Mandatory pension systems occupy a central role in the system of social security because of the share of social expenditure in national economies. One of the goals of pension system is to redistribute incomes among individuals. However, it is not clear how the intentions to redistribute incomes coincide with the outcomes. In this paper, we will study the difference between the intentions as they are articulated within institutions, with the outcomes that are generated by them. We use the method of comparative institutional analysis in order to find out the differences. Our comparative institutional analysis is based on the grammar of institutions that is proposed by Crawford and Ostrom. Also, in order to understand the differences, we will compare the institutions in relatively similar cases – the Baltic States. The results show that there is a gap between the intentions and outcomes to redistribute incomes among individuals. The findings from the comparative institutional analysis suggest that the most redistributive old age pension system is in Estonia. However, according to the factual information from Eurostat, the greatest distributive effect is produced by the mandatory pension system of Lithuania.
In several developed countries, the baby boomers will come to retire in the next decades. This problem will threaten the sustainability and the intergenerational equity of mandatory pay-as-you-go pension systems because they will have to drain the “demographic wave” of retirees with a relatively small number of contributors. In this paper, we give the operating method developed on the basis of a general principle, which a defined contribution pension system, in a state of stable sustainability, should adopt to control these issues in the presence of a demographic wave. In the theoretical profile, our approach breaks and overcomes the classical juxtaposition between funded and pay-as-you-go pension schemes, carrying out the integration of the two financial methods.
savings. As mentioned before, the CEE countries are similar in terms of the architecture of their pension systems. However, not only the design itself but also, to a large extent, the parametric settings reflect the principles underlying the social policy, which could potentially influence the performance of the non-mandatorypensionsystem in terms of coverage and accumulated pension savings. The issue of the similarity of pension systems in the CEE region and their outcomes can be regarded with reference to the more general term of the social model. Some studies