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Interpretations of logics with only truth-functional connectives create a number of problems regarding the understanding of interpreted sentences. A particular problem is caused by the understanding of a sentence that is the negation of another. What is the meaning of sentence ¬p, for a particular sentence p? Even when we know what the semantic correlate of the sentence p is, we still do not know how to understand the semantic correlate of the sentence ¬p. The standard algebraic approach does not explain much. The problem is still open, because it is still unclear how to understand the element of algebra −v(p). The propositional logic with the connective of the content implication, as it is a non-Fregean logic, proposes a simple solution to this problem. The key to understanding the content of the sentence ¬p is to understand the content of the sentence p. Because, the content of the natural language sentence usually has a partial understanding, so it can be understood differently. Therefore, the negation ¬p is here understood adequately to the current and partial understanding of the sentence p. It seems that the proposed approach is consistent with our daily thinking.