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Shapiro, Steven R. "The Role of Courts in the War against Terrorism: A Preliminary Assessment." The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Vol. 29, Issue 1 (2005): 103-118.
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Spaulding, Norman W. "The Discourse of Law in Time of War: Politics and Professionalism during the Civil War and Reconstruction
• Arbour Jane M., 2003, ‘The Protection of Aboriginal Rights Within a Human Rights Regime: In Search of an Analytical Framework for Section 25 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’, SupremeCourt Law Review , XXI: 3.
• Baines Beverley, 2005a, ‘Is Substantive Equality a Constitutional Doctrine?’, Queen’s University Legal Research Paper n. 2015-042 .
• Baines Beverley, 2005b ‘Using the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to Constitute Women’, in Baines Beverley and Ruth Rubio-Marin (eds), The Gender of Constitutional
Freedom of Speech? Israeli Supreme Court Ruling 606/93 - Kidum Initiative Inc. versus the Israel Broadcasting Authority. A Rhetorical Language Analysis
The article examines nine different rhetorical devices employed by two Israeli Supreme Court justices in their writing of the majority and minority opinions (Justices Dorner and Cheshin respectively) in the case of Kidum Initiative Inc. versus The Israel Broadcasting Authority which addressed the issue of freedom of speech versus good taste. Theoretical background and examples from the verdict are presented and discussed.
In September 2013 in the case of Divito v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the issue of whether section 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Charter, which grants Canadians the right to enter Canada was violated in a case where the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness declined to consent to the transfer of a Canadian citizen to serve his sentence in Canada where the sentencing state had consented to the transfer. Another issue was whether sections 8(1) and 10(1)(a) and 10(2)(a) of the International Transfer of Offenders Act, which granted the Minister the discretion to consent or not to consent to the transfer, were contrary to section 6(1) of the Charter. In resolving the above issues, the Court referred to its earlier jurisprudence, academic publications and international law. Although the Court agreed with the government that the appeal was moot because the appellant had left the USA by the time it was heard, it held that it retained “a residual discretion to decide the merits of a moot appeal if the issues raised are of public importance” and that this case was one of public importance because “[t]he issues are likely to recur in the future and there is some uncertainty resulting from conflicting decisions in the Federal Court.” The purpose of this article is to highlight the interpretative tools invoked by the court and the implications of the judgement.
The article is focused on a serious dispute between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal over interpretative verdicts in the Republic of Poland. This kind of decisions are issued by the Tribunal. Interpretative verdicts contain explanation (interpretation) of a statutory provision, which constitutionality is controlled by the Tribunal. The main problem is, if this kind of decisions bind other courts. Judges of the Tribunal Court claim that courts, including the Supreme Court, are suppose to obey interpretative verdicts. The judges of Supreme Court maintain that this kind of decisions only indicates one of possible interpretation of a statutory provision and courts don’t have to follow it. In the article the author describes this type of verdicts, their history and explains the essence of the dispute.
The concept of truth as an integral component in the exercise of discourse and freedom of expression in democratic society has historically received considerable attention from the SupremeCourt. Many of the Court’s pivotal decisions regarding First Amendment concerns have been determined by how justices have conceptualized truth and how they have understood the complex connection truth and falsity share in free debate. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Chaplinsky
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Dobrić v. Serbia, no. 2611/07 and
A ‘distinction without a difference’ exists where a linguistic or conceptual difference turns out to have no substantial significance and merely masks two similar, if not identical, objects. As applied to constitutional law and interpretation, it means that judges – especially the Justices of the United States SupremeCourt – employ the forms and language of law, while their reasoning, motivations and goals are political. As some often say, members of the SupremeCourt are properly viewed as “politicians in judges’ robes”.
Is this assertion accurate? The
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