Search Results

1 - 10 of 205 items :

  • "jurisprudence" x
Clear All
Europeanisation effects in the court jurisprudence

le cinquantième anniversaire des traités de Rome: l’influence du droit national et de la jurisprudence des juridictions des états membres sur l’interpretation du droit communautaire 1957–2007 Luxembourg: Office des publications officielles des Communautés européennes, 2007. NOWAK, Janek, Tomasz (ed). EU Procedural Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. PAPP, Tekla (Eds.) Atipikus szerződések.(Atypical contracts), Budapest: Opten, 2015. SCHERMERS, Henry G. WAELBROECK, Denis F. Judicial Protection in the European Union. The Hague: Kluwer Law

Open access
Two Concepts of Freedom in Criminal Jurisprudence

I Introduction The goal of this essay is to identify and discuss two aspects of liberty by examining the distinction between act and omission in criminal jurisprudence. Criminal law makes a significant distinction between harmful actions and harmful omissions and, consequently, between killing and letting die. Any act that causes death is grounds for a homicide conviction – subject, of course, to the existence of the other elements necessary for establishing criminal liability, such as causation and mens rea . However, liability for death by omission is

Open access
Education Rights Development in Accordance with European Jurisprudence of Strasbourg

.iie.org; The jurisprudence of the European Court. [Online]Available http://journals.openedition.org/revus/ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948, Paris; United Nations Development Program. [Online] Available www.undp.org; UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, , Articles no 13 and 14, vol. 993, p. 3, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html [accessed 4 January 2018]. General Assembly

Open access
Interpretation Of “Equality Of Arms” In Jurisprudence Of AD Hoc Tribunals And ICC

., London, 2007 Report of the Secretary General , S/25704, 3 May 1993, para. 106, available at: http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_re808_1993_en.pdf Gabrielle McIntyre, Equality of Arms – Defining Human Rights in the Jurisprudence of the ICTY , The International Society for the Reform of the Criminal Law, 17 th Annual Conference, Convergence of Criminal Justice Systems: Building Bridges – Bridging the Gaps, Workshop 303 – Ethics, The Hague, Netherlands, 24-28 August, 2003. Joan Sloan “The International Criminal Tribunal for

Open access
Posner’s Folly: The End of Legal Pragmatism and Coercion’s Clarity

course of argument and debate and does not exist to the side of argument and debate.” (Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory , 96 Yale L.J. 1773–1800, 1796 (1989)). wrote some time ago, “Posner puts the cap on his anti-essentialist, anti-foundational, anti-rational (in the strong sense), anti-metaphysical, and deeply pragmatist view of the law, and it is perhaps superfluous for me to say that I agree with him on almost every point.” Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner’s Jurisprudence , 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1447, 1456 (1990) (referring to

Open access
Reflections About Public Property In The Romanian Constitutional System And Comparative Law – Selective Aspects

Abstract

What seems relevant for the present study to highlight is the approach evolving reflections about public property in the Romanian constitutional system and comparative law.

The subject of the scientific endeavour will be circumscribed to the scientific analysis of its parts, as follows: 1) Introduction. 2) Identification of constitutional rules on public property in Romanian constitutional system and comparative law. 3) Highlights of Romanian doctrine and comparative law on public property. 4. Highlights of jurisprudence regarding public property. 5) Conclusions.

Open access
Reflections on the Regulation of the Principle of Nondiscrimination in the Romanian Constitutions and in the International Bill of Rights – Selective Aspects

Abstract

At the onset of the study it is necessary to mention that its topic will be circumscribed to "Reflections on the regulation of the principle of non-discrimination in the Romanian Constitutions and in the International Bill of Human Rights - Selective aspects". By this approach, the proposed study opens a complex and complete vision, but not exhaustive, on the "Reflections on the regulation of non-discrimination in the Romanian Constitutions and in the International Bill of Human Rights - Selective aspects”. In the analysis of the International Bill of Human Rights, we will keep a symmetrical approach to identifying regulations concerning non-discrimination. The subject of the scientific endeavour will be circumscribed to the scientific analysis of its parts, as follows: 1. Preliminary considerations. 2. Identification of constitutional rules on the principle of nondiscrimination in the Romanian Constitutions. 3. Identification of rules on the non-discrimination in the International Bill of Human Rights. 4. The highlights of Romanian doctrine on the nondiscrimination. 5. Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court regarding non-discrimination (Selective aspects) 6. Conclusions

Open access
Barak’s Purposive Interpretation in Law as a Pattern of Constitutional Interpretative Fidelity

Abstract

Political jurisprudence points out that constitutional court judges sometimes act like political actors, and that their decisions are a function of strategic and ideological as much as legal considerations. Consequently, the proper role of the courts, notably in exercising their review of constitutionality, has been one of the most debated issues in modern political and legal theory. Part of the controversy is also how to measure the interpretative fidelity of judges to the constitutional texts, or conversely, the level of their political engagement. This paper argues for the reconsideration of Aharon Barak’s Purposive Interpretation in Law in that light. Barak’s work was intended to provide, in the first place, judges and other lawyers with a sort of judicial philosophy – a holistic system of legal reasoning, applying both to the interpretation of will, contract, statute and constitution. Nevertheless, these conventions of legal reasoning, modified and readapted, could well be used also as heuristic tools by the academics in measuring the interpretative fidelity of judges to various sources of law. Accordingly, this paper clings closely to the presentation of Barak’s precepts for the purposive interpretation of constitutions, by focusing on the notions of subjective and objective purpose in interpreting constitutions, and how the potential conflicts between these purposes are resolved.

Open access
Interpreters of the Constitution: The Problem of Typology

References 1. Alexy, Robert. A Theory of Legal Argumentation. The Theory of RationalDiscourse as Theory of Legal Justification. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. 2. Bergel, Jean Louis. Théorie générale du droit. Paris: Jurisprudence Générale Dalloz, 1999. 3. Diritto costituzionale. XVIII Edizione. Napoli: Gruppo Editoriale Esselibri - Simone, 2003. 4. Durkheim, Emile. Les Règles de la méthode sociologique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007. 5. Dworkin

Open access
From Milligan to Boumediene: Three Models of Emergency Jurisprudence in the American Supreme Court

From Milligan to Boumediene: Three Models of Emergency Jurisprudence in the American Supreme Court

This article aims to bring philosophical and legal aspects of the discussions of the problem of emergency together by employing classic philosophical views on the problem of emergency to categorize dominating paradigms of legal interpretation in the American Supreme Court.

In the first part of the article I review the American Supreme Court's case-history and single out three dominating legal paradigms for interpreting the problem of emergency: the rights model, the extra-legal model and the procedural model. I argue that the procedural model has been by far the most influential.

In the second part of the article I ask how this precedence has played out in the context of terrorism cases. I argue that the first four cases that were brought against the government confirmed the procedural model as the Court's primary model for evaluating legal problems related to emergencies. But I also argue that the Court's latest decision on this issue, Boumediene v. Bush from 2008, introduces a shift from the previous general tendency to rely primarily on a procedural model towards including substantial rights concerns.

Open access