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References Chalmers, David. 1996. The Conscious Mind . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chalmers, David. 2013. Panpsychism and panprotopsychism. The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 8: 1–35. [Online] Feser, Edward. 2004. Why Searle is a property dualist. [Online] Jackson, Frank. 1982. Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127–36. Jackson, Frank. 1986. What Mary didn’t know? Journal of Philosophy 83: 291–5. Kim, Jaegwon. 1978

. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. Howson, C. and Urbach, P. 1996. Scientiic Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach , 2 nd edition. Chicago: Open Court. Huxley, Thomas. 1874. On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata. Reprinted in Collected Essays . London, 1893-94. Jackson, Frank. 1982. Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32:127-136. James, William. 1890. The Principles of Psychology . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lindahl, B. I. B. 1997. Consciousness and Biological Evolution. The Journal of Theoretical Biology 187: 613-629. Meacham, C. (2008

References Corabi, Joseph. 2008. Pleasure’s Role in Evolution: A Response to Robinson. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15:78-86. James, William. 1890. The Principles of Psychology . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lipton, Peter. 2004. Inference to the Best Explanation . Second edition. London and New York: Routledge. Robinson, William S. 2007. Evolution and Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14:27-42.

) Consciousness Explained. Middlesex: Penguin Books. Greenfield, S. (1995) Journey to the Centers of the Mind. New York: Freeman and Company. Hirst, W. (1996) “Cognitive Aspects of Consciousness” in Gazzaniga (ed.) The Cognitive Neurosciences. Cambridge-Mass.: The MIT Press, pp. 1307-1320. Jackson, F. (1982) “The Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly, 32, pp. 127.136. -- (1997) “What Mary Didn’t Know” in Block, Flannagan, Guzeldere (eds.) The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.567-570. Johnson-Laird, P. (1987) “How

’s Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument , P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, and D. Stoljar (eds.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 333–64. Jackson, Frank 1982. Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127–36. Jackson, Frank 2003. Mind and Illusion. In Minds and Persons: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53 . A. O’Hear (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 251–71. Jackson, F. 2007. The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism. In Phenomenal Knowledge and Phenomenal Concepts: New

Bibliography Chalmers D (1996) The Conscious Mind. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Fumerton R (2013) Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gazzaniga M (1971) The split brain in man. In Thompson R (ed) Physiological psychology. San Francisco, CA: Freeman, pp. 118-123. Hume D (1951) A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jackson F (1982) Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32(*): 127-136. Kant I (1964) Critique of Pure Reason . London: Macmillan. Kirk R (1974a

. Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 49(*): 101-120. Walter S (2009) Epiphenomenalism. In McLaughlin BP, Beckermann A and Walter S (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind . Oxford: Clarendon Press.

impossibility is possible. The science has shown its possibility by explaining its actual- ity in systematic law-like ways.23 over the last three to four decades they have been notably unsuccessful. They often covertly entail epiphenomenalism. What is scientifically clear is that there is causation that involves contentful states with contentful structures. Such states are individuated and explained partly in terms of their roles in law-like causal patterns. The psychological states have causal powers. These powers produce patterns of computational transitions in