, more strategic attitude.
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership represents a strategic vision of transatlantic relations, including job creation, global leadership, and establishing high international standards. This paper discusses how three recent bi-lateral and regional agreements, along with positions adopted in transatlantic negotiations, convey respective side's acceptable parameters, and how international standards are emerging from and disseminated through agreements involving the European Union and the United States
The study focuses on the security of the transatlantic space and the role played by its various components in ensuring the stability, security and development of the countries in this space. The role played by the North Atlantic Alliance in the transatlantic space and beyond, as well as contributing to securing the European continent, is also avoided. At the same time, in order to complete the picture of the transatlantic relations, it is necessary to mention the way in which Russia is present in the international relations of South-eastern Europe. The results of this theoretical approach can contribute to creating an overall image of the transatlantic security community and identifying the transatlantic space from a static and dynamic point of view.
Following Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea, there are few who would doubt Moscow’s endeavours to influence the balance of power in the pan-Baltic region as well. As often as not, such endeavours tend to be analysed after they occur. Russia’s potential to exercise this kind of influence using the Kaliningrad factor was recalled as if apropos of nothing. This is cause to suspect that academic research has so far failed to properly consider Kaliningrad as a geostrategic factor. Then there are the questions: What is the course of the transformation of the geopolitical status of the Russian Federation’s Kaliningrad (Konigsberg) region? What is the role that Moscow has earmarked for the exclave within the European security architecture? And is it a merely regional role? One way to find out the answers is by verifying the governance model applied by the parent country to the oblast, which is convincingly grounded on the concept of a geopolitical hostage. Moscow is tightening its grip on the social, economic and political processes in Kaliningrad. By using financial subsidies, infrastructural projects and laws to modify the status of the exclave, it is trying to stabilise the socio-economic situation in the exclave, making every effort to ensure Kaliningrad’s viability under isolation and transit restriction (termination). Political control is assured by Moscow’s direct dummies within the exclave’s administration and United Russia’s dominance at so-called elected institutions. After the war with Georgia, which is to say roughly since 2009, Russia has taken focused steps to rapidly modernise and reorganise its military. As we analyse the measures Russia deploys to develop its military presence in the Western Military District, we can say that in 2015-2016 Moscow attained the complete superiority of conventional weaponry over NATO. The Kaliningrad region played a vital role in that process. Both implicitly and for all practical purposes, the exclave became a factor to perform the function of Russia’s military bastion. Strategically speaking, this is the region’s old role given new life. Kaliningrad has become the heart of Russia’s A2/AD ‘bubble’, raising new challenges for the security of the Scandinavian countries, Finland, the Baltic states and Poland, ergo Western Europe. Kaliningrad has turned into a diminishing factor in terms of Belarus’ geopolitical role. The consistent re-militarisation of Kaliningrad affects the regional states and transatlantic relations alike. Moscow’s goal is for the Kaliningrad factor to be of strategic importance in the balance of power dialogue with the West, and the US in particular. Moscow is being frank that the purpose of a remilitarised Kaliningrad in the Baltic region and the Kuril Islands in the Far East is to reduce the geostrategic influence of the US and increase Russia’s security beyond the perimeter of its borders.
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