References Andone, C. (2013). Argumentation in Political Interviews. Analyzing and Evaluating Responses to Accusations of Inconsistency. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Andone, C. (2014). The burden of proof in practices of politicalaccountability. In Saftoiu, R., I. Neagu & S. Mada (Eds.), Persuasive Games in Political and Professional Dialogue. (forthcoming). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Bovens, M. (2006). Analysing and assessing accountability: A conceptual framework. European Law Journal 13(4), 447-468. Curtin, D. (2007). Holding (quasi
During the past two decades, the number of countries that have enacted Freedom of Information (FOI) laws has increased dramatically. In many respects, FOI laws have become a democratic ‘right of passage’. No FOI, no ‘proper’ democracy.
The promises of FOI regimes are far-reaching: extensive independent access to government-held information will lead to increased transparency, prevention of corruption and maladministration and greater public participation in the political process. But are these promises borne out by the practice of FOI?
This article describes a study that tracked a number of real-life FOI requests in five countries. The project puts forward a prototype for the first International Freedom of Information Index, ranking the five countries of study on how their FOI regimes function in practice.
In conclusion, the paper suggest that the FOI Index should be expanded to cover all 65 plus countries that have implemented FOI laws. It is argued that such an index could play an important role in furthering some of the core properties of liberal democracy: transparency, political accountability and good governance.
Aim: A massive flood due to exceptional rainfalls devastated the town of Genoa on 9 October 2014. Media reports focused on the disaster, its causes and the political accountabilities. Reading facts after the event is commonly biased by the hindsight perspective and the aim of the paper is to investigate the amount and the potential effects of hindsight bias in terms of citizens risk perception and community resilience.
Method: We performed a qualitative analysis of the narratives in the national and local news reports during the aftermath to investigate occurrences of a blaming attitude and cognitive biases.
Results: The results showed a considerable amount of sentences that were focused on blaming the forecasters, the Civil Protection System, and the local administration. Many narratives were affected by hindsight bias and described the events as simple and linear chain reactions. This led to counterfactual biases, assuming that a simple intervention on a single factor could have prevented the tragic outcome.
Conclusion: We claim that the biased nature of the media narratives could affect the citizens’ risk perception and their attitude towards the institutions, increasing their exposure to future flood-related threats. We propose the appropriate language would generate correct cognitive frames and, therefore, safer behaviour.
Agencies are an organisational form with regulatory, expert or executive tasks that may ensure better usage of expertise compared to traditional administrative organisations. However, there are certain unintentional effects of the agency model, which are more obvious in transitional countries. Coordination and policy coherence gaps may raise the question of political accountability, provoke robust political interventions, and undermine the level of autonomy and expertise, especially where a firm legal framework does not limit the influence of politics. Another problem is the effective legal control over agencies. Traditional, bureaucratic legal procedures of internal control and courts’ supervision in certain transition countries, like those researched in the paper (Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro), are not fully suitable and effective for agencies, opening significant room for politicisation hidden behind expertise. The recent proliferation of agencies in those countries causes many new problems of public administration and enhances old ones. Interview-based research conducted in three countries in January 2012 has the purpose to establish the main problems and issues in the functioning of agencies, especially with regard to the legal aspect of agency and politics / policy relations. Basic findings confirm the hypothesis that the agency model in those countries has not been stabilised yet. Professionalism, autonomy and expertise of the agencies are in a precarious position. The legal framework for agencies should be fine-tuned and strengthened, to ensure proper steering within the agency model.
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REFERENCES Andone, C. (2014). Maneuvering with the burden of proof: confrontational strategies in dealing with politicalaccountability. Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric , 36 , 59–78. Arunachalam, S., & Waxman, S. R. (2014). Let’s see a boy and a balloon: Argument labels and syntactic frame in verb learning. Learning and Development , in press. Bałaj, B. (2013). Visual scanning of figurative and abstract painting. Research on naïve in the field of art. Paper presented at Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies, 1st International Avant Conference, Toruń
in European Democracy’, The Modern Law Review , LXXVII(1): 1-32. • Cygan Adam, 2017, ‘Legal Implications of Economic Governance for National Parliaments’, Parliamentary Affairs , LXX(4): 710-727. • Dawson Mark, 2015, ‘The Legal and PoliticalAccountability Structure of ‘Post-Crisis’ EU Economic Governance’, Journal of Common Market Studies , LIII(5): 976-993. • Esposito Antonio, 2014, ‘La cooperazione interparlamentare: principi, strumenti e prospettive’, in Lupo Nicola and Manzella Andrea (eds), Il sistema parlamentare euro-nazionale , Giappichelli, Torino
Reconstitute Itself?” in Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.) State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror , Washington: Brookings Institute Press, 129-158. CNN. (2000) Somaliland, Ethiopia sign trade accord. November 12. http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/11/12/somaliland.accord.reut/, accessed July 05 2012. Eubank, Nicholas. (2012) “Taxation, PoliticalAccountability and Foreign Aid: Lessons from Somaliland.” Journal of Development Studies 48, 4: 465-480. Geldenhuys, Deon. (2009) Contested States in World Politics . Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. GlobalPost
References Adsera, A., C. Boix and M. Payne. 2003. “Are you being Served ? PoliticalAccountability and Quality of Government.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 19(2), 445 – 490. Banisar, D. 2004. “Global Survey: Freedom of Information and Access to Government Record Laws around the World.” The Freedominfo.org. Publisher not identified. Bannister, F. and R. Connolly. 2011. “The Trouble with Transparency: A Critical Review of Openness in e-Government.” Policy & Internet 3(1), 1 – 30. Beynon-Davies, P. 2007. “Models for e-Government.” Transforming