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References Arnold, R. D. (1987). Political Control of Administrative Officials. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organisations , 3(2), 279–286. Arrow, K. J. et al. (1996). Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health and Safety Regulation . Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press. Ayres, I. & Braithwaite, J. (1992). Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bednářová, P. (2018). How Expensive Transparent Lobbying Is. ACC Journal , 24(2). Liberec: Technická univerzita v Liberci. Commission of

References AIE et al. (2015). The International Standards for Lobbying Regulation. Access Info Europe, Open Knowledge, Sunlight Foundation, Transparency International. Retrieved May 30, 2017, from AIE. (2015). Lobbying Transparency via the Right to Information. Access Info Europe. Retrieved May 30, 2017, from Begg, I. (2006). Economic Policy and institutional transparency. In Oxelheim, L. (ed.). Transparency Corporate and

References BEAUMONT, E. (1999). Democracy and public administration reform linked. The Public Manager, 28(1): 47-50. BELLVER, A. and D. KAUFMANN. (2005). Transparenting Transparency: Initial Empirics and Policy Applications. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. BENNEDSEN, M. and S. E. FELDMAN. (2002). Lobbying Legislatures. Journal of Political Economy, 110(4): 919-946. DOI: 10.1086/340775 BUNTING, R. (2004). The new peer review watchword. The CPA Journal, 74(10): 6-9. CAMPOS, N. F., and F. GIOVANNONI. (2007). Lobbying, corruption and political influence

References Bitonti, A., & Harris, P. (2017). An introduction to lobbying and public affairs. In A. Bitonti and P. Harris (Eds), Lobbying in Europe: Public affairs and the lobbying industry in 28 EU countries (pp. 1-16). Basingstoke: Palgrave. Byrne, E. (2012). Political corruption in Ireland 1922-2010: A crooked harp? Manchester: Manchester University Press. Chari, R., Hogan, J., & Murphy, G. (2010). Regulating lobbying: A global comparison. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Chari, R., Murphy, G., & Hogan, J. (2007). Regulating lobbyists: A comparative

References Acocella, N., (2005). Economic Policy in the Age of Globalisation , Cambridge University Press, pp. 116-117. Ball, R. J., (1995). Interest Group, Influence and Welfare, Economics and Politics , vol. 7/1995. Bednářová, P., (2018a.). How Expensive Transparent Lobbying Is. ACC Journal , 24 (2), pp. 7-19. DOI: 10.15240/tul/004/2018-2-001. Bednářová, P., (2018b). What Benefits Does Transparent Lobbying Bring. DANUBE: Law and Economics Review , 9 (3), pp. 193-205. DOI: 10.2478/danb-2018-0012. Bénassy-Quéré, A., Coeuré, B., Jacquet, P., Pisani – Ferry, J

, Johansson & Larsson ( 2015 : 129) also argue that the recent growth in the PR industry can be linked to change in the corporatist system in Sweden, especially from the 1980s and onwards. Where unions, business firms and interest groups used to find themselves widely represented in government committees and other government bodies, today the same groups seek instead to achieve influence through, among other things, lobbyism and opinion building in the news media. In Denmark, where the development of PR has been less in focus, Kristensen ( 2004 , 2009 ) registers a growth

References Centrul de resurse juridice – „Cercetare privind reglementarea activităților de lobby” – 2002 Commission of the European Communities – „A Green Paper on the European Transparency Initiative” – Brussels, 2006 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly – „Lobbying in a democratic society (European Code of conduct on lobbying): Report Committee on Economic Affairs and Development” - Strasbourg, 2009 Elena Simina Tănăsescu, Miruna Andreea Balosin, Cosmin Dima, Cristian Ducu, Ștefan-Ilie Oanţă, Ramona-Delia Popescu – „Lobby în România vs. lobby în UE” – IER

, SJ PARK, and J. ZDANOWICZ. “Estimating the magnitude of capital flight due to abnormal pricing in international trade. The Russia-USA case.” Accounting Forum, 2005: 249-270. 11. BOZIO, A., R. DAUVERGNE, B. FABRE, J. GOUPILLE, and O. MESLIN. Fiscalité et redistribution en France 1997-2012. Mars, Institut des politiques publiques, Paris: , 2012. 12. BRASHER, H, and D LOWERY. “The corporate context of lobbying activity.” Business and Politics 8/1, 2006: 1. 13. BRENNAN, G., and JM. BUCHANAN. The power to tax. Analytic foundation of a fiscal constitution


Hypercompetition is at the very center of modern economies. As a consequence, both states and enterprises have been heavily engaged in an amoral power game () based exclusively on strength where tax systems have a prominent role. An obscure fiscal war takes place firstly between states seeking to increase their attractiveness. On the other hand, firms fight against states to optimize their revenues. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to discuss the components and the implications of the competition between states expressed through the establishment of tax havens and the launch of merciless fiscal policies. At the same time, enterprises try to shape the existing laws in a manner that favors their interests, using also aggressive fiscal strategies.

. 2012. Lobbying institutional key players. Journal of Common Market Studies , 50(1), pp. 129–150. Publication of the Centre for Eastern Studies, 28.03.2012. Limited EU Economic Sanctions on Belarus < > [Accessed 15 May 2013]. Radio Free Europe, 14.06.2013. Interview: Lithuania’s Foreign Minister Sees Eastern Promise for EU Presidency , < > [Accessed 20 May 2013]. Raik, K