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References: Bird, R. & Tarasov, A.V. (2002, March). Closing the Gap: Fiscal Imbalances and Intergovernmental Transfers in Developed Federations . Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Working Paper 02-02, Atlanta. Bitner, M. & Cichocki, K.S. (2012). Finanse podsektora samorządowego w wybranych krajach OECD w latach 1999–2010. Samorząd Terytorialny 1–2, 5–71. Cowell, F.A. (2011). Measuring Inequality . LSE Perspectives in Economic Analysis, New York: Oxford University Press. GDP by state all industry total (current dollar) . BEA, 4

Abstract

The years since the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent economic crash have witnessed significant changes to the funding of the local government system in Ireland. This paper outlines these developments, while, at the same time, exploring some of the most important future challenges relating to the financing of Irish local authorities. The dominant local government revenue issues of the last decade outlined here are fiscal autonomy and the balance between own-source income and central government grants, income differences between urban and rural councils, the Local Property Tax, changes in commercial rates and fiscal equalisation. In terms of fiscal dependency and equalisation, our findings show reductions in the vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances in the Irish local government system. Likely future challenges include the need to re-examine the balance between business taxes and non-business taxes, funding the expected growth in metropolitan areas and the financing options for capital investment by local authorities, including consideration of municipal bond issuance for the Greater Dublin Area.

Fiscal Imbalance and Fiscal Risks Management on the Regional Level

The aim of the paper was to evaluate usage of the fiscal instruments (mainly liabilities and fiscal risks management) in present practice of Czech regions. The current practice of fiscal instruments was explored particularly by the means of structured interviews in which representatives of all Czech regions participated. The survey showed different attitudes to debt/liabilities management exercised on the Czech regional level. An active debt management, as defined by the theory, has not been encountered in any of the Czech regions (except for the capital of Prague), although their representatives are convinced otherwise. Risk maps or risk matrixes are not usually created either but the risks connected with the regional budgets are monitored (especially currency risks and interest rate risks) and solved if necessary.

Abstract

This article focuses on the effects of corrections to the budgetary policy in eurozone economies. The goal of the text is to check if advancement in implementing modern tools of public management is helpful in the time of fiscal adjustment. We assume that the most important role of a performance approach in conducting fiscal policy is the ability of government to implement active policy meant as structural changes in the composition of public expenditures. In the case of the need to cut general levels of public spending, public sector managers who have knowledge of performance effects of public policies should be able to conduct fiscal adjustment in such a way as to minimise negative outcomes of spending correction on society. The structure of the text is as follows. First, we present some insights on the economic effects of fiscal adjustment. Then, we discuss the concept of performance management presented in the theory and policy agendas of international institutions such as the European Union or the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). Finally, we present the result of an empirical exercise that is designed to combine the level of advancement in implementing performance budgeting (PB) and the social cost of fiscal adjustment in eurozone economies. The most important finding of the research is that PB tools seem to have very limited usefulness in a time of fiscal adjustment. There is no statistical evidence that countries advanced in utilisation of PB tools conduct more active fiscal policy – approach of cutting all expenditures across the border by given percentage rather than looking at priorities and social outcomes of fiscal adjustment dominates in all cases.

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to analyse the effects of economic immigration on subnational government finance (SNG) in Poland. The goal to achieve is to answer the following research question: what are the fiscal effects of immigration on SNG budget revenues and expenditures. To answer this question, logarithmic models were developed. The analysis refers to the years 2007-2016. In this respect, data from Statistics Poland - referring to budget revenues and expenditures of communes, cities of district status, districts and voivodeships - were used. As far as immigration statistics are concerned, data from the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy were used. The results indicate an increase in both revenues and expenditures of SNG as a result of immigration. Such results can be explained inter alia by the nature of migration - research were focused on economic immigration. Results confirm that the level of employment of foreigners is one of the determinants shaping the fiscal effect of immigration. Moreover, the impact of economic immigration on SNG budget revenues and expenditures depends on the structure of this budget. This explains the differentiated results of the analysis of the impact of immigration on SNG in different countries. The positive correlation between immigration and SNG revenues in Poland can be associated with a high share of subnational governments in personal income tax revenues as this tax is one of the main categories of SNG revenues. Furthermore, results show that the impact of immigration on local government budgets in Poland is modest. This confirms the conclusions drawn by other authors (e.g. Auerbach and Oreopoulos), that in the long term, immigration cannot be considered as a potential instrument for resolving fiscal imbalances.

6. References Abid Hameed, Hammad Ashraf and Muhammed Ali Chaudhary (2008). Eternal Debt and its Impact on Economic Business Growth, International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, Issue 20. Asif Idrees Agha and Muhammad Saleem (2006). An Empirical Analysis of Fiscal Imbalances and Inflation in Pakistan, State Bank Research Bulletin vol. 4 NO.2, 2006 . Cunningham, R.T. (1993). The Effects of Debt Burden on Economic Growth in Heavily Indebted Nations, Journal of Economic Development, Vol. 18 No. 1. Dickey, D.A & Fuller, W.A. (1979) Distribution of

with citizens’ preferences. I analysed the preference-matching using the information about the structure of local society. The median voter model suggests that when there are more citizens in a municipality that demand cultural services more, the spending on culture is higher. The second group of variables defines the financial condition of the municipality. The revenues of the municipality and also the fiscal imbalance indicator are included in this group. This indicator represents the differences in the real elasticity of local fiscal policy. The third group of

References 1. Abbas, K., & Husain, F. (2006). Money, Income and Prices in Pakistan: A Bi-variate and Tri-variate Causality. South Asia Economic Journal, 7(1), 55-65 2. Agha, A. I., & Khan, M. S. (2006). An empirical analysis of fiscal imbalances and inflation in Pakistan. SBP research Bulletin, 2(2), 343-362. 3. Ahmed, M. (2002). Money-Income and Money-Price Causality in Selected SAARC Countries: Some Econometric Exercises. Indian Economic Journal, 50(1), 55-62. 4. Ashra, S., Chattopadhyay, S., & Chaudhuri, K. (2004). Deficit, money and price: The Indian

References 1. Afonso, A., 2003. Understanding the determinants of sovereign debt ratings: evident for the two leading agencies. Journal of Economics and Finance 27 (1), 56-74. 2. Afonso, A., P. Gomes, and Rother, P. (2007). What hides behind sovereign debt ratings?, ECB WorkingPaper Series, 711, January. 3. Afonso, A., Gomes, P., 2011. Do fiscal imbalances deteriorate sovereign debt ratings? Revue Économique 62 (6). 4. Afonso, A., Furceri, D. and Gomes, P. (2012). Sovereign credit ratings and financial markets linkages: Application to European data. Journal of

://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=truedb=bthAN=4503967site=ehost-livescope=site . Borge, L.E., Brueckner, J.K. (2014). Partial Fiscal Decentralization and Demand Responsiveness of the Local Public Sector: Theory and Evidence from Norway. Journal of Urban Economics , 80, 153–163. Retrieved from: http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~jkbrueck/coursereadings/Econ272Breadings/norway.pdf . Borge, L.E., Rattso, J. (2002). Spending Growth with Vertical Fiscal Imbalance: Decentralized Government Spending in Norway 1880-1990. Economics and Politics, 14 , 351–373. Dahlberg, M., Mork, E., Rattsø, J., Argen, H. (2008). Using a