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Bibliografie BEČKA, Josef V.: O neurčitých výrazech v jazyce novin. In: Naše řeč, 1939, roč. 23, č. 9 – 10, s. 257 – 270. BERKA, Karel – RYBOVÁ, Jarmila: Logika a metodologie pro novináře. Praha: Novinář 1988. BURGESS, John Alexander: The Sorites Paradox and Higher-Order Vagueness. Synthese, 1990, 85, s. 417 – 74. COOK, Guy: Genetically Modified Language. London: Routledge 2004. CUTTING, Joan: Introduction to Vague Language Explored. France: Springer 2007. DE HAAN, Ferdinand: Evidentiality and Epistemic Modality: Setting Boundaries. In: Southwest Journal of

References Åkerman, Jonas and Greenough, Patrick. 2010. Hold the Context Fixed: Vagueness Still Remains. In Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, and its Logic . Edited by Dietz, Richard and Moruzzi, Sebastian. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 275-88. Bobzien, Susanne. 2010. Higher-order Vagueness, Radical Unclarity, and Absolute Agnosticism. Philosophers’ Imprint 10: 1-30. Bobzien, Susanne. 2012. If it’s Clear, then it’s Clear that it’s Clear, or is it? Bobzien, Susanne Higher-order Vagueness and the S4 Axiom. In Episteme, etc. Edited by Katerina

References Fine, Kit. 1975. Vagueness, Truth and Logic. Synthese 30: 265–300. Keefe, Rosanna. 2000a. Supervaluationism and Validity. Philosophical Topics 28: 93–105. Keefe, Rosanna. 2000b. Theories of Vagueness . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Montminy, Martin. 2008. Supervaluationism, Validity and Necessarily Borderline Sentences. Analysis 68: 61–67. Varzi, Achille. 2007. Supervaluationism and its Logic. Mind 116: 633–676. Williamson, Timothy. 1994. Vagueness . London: Routledge.

REFERENCES Barker, Ch., (2002), “The Dynamics of Vagueness”, Linguistics and Philosophy 25, 1–36. Barker, Ch., (2013), “Negotiating Taste”, Inquiry: an Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy , 56:2–3, 240–257. Braun, D., (2015), “Indexicals”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, . Kamp, H. (1975), “Two theories about adjectives”, [In:] E. L. Keenan (Ed.), Formal semantics of natural language , 123–155. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Karczewska, N. (forthcoming in 2016

References Eklund, Matti. 2001. Supervaluationism, vagueifiers, and semantic overdetermination. Dialectica 55: 363-378. Field, Hartry. 2003. The semantic paradoxes and the paradoxes of vagueness. In Liars and Heaps, New Essays on Paradox. Edited by J.C. Beall. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Field, Hartry. 2008. Saving Truth from Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fine, Kit. 1975. Vagueness, truth and logic. Synthese 30: 265-300. Graff Fara, Delia. 2000. Shifting sands. Philosophical Topics 28: 45-81. Gupta, Anil and Nuel Belnap. 1993. The Revision Theory

reality. In Modality and Tense . Oxford University Press. Fitch, G. and Nelson, M. (2007). Singular propositions. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Hawley, K. (2002). Vagueness and existence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , CII (2):125-140. Lewis, D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds . Blackwell. Linsky, B. and Zalta, E. N. (1994). In defense of the simplest quantifed modal logic. In E.Tomberlin, J., editor, Philosophical Perspectives , volume 8, pages 431-58. Atascadero: Ridgeview. Linsky, B. and


What is discussed in the present paper is the assumption concerning a human narrowed sense of perception of external world and, resulting from this, a basically approximate nature of concepts that are to portray it. Apart from the perceptual vagueness, other types of vagueness are also discussed, involving both the nature of things, indeterminacy of linguistic expressions and psycho-sociological conditioning of discourse actions in one language and in translational contexts. The second part of the paper discusses the concept of conceptual and linguistic resemblance (similarity, equivalence) and discourse approximating strategies and proposes a Resemblance Matrix, presenting ways used to narrow the approximation gap between the interacting parties in monolingual and translational discourses.


Epistemic relativism comes in many forms, which have been much discussed in the last decade or so in analytic epistemology. My goal is to defend a version of epistemic relativism that sources the relativity in the metaphysics of epistemic properties and relations, most saliently knowledge. I contrast it with other relativist theses. I argue that the sort of metaphysical relativism about knowledge I favor does not threaten the objectivity of the epistemological domain.


The promise of Newtonian science to create a universal precise explanation of all phenomena seems to be out-dated. “Cutting through complexity” may kill potential solutions. The complexity of real phenomena should be accepted and at best tamed by appropriate techniques. Complexity, a recent megatrend in the sciences, may effectuate another scientific revolution.

References [1] Granik, A. and Caulfield, H.J. (2001), Fuzziness in Quantum Mechanics, arXiv:quant-ph/0107054v1. [2] Alvarez, D.S. and Skarmeta, A:F.G. (2004), A fuzzy language, Fuzzy Sets and Systems , 141, 335–390. [3] James F. Baldwin, Trevor P. Martin, and Maria Vargas-Vera (1999). Fril++ a Language for Object-Oriented Programming with Uncertainty. In Anca L. Ralescu and James G. Shanahan (editors), Fuzzy Logic in Artificial Intelligence , volume 1566 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 62–78. [4] Max Black (1937). Vagueness. An