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In the paper, there is presented the theory of logical consequence operators indexed with taboo functions. It describes the mechanisms of logical inference in the environment of forbidden sentences. This kind of processes take place in ideological discourses within which their participants create various narrative worlds (mental worlds). A peculiar feature of ideological discourses is their association with taboo structures of deduction which penalize speech acts. The development of discourse involves, among others, transforming its deduction structure towards the proliferation of consequence operators and modifying penalty functions. The presented theory enables to define various processes of these transformations in the precise way. It may be used in analyses of conflicts between competing elm experts acting within a discourse.


The aim of the article is to present consumer attitudes in Poland in respect of modern solutions in the retail trade and the influence which these attitudes have on their behaviour in the market. The considerations were conducted using methods of logical inference, based on a critical analysis of available derivative sources and conclusions from quantitative research conducted on a sample of 1.075 consumers. In order to analyse more deeply the research results a cluster analysis was conducted using one of the hierarchical methods - the Ward’s method. Respondents’ attitudes towards modern solutions in the retail trade are generally positive. However they are not always recognized by them. A large percentage of respondents declared that they are not acquainted with particular forms of modern retail trade (mostly Beacon, PSS or RIFID systems). They were mostly consumers from the ‘retreated skeptics’ group, in other words the elderly with basic or vocational education from small towns and villages. The research findings presented may be used by trade enterprises in order to answer to the identified need of consumers from generation Z and to set out the direction of the technological education of consumers and increase the availability of particularised solutions

-1936 , S. Feferman, J. W. Dawson, Jr., S. C. Kleene, G. H. Moore, R. M. Solovay and J. van Heijenoort eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, and Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 144–195. 9. Gödel K. Collected Works , vol. I: Publications 1929-1936 , S. Feferman, J. W. Dawson, Jr., S. C. Kleene, G. H. Moore, R. M. Solovay and J. van Heijenoort eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, and Oxford: Clarendon Press. 10. Hamami, Y. Mathematical inference and logical inference, The Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (4), 2019, pp. 665–704. 11. Kahle, R. Is there a “Hilbert thesis

, an important philosophical result. One of the manifestation of the interaction of cognition and emotion is the growing interest shown in “affective computing” by scientists working in Artificial Intelligence. From the philosophical point of view, I would stress the crucial role of emotions in complementing mere logical inference in two essential ways: first, our emotional states set or at least constrain our goals. Emotions therefore set the stage for any rational calculation. Second, by narrowing the field of our attention to immediately relevant concerns

Symons, he is Chief-Editor of the Springer series on “Logic, Epistemo- logy, and the Unity of Science”. Professor Rahman’s work deals mainly with logical inferences in the context of History and Philosophy of Sci- ence. He visited the Centre for Philosophy of Sciences of the University of Lisbon between the 27th and 29th of October, 2015. On the ! rst day 1 I would like to thank Klaus Gärtner for his time and sympathy but mostly for his in- sightful revisions of this text. Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science 15, 2016 Center for the Philosophy of Sciences of

that not all speech acts are to be evaluated in terms of truth and falsity, is that they are unable to account for logical inference. Consider the inference ‘Joe is not bald. Therefore, not everyone is bald.’ Assume that ‘bald’ is a vague predicate, and let Joe be borderline bald. If, as Richard holds, the premise in the inference cannot be the assertion of the negation of Joe’s being bald, but is, rather, a sui generis denial, how could he possibly account for the fact that the inference at stake is a logically valid inference? Does not validity have to be

earlier, that in the absence of language or meta- representational capacities, animals cannot have propositional atti- tudes or engage in logical inference. Some philosophers take the existence of alternative explanations to show that there is no saying what the representational capacities of non-linguistic animals are. I believe that generalized scepticism about representational explanations of non-linguistic creatures has been 25 Josep Call, ibid; also Josep Call, ‘Descartes’ Two Errors: Reasoning and Ref- lection from a Comparative Perspective’, in S. Hurley

(however important they may be for the individual mathematician, or in his communication with peers) should not be displayed in printed papers. Mac Lane comments: Proof in Mathematics is both a means to understand why some result holds and a way to achieve precision. As to precision, we have now stated an absolute standard of rigor: A Mathematical proof is rigorous when it is (or could be) written out in the first order predicate language L(ε) as a sequence of inferences from the axioms ZFC,41 each inference made according to one of the stated rules [of logical

be able to survive on his own in the Amazon forest or the Sahara desert. So, ‘without special preparation’ needs to be taken with a grain of salt. But, more importantly, a human would need some 20 years or so of development and learning before he or she could even begin to explore these environments. Development of this kind is not covered by the learning dimension in the way described by TH. Development, certainly in early life, is much more than making a selection between different types of reinforcement learning or logical inference. The difference