theological ethics in the world church: the plenary papers from Padua, New York, Continuum, 167-175, 292-293, 2007.
Junker-Kenny, Religion and publicreason. A comparison of the positions of John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas and Paul Ricoeur, De Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 2014.
Junker-Kenny, Approaches to theological ethics. Sources, traditions, visions, Bloomsbury, London, New York, forthcoming 2019.
Klöcker K., Freiheit im Fadenkreuz. Terrorbekämpfung als christlich-ethische Herausforderung, Herder, Freiburg, 2017.
LaCocque A., Ricoeur P., Thinking
The most recent phase of global capitalism has been characterised by neoliberal arguments which have supported the deregulation of large sectors of world financial markets. This phenomenon has led to so-called financialization with capital attempting to separate itself from the material base of the economy. The instability of this form of economic activity in addition to the highly attractive short-term returns the financial sector has offered has been the main driver of the current global financial crisis.
This article will seek to examine the manners in which global regulatory frameworks can be reformed to ameliorate the current crisis and create an institutional architecture that will be robust to future shocks. It will be argued that reform needs to proceed in two directions depth and breadth. During the neoliberal phase of economic development, the public discourse on economic policy has centred on arguments based solely upon economic value, it will be suggested that a reformed framework needs to take into account and admit into the space of public reasons, ethical, aesthetic and civic arguments. This is due to the highly volatile nature of economic value and the necessity to acknowledge that in addition to being producers and consumers economic agents are also people.
In a similar vein following the work of Karl-Otto Apel on the public sphere, international regulatory institutions should take into consideration and be accountable to all those effected by their policies and actions. Given the increasingly integrated nature of the European and World economies agencies need to be rendered democratic
Epistocracy, the rule by the experts or educated, poses a significant challenge to authentic democratic rule. Epistocrats typically reason from the premise, “experts have knowledge of political truths” to the conclusion, “experts should have the authority to rule.” There may be powerful moral reasons for thinking that the inference is fallacious. Invoking a public reason standard of acceptability, David Estlund makes a powerful argument of this sort. I argue that Estlund’s argument against epistocracy overlooks democratic epistemology, which can and should be utilized to strengthen the epistemic merits of a democratic rule. I therefore examine whether democratic democracy’s epistemic value can rest on a formal epistemic model. The inadequacy of the formal epistemic model leads us to defend democratic epistemology differently. This will be defended in two ways. The first step will be to cast doubt into the epistemic merits of expert rule in two ways. First, experts sometimes do not have access to privileged information of citizens who bear the consequences of expert decisions. Second, experts themselves can be biased. I argue that democratic deliberation can offset those two disadvantages of expert rule. The second step will be to examine the epistemic values of inclusive democratic rule.
Within itself the political conception does without the concept of truth... Once we accept the fact that reasonable pluralism is a permanent condition of public culture under free institutions. Holding a political conception as true, and for that reason alone the one suitable basis of publicreason, is exclusive, even sectarian, and so like to foster political division.
–John Rawls (1995, 94, 129).
Pluralism Today: A Fait Accompli
Because it obeys the law of neutrality in matters of religious and cultural values, the liberal order opens up an array of
Daukšas, D 2013, ‘Lithuanians in Norway: between ‘here’ and ‘there’’, Urbanities, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 51-68.
Dzenovska, D 2010, ‘Publicreason and the limits of liberal antiracism in Latvia’, Ethnos, vol. 75, no. 4, pp. 496-525, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00141844.2010.535125.
Dzenovska, D 2013, ‘Historical agency and the coloniality of power in postsocialist Europe’, Anthropological Theory, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 394-416, DOI: 10.1177/1463499613502185.
ECRI-The European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, 2007
Human Rights and the Question of Secularization and Re-Sacralization
Marius Timmann Mjaaland
series of such military interventions justified with reference to human rights concerns. It started with the NATO intervention in Libya, which lacked UN mandate, but was effective in the sense that the regime collapsed ( Terry 2015 ). As Terry points out, the publicreason given for the intervention was to protect the citizens of Benghazi (captured by rebels) from a humanitarian disaster. The reason was thus humanitarian, playing on the duty of protecting civilians. Still, how many civilians were killed by more than 14,000 bombing attacks over six months?
focus on what the law should be on the basis of some select normative factor. Normative basis for such theories include welfare maximization This underpins the “law and economics” movement. , rational principles of justice, John Rawls, A Theory Of Justice (Revised ed. Harv. Univ. Press 1999). or metaphysical theories of human flourishing John Finnis , Commensuration and PublicReason: Reason in Action , in 1 Collected Essays (2011). . Other theories are more openly based on legal precepts, as is the case of Dworkin’s theory of constitutional rights as trumps
distinction grounded in their religious convictions and publicreason, For philosophical articulations and defenses of this distinction, see S HERIF G IRGIS , R YAN T. A NDERSON , & R OBERT P. G EORGE , W HAT IS M ARRIAGE ?: M AN AND W OMAN : A D EFENSE (2012); Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, C ONJUGAL U NION : W HAT M ARRIAGE IS AND WHY IT M ATTERS (2014). Of course, there are skeptics of this view. Andrew Koppelman, Judging the Case Against Same-Sex Marriage , 2014 u. I LL . l. R EV . 431. And there are replies to these skeptics. Sherif Girgis, Windsor