Search Results

1 - 4 of 4 items :

  • "Polish public opinion" x
Clear All


The bloody conflict which was taking place in South Africa in the years 1899-1902 was followed with a great interest by Polish public opinion. Its greatest part strongly sympathized with the Boer republics. Their burgers were idealized and presented by the Polish press as brave fighters for independence, who dared to stand up against the world empire to defend their rights while Great Britain was attributed full responsibility for the outbreak of the war. For many Poles the Boers personified the general idea of freedom fighters and symbolized all suppressed nations. Their sad fate seemed to be quite similar to the Polish one and this similarity was the main source of sympathy toward defenders of the Transvaal and Free Orange State. Voices of few Polish intellectuals, who called for a more objective and not so emotional view on the war, could not change the pro-Boers stance of the greatest part of Polish public opinion.


The dissemination of the media has led to the phenomenon of the mediatization of social reality, which in the era of new media has become dominant, because the new media have infiltrated almost every aspect of human functioning. The surprising paradox of the new media is the fact that on the one hand they give access to almost unlimited information, on the other hand they narrow it down extremely. The modern media user, often without realizing it, “uses” only the information that is offered to him by specially selected internet algorithms. Created in this way the so-called “information/filter bubble” condemns him to the only vision of reality - and in the absence of the possibility of verifying his observations what results from the way the new media works - in his opinion the only true one. This is particularly important in creating the vision of social order and the functioning of the state. The mediatisation of Polish social reality - especially in the context of social media - led to the emergence of polarized groups isolated from each other and caused a lack of rational political debate on a number of important social issues.

University Press, Frentzel-Zagórska, J. and Zagórski, K. (1993). Polish Public Opinion on Privatization and State Interventionism. Europe-Asia Studies, 45 (4): 705–728, Fuchs, D., Guidorossi, G. and Svensson, P. (1995). Support for the Democratic system. In: H.-D. Klingemann and D. Fichs (eds.), Citizens and the State. Oxford–London: Oxford University Press. Fuchs, D. and Roler, E. (2006). Support of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. International Journal of


The purpose of this study is to investigate anti-EU and anti- LGBT attitudes in Poland on the basis of quantitative evidence (statistical data) and qualitative evidence (discourse analysis of statements expressed on the Internet). As Euroscepticism seems to frequently appear in conjunction with prejudice against LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual or transgender) persons, the task of this article is to find out whether they may have a common foundation and what it may be.

A possible answer, as the article argues, is that both attitudes could be considered symptoms of a deeper, more wide-ranging and fundamental problem-a fear, tension, or anxiety caused by social change, especially the fragmentation of dominant collective (national) identity. The case for such an interpretation of the situation is first made on the basis of existing academic literature and statistical data provided by Eurobarometer and the Polish Public Opinion Research Centre (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, CBOS). However, as the text further argues, such quantitative methods have their limitations and should be supported and illustrated with qualitative studies. The article thus proposes an alternative discourse-oriented approach, namely critical discourse analysis (CDA). This approach is used to conduct an introductory, presentational analysis of some examples of anti-EU and anti-LGBT discourse found on the Internet.

This analysis shows that sexual minorities represent values so strange and foreign to Polish conservatives that they can only be conceptualized as something imposed by the power which is both new and distant-by Brussels. And the other way round, the European Union’s liberalism and espousal of human rights, including women’s and LGBT rights, makes it impossible for the conservative parts of the Polish society to accept a “European identity”. This means that Euroscepticism and LGBT prejudice are not just occasionally, coincidentally connected expressions of an underlying resistance to change, but that a closer relationship exists between them. Namely, the conservative reluctance or hostility towards both the EU and LGBT is caused by their incompatibility with the patriotic and religious national identity construction.