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For liberalism, values such as respect, reciprocity, and tolerance should frame cultural encounters in multicultural societies. However, it is easy to disregard that power differences and political domination also influence the cultural sphere.
In the age of colonialism, Europe controlled large parts of the world for more than 400 years. In this essay, I discuss cultural pluralism from this historical point of departure. In relation to Indian political theorist Rajeev Bhargava, I discuss the meaning of cultural domination and epistemic
social constructions so that it is pointless to make a fuss about their intrinsic value, these same people are nevertheless deeply attached to them in their daily lives, not so much because these traditions and values would be better, but simply because they are theirs, in other words because they define their socio-cultural identity ( Jonkers 2008 , 171-176).
Against this background, it is timely to probe, from a philosophical perspective, why socio-cultural identity has often become a pretext for excluding the other, in other words why pluralism has become so
In this article, we assume that the concept of identity and that of system of values are correlative, if obviously not equivalent; indeed, one’s identity affects the things that one values, while any system of values motivates a particular sense of identity. Therefore, when speaking about pluralism or conflict of values, we shall by the same token imply the issue of identity. One of the theses of the article is that instead of there being two Russian identities (that of the intellectual elite and that of the masses) there are three identities in
In reference to the monograph entitled “Sports and Ethics: Philosophical Studies”, published in the “Physical Culture and Sport. Studies and Research” quarterly (2014, vol. 62), and in particular in reference to the paper entitled “The Normative Ethics and Sport” (Kosiewicz, 2014, pp. 5-22), the article presents new and at the same time supplementary views on the relationships between sports and normative ethics. The main objective of the paper is to provide a rationale as to why these relationships may be viewed in the context of the assumptions of ethical pluralism, ethical relativism, ethical panthareism, and axionormative negationism.
The text is of a strictly cognitive and extra-ideological nature and it attempts to avoid moral valuation, moralism, and moralizing. The view it postulates is also labeled as ethical negationism, which rejects the necessity for external support and enhancement of sports rivalry rules with moral principles. It assumes that regulations, book rules, and game rules as well as the principles of sports rivalry ought to be of an entirely amoral character, independent of ethics.
The article suggests minimizing the impact of moral postulates on sport. It postulates a need for widespread propagation of this point of view in competitive, professional, spectator, and Olympic sport disciplines, as well as in top-level sports or elite sports. The views presented in the paper point to the need to separate normative ethics from sports as far as it is at all possible in contemporary sports indoctrinated with obligations or attitudes of a moral tenor. This is because normative ethics – according to the author - is relative ethics, depending on an unlimited number of variables, e.g., various social contexts or individual points of view.
The text engages in a polemic with colloquial and evaluative opinions of those sports fans who by all means strive to bolster its formal, functional, and axiological status. A significant part of them erroneously attributes sports to an extraordinary moral mission related to promoting an intuitively understood good with a religious and extra-confessional tenor.
The article deals with following issues: - plurality of mass media as a freedom of speech principle, - regulation of mass media and its two faces: regulation as a way of limitation of freedom of expression and regulation as a way of protection of freedom of expression, - danger of mass-media monopoly for “free trade of ideas”, - regulation of content versus regulation of access, the question of positive obligations of state power resulting from constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, - legal means for securing of mass-media plurality and question of its constitutional conformity with protection of property (regulation of mass-media ownership as a protection of freedom of speech).
. In 2009, he was seen eagerly waiting for an IOM-hired bus to take him to Kathmandu airport for residency in either Europe or Canada—where many Ahmadiyyas have already settled. For more information on this, read http://tribune.com.pk/story/684227/visa-fines-pakistani-refugees-others-condemned-to-hilly-prison-in-nepal/ Religious extremists in Pakistan repeatedly attack the Ahmadiyya community. A recent example is that of the December 2016 attack on their ‘place of worship’ in Chakwal, Punjab ( Dhakku 2016 ). This raises questions on pluralism and respect for
The paper offers a comparative perspective on transmigrant cultural identities as illustrated in the works of two contemporary South Asian American and Romanian American authors, Jhumpa Lahiri and Aura Imbăruș. The comparison involves Gogol, a South Asian American character, and Aura, the author of the memoir Out of the Transylvania Night. Although Gogol is a fictional character and Aura is an actual transmigrant, their comparative assessment relies on the assumption that both narratives are inspired by the authors’ background of relocation. Despite their different cultural origins, both authors share thematic aspects related to the dynamics of cultural identity in the context of migration. This paper aims to provide a starting point for an enlarged framework of comparative analysis, in order to foreground intersections between different experiences of cultural negotiation in the context of displacement. Born and raised in America, Gogol is challenged by his cultural multiplicity and strives to suppress elements of his Indian identity. After years of rebelling against his parents’ norms, Gogol shifts to the Bengali model, when his father dies. Once he accepts the relevance of his cultural roots, Gogol is able to plunge into a dimension situated beyond his Bengali and American selves. His transcendent strategy is illustrated by his decision to plunge into a third space of redefinition, suggested by the Russian literature which is appreciated by Gogol’s father. Aura Imbăruș offers the example of a first generation Romanian transmigrant who undergoes voluntary relocation to the United States. Fascinated by the American world, Aura is eager to take over norms of material success and consumerism, overlooking the relevance of her cultural roots. When she undergoes a personal family crisis, Aura eventually reassesses the value of her Romanian background, aiming to reconcile her source culture with her Americanised self. In a manner similar to Gogol’s, Aura manages to integrate American norms of success, while forging enduring bonds with the Romanian American community in California.
This short tribute to Ján Podolák comments on the space between two extremes: pure science and blind belief. If religion is not susceptible to scientific proof because it is a belief in an invisible world inhabited by spirits who influence human existence on earth then science in its strictest sense is the opposite of religion because it is not based on any beliefs but solely on provable facts. However, the anthropology of science should be based on the pluralism of knowledge and the seeking of truth in different cultural settings around the world. Everything human, also science, is a social and cultural phenomenon. This means that rationality is not a preserve of the Western mind only and that without falling into the trap of postmodernist excessive relativism, we should admit that rationality is not only universal but also not hierarchized evolutionistically or qualitatively by giving preference to its Western brand. Science thus ceases to be the only realm of rational knowledge. Religion in its turn is a kind of non-scientific knowledge.