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This paper evaluates the impact of austerity measures on national social protection mechanisms and on the European Social Model. The study is based on an in-depth analysis of austerity measures adopted in Italy and Portugal and the evolution of several indicators, such as unemployment rates and the percentage of citizens at risk of poverty.
The analysis demonstrates that measures adopted in the field of new economic governance have had an impact on the organization and provision of SGEIs and have affected the solidity of the national welfare state. It will be argued that in this context the promotion of a social dimension of the EU requires innovative methods for the regulation of new economic governance.
The present special issue of Perspectives on Federalism reflects on the nature and characteristics of solidarity within a supranational context, it explains what solidarity has meant so far in the EU, how much solidarity we had during the crisis, what type of solidarity is needed and how to build it. It focuses on the new economic governance and its solidarity mechanisms during and after the economic crisis but tackles other related fields such as its impact on services of general economic interest or the European budget, as well as other areas where solidarity is also discussed such as the free movement of persons.
This monographic issue has its origin in the International Conference “Solidarity in Hard Times. Solidarity and the European Social Model in times of economic crisis” organized by the University Institute for European Studies (IDEE) on 11-12 June 2015 in Madrid, within the Jean Monnet Network MoreEU (“More Europe to overcome the crisis”).
Contributions in this special issue argue make a number of points with regard to the urgent need to change the economic governance of the Eurozone, pointing at some tools to increase its spending capacity. The process of potential fragmentation ignited by the recent vote on Brexit make such changes even more urgent, signalling the need to provide concrete responses to citizens, in order to show that the euro area, and the EU at large, are able to satisfy some of their crucial needs. The papers which make up this special issue were presented in Florence, at a meeting held in the framework of a Jean Monnet + Project called MoreEU. The first section deals with the reform of the budget; the second with a further use of quantitative easing and the role of the ECB.
-Beiträge zu den Europäischen Verfassungswissenschaften , XII(1).
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• Cooper Ian, 2017, ‘The Emerging Order of Interparliamentary Cooperation in the Post-Lisbon EU’, in Jancic Davor (ed), National Parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty and the Euro Crisis , Oxford University Press, Oxford, 227-246.
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‘Article 13 Conference’ on EconomicGovernance’, Comparative European Politics , XIV(2): 196–214.
• Cooper Ian, 2016b, ‘The Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance (the “Article 13 Conference”),’ in Lupo Nicola and Fasone Cristina (eds), Interparliamentary Cooperation in the Composite European Constitution , Hart Publishing, Oxford, 247-267.
• Cooper Ian, 2015, ‘The Nordic Parliaments and the EU,’ in Caroline Howard Grøn, Peter Nedergaard and Anders Wivel (eds), Still the other European Community? The Nordic
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The Council is a crucial intergovernmental institution of the European Union. However, the complex, opaque and consensual character of the decision-making process in the Council puts its legitimacy into question. Intergovernmentalist theory posits that it is sufficiently legitimised, indirectly, by the member state governments. Constructivist research, on the other hand, suggests that socialisation might disturb the relaying of positions from the national to the supranational level, as the former approach implies. This paper aims to explore these issues, in particular related to representation and consensus. It contains an analysis of material generated in in-depth interviews. The Capital Markets Union (CMU) initiative serves as an umbrella term for regulatory changes directed at the overall development of European capital markets. As such, when analysing the legal framework of the CMU, it is important to note that this involves an undertaking which goes beyond the regulation of financial systems, also aiming to achieve supervisory convergence throughout the member states of the European Union. Indeed, it is perhaps one of the clearest examples of federal implications within the EU. All the synchronous movements enacted into law, leading towards harmonisation and supervisory convergence, show us that the CMU is an foundational piece in a collective journey towards ever greater integration in terms of economic governance and economic policies. Nonetheless, even if the CMU is one of the few cross-country risk-sharing mechanisms available to the EU, its implementation faces difficulties (as well as the looming Brexit) that demand careful analysis.