There is a large value added tax fraud in the European Union. The current value added tax system is universal as tax is applied to all parties involved in the chain transactions, thus creating a risk of tax losses if one of the parties involved in the chain transaction does not pay tax in good faith. There is the action plan to introduce the definitive value added tax to prevent tax fraud in intra-community transactions. However, in order to ensure normal value added tax administration in all member states, a number of measures are needed to be done. It is necessary to develop a mutual settlement mechanism in cases of intra-community transactions. The aim of this research is to develop a possible solution for the management of tax payments under the definitive value added tax regime. The results of the research show that to manage tax payments, several payment management systems can be used. However, as a solution, a special clearing system could be introduced. Quantitative research methods such as statistical methods were used in order to analyze the situation of tax fraud in EU and its main causes, as well as mathematical modeling methods to analyze the definitive VAT system and to calculate the balance between countries in an example for clearing mechanism.
exemptions and reduced rates, tax arrears, and taxfraud; if it is higher, this may be caused by inclusion of investment in the VAT base.
E = V τ s G D P
where E is the efficiency ratio, V is the VAT revenue, and tS is the standard VAT rate.
The c-efficiency ratio takes into account national consumption instead of GDP and is calculated as follows:
E c = V τ s C
where E C is the efficiency ratio, V is the VAT revenue, tS is the standard VAT rate, and
The main goal of this paper was to identify the main factors determining the performance of the Slovak tax system. For practical reasons, we decided to deal with all of the potentially relevant dimensions that can be included in the theme – from tax policy to tax administration. The paper is based on primary and secondary data; it combines qualitative and quantitative research methods. The primary data were collected in two rounds, with long-term research about the needs perceived by tax officials and with the “Delphi method”. The comparison of the opinions of tax officials and tax experts with the existing evidence serves as the basis for the paper’s conclusions and policy proposals. The research shows that the most important areas mentioned by tax officials and experts are relevant (to simplify tax collection, to decrease tax bureaucracy, to provide better information about the tax system to businesses and citizens and to improve tax administration services). However, the second most frequent answer by tax officials (to decrease the tax burden) is somewhat disputable – the research indicates the existence of some level of tax illusion, even at the level of tax administration professionals. The research also reveals the relatively low priority given to the need to increase the level of risk connected with tax evasion, which is surprising because the data clearly indicate a very high level of tax fraud in the country.
There are significant losses in tax revenues across the European Union (EU). National governments lose billions of euros in the revenues from non-paid taxes and other illegal activities. The fight against aggressive tax planning, tax fraud and illegal activities is on the agenda of the EU, OECD and all the national governments. However, due to the size of tax losses it should not be treated just as tax evasion, but rather as tax terrorism! Therefore, the author has set criteria when tax evasion should be named as “tax terrorism” as well as designed the principles for tackling tax terrorism and other ways of non-payment of taxes. The tax evasion could be treated as “tax terrorism” in case of international evasion from taxes by organized groups of persons for criminal purposes as well as when it creates significant losses in government revenues. The term “tax terrorism” would have impact to communication and cause response of society and politics, therefore it would have more social and political consequences.
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