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The challenge of death and ethics of social consequences: Death of moral agency

): Moral Agents. In: E. Craig (ed.): Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 6 . London: Routledge, pp. 499–504. KALAJTZIDIS, J. (2013): Ethics of social consequences as a contemporary consequentialist theory. In: Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe) , 3(3–4), pp. 159–171. KALAJTZIDIS, J. (2017): Mravný subjekt v etike sociálnych dôsledkov a jeho komparácia v kontexte konzekvencializmu [Moral agent in the ethics of social consequences and its comparison in the context of consequentialism]. In: V. Gluchman (ed.): Etické myslenie minulosti a súčasnosti

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On two modern hybrid forms of consequentialism

Abstract

The article deals with two consequentialist theories and their comparison in terms of promoting certain values and evaluation of moral agents’ actions and behaviour. A basic presupposition is their mutual compatibility based primarily on their consequentialist nature. The paper searches for possible evidence that presented theories might be denominated as hybrid theories based on their dynamic transformations and it also searches for possible mutual enrichment of these theories/approaches as their examined similar character might be a good starting point for such goals. The nature of ethical values is questioned as well as the idea (supported by relevant argumentation) of not distinguishing ethical theories based on their implicit inclination towards usage of specific values. The paper confronts these traditional (classical) ideas of making such differentiation and thus strictly connecting specific moral values with specific ethical theories and not allowing possible productive associations. Ethics of social consequences and the theory of lesser evil are chosen as examples to prove that not limited approaches in terms of operation with only specific type of values might be productive. Their dynamic character predestines these theories to be hybrid ethical theories and thus compatible in their value structure and theory of right.

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Why Care About Robots? Empathy, Moral Standing, and the Language of Suffering

.1007/s10676–017–9442–4. Johnson, Deborah G. 2006. Computer systems: Moral entities but not moral agents. Ethics and Information Technology, 8 (4): 195–204. Kant, Immanuel. 1997. Lectures on Ethics , eds. P. Heath and J.B. Schneewind. Trans. P. Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 2012. Lectures on Anthropology , eds. A.W. Wood and R.B. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rosenthal-von der Pütten, Astrid M., Krämer, Nicole C., Hoffmann, Laura, Sobieray, Sabrina, and Sabrina C. Eimler. 2013. An Experimental

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G. E. Moore and theory of moral/right action in ethics of social consequences

bioethics. In: V. Gluchman (ed.): Bioethics in Central Europe: Methodology and Education . Prešov: FF PU, pp. 73–86. GLUCHMAN, V. (2012): Ethics of social consequences – methodology of bioethics education. In: Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe), 2(1–2), pp. 16–27. GLUCHMAN, V. (2016): Disaster issues in non-utilitarian consequentialism. In: Human Affairs , 26(1), pp. 52–62. GLUCHMAN, V. (2017): Nature of dignity and human dignity. In: Human Affairs , 27(2), pp. 131–144. GLUCHMANOVÁ, M. (2013): The Teacher as a Moral Agent: Humanity and

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Good Tax Governance: A Matter of Moral Responsibility and Transparency

normal to do, but what is proper and (morally) right to do. What is good behavior towards others and what is the good society to which one should aspire? Other individuals are “others with whom we interact personally, as well as those more distant who may be affected by what we do”, in the words of the moral philosopher Paine (1996, 478) . However, while it is necessary to consider others’ interests, morality does not demand that one does this at the expense of one’s own personal needs and aspirations. Moral agents may see to their own interests or the interest of

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Strategic and Tactical Totalization in the Totalitarian Epoch

, “the will of an administrative planning agency” substituted for “the will of the contract partners.” Loeber, supra note 41, at 129. The central mind—the Party—was “the brain, the conscience, the mind of the Soviet society.” The Party was the one “self-perpetuating organization.” Private action poses no threat to the totalitarian project as long as that action is directed by norms specified by the central mind, but it is a threat if directed by the reasoned deliberations and judgments of the independent moral agents. Thus, use of land was assigned to private

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