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The aim of this paper is to bring together some of the foundational and recent literature interlinking corporate governance and the leadership role of the board of directors. Strategic leadership is widely assumed to be a responsibility that defaults to the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). However, in practice, what most CEOs do is strategic management rather than strategic leadership. While strategic management does share key aspects of strategic leadership CEOs are expected to prioritize the managerial side over the leadership side. This is just one of the situations in which the board-room assumes the leadership role. This paper discusses how boards of directors conduct the process of strategic leadership in their organizations. In recent years there has been an increasing interest among scholars to understand how boards strategize from a behavioral point of view. This growing interest has resulted in the development of various typologies regarding boards’ involvement in the strategic leadership processes.
The article concentrates on the impact of selected aspects of governance - the level of autonomy and the involvement of stakeholders in the internal governance of a university - on the research performance of universities measured by indicators of international university rankings in cross-country comparisons. The analyses are geographically situated in Europe. They follow two paths which are from the theoretical point of view based on the concepts of the principal-agent problem and stakeholder theory. Using linear regression, the author identifies statistically significant aspects of governance and compares them with results of previous studies. The findings serve as a basis for a discussion regarding how to create appropriate conditions for universities in order to improve their prospects for international success in research. The limitations of the results relating to the data, methodology and their application in the European context are discussed and general recommendations are formulated.
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