1. Carubba, Clifford J., and Murrah Lacey. “Legal Integration and Use of the Preliminary Ruling Process in the European Union.” International Organization Vol. 59, No. 2 (Spring, 2005): 399–418.
2. Claes, Monica. “The Validity and Primacy of EU Law and the ‘Cooperative Relationship’ between National Constitutional Courts and the CourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion.” Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Vol. 1 (2016): 151–170.
3. Craig, Paul, and Gráinne de Búrca. EU law: text, cases, and materials . 5 th ed
The paper analyses and evaluates the linguistic policy of the Court of Justice of the European Union against the background of other multilingual courts and in the light of theories of legal interpretation. Multilingualism has a direct impact upon legal interpretation at the Court, displacing traditional approaches (intentionalism, textualism) with a hermeneutic paradigm. It also creates challenges to the acceptance of the Court’s case-law in the Member States, which seem to have been adequately tackled by the Court’s idiosyncratic translation policy.
The article examines the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on Public Procurement issues. On the one hand, the paper analyzes the control exercised by the Court in this area while the Member States implement the Public Procurement Directives by transposing them into national law or by administrative practice which is subject to judicial review. The Court's control is executed through the interpretation of provisions and through actions taken by the European Commission against Member States for breaches of EU law in the area of Public Procurement. On the other hand, in the references for a preliminary ruling, the Court of Justice of the EU defines some basic terms, such as 'public procurement' (at Union level), a contractor, a minimum threshold, etc., and affirms the key principles that must be respected for the fulfilment of Public Procurement objectives such as transparency, competition and equal treatment. The article aims to show the contribution of the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union to the development and uniform application of Public Procurement legislation in the Member States and facilitates the functioning of the Internal market
The Constitutional Court of Romania has subjected the introduction of a norm of European Union law into the constitutionality control, as an interposed norm to the standard norm. On the one hand, the norm should be sufficiently clear, precise and unequivocal in itself, or its meaning should have been clearly, precisely and unequivocally established by the Court of Justice of the European Union, and on the other hand it should be circumscribed by a certain level of constitutional relevance, so that its normative content could support the possible breach of the Constitution - the only direct standard norm within the constitutionality control - by national law. However, the experience of the Constitutional Court of Romania over the eight years (2007-2014) since the EU accession, does not seem to be very convincing, irrespective of the way in which European Union law, including the case law of the CJUE has been used: as justifying or circumstantial argument, as a mere reference or in an inadequate context.
The present paper presents the obligation that courts in the member states of the European Union have to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, with a focus on courts against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under national law. The paper starts by presenting the applicable framework regarding the preliminary reference procedure, then focuses on analyzing the exceptions to national court’s duty under article 267 TFEU, with a focus on the direction in which the case law is heading based on the most recent judgments handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2015, finally presenting the author’s conclusions and observation on the subject.
European Union, and criminal, laws had been interacting in many ways even before explicit competence in criminal matters was acquired by the Union in the Treaty of Maastricht. Such intersections between supranational and national provisions have frequently been handled by the CJEU. In the main, the intervention of the Court is triggered by Member States’ recourse to penal sanctions in situations covered by EU law. In such cases, the CJEU is called upon to strike a complicated balance: it has to deal with Member States’ claims of competence in criminal law, whilst ensuring that that power is used consistently with EU law. By making reference to selected cases, this paper highlights the impact that principles established in the context of the fundamental freedoms can have on EU criminal law.
European Union (EU) was founded to strengthen European integration through purely economic cooperation while disregarding human rights. However, throughout its existence the EU has been challenged to take a stand on human rights. In fact, the application and promotion of human rights has increased significantly in recent years, especially during the last 15 years, mainly thanks to the establishment of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000. Through the selected cases concerning emergency medical services, this paper examines how the arguments of the European Court of Justice have eventually been shifting from purely economic ideology towards more human rights based approach. However, the article essentially argues that the full potential of human rights to support the claims that are inherently economic in their nature has not yet been utilized and therefore the essential aim of the Charter to strengthen human rights protection in the EU remains unachieved.
The article analyses the decision of the EU Court of Justice in Coman in which the Court derived residence rights for spouses in the same-sex marriages. The article outlines the basic grounds of the judgement and critically appraises them in the context of EU primary as well as secondary law and especially Directive 2004/38. The article raises concerns about the division of competences between the EU and its Member States, extended interpretation of the term “spouse” in the context of EU law, human rights considerations as well as potential effects of the decision on national family law.
The paper deals with the changes in the centralized (Kelsenian) model of constitutional review resulting from a state’s membership of the EU, which unequivocally demonstrates the decomposition of the classic paradigm of constitutional judiciary. The main point raised in the paper is that European integration has fundamentally influenced on the four above-mentioned basic elements of the Kelsenian model of constitutional review of legislation, which are the following: the assumption of the hierarchical construction of a legal system; the assumption of the supreme legal force of the constitution as the primary normative act of a given system; a centralised model of reviewing hierarchical conformity of legal norms; coherence of the system guaranteed by a constitutional court’s power to declare defectiveness of a norm and the latter’s derogation. All its fundamental elements have evolved, i.e. the hierarchy of the legal system, the overriding power of the constitution, centralized control of constitutionality, and the erga omnes effect of the ruling on the hierarchical non-conformity of the norms. It should be noted that over the last decade the dynamics of these changes have definitely gained momentum. This has been influenced by several factors, including the “great accession” of 2004, the pursuit of formal constitutionalization of the EU through the Constitutional Treaty, the compromise solutions adopted in the Treaty of Lisbon, the entry into force of the Charter, and the prospect of EU accession to the ECHR. The CJEU has used these factors to deepen the tendencies towards decentralization of constitutional control, by atomising national judicial systems and relativizing the effects of constitutional court rulings within national legal systems. The end result is the observed phenomenon, if not of marginalisation, then at least of a systemic shift in the position of constitutional courts, which have lost their uniqueness and have become “only ones of many” national courts.
1. Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies, Giorgio Monti - European Union Law: Cases and Materials 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010;
2. Paul Craig, Grainne de Burca - EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 5th Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011;
Judgments of the CourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion:
3. Joined Cases 28 to 30/62 – Da Costa v Nederlandse Belastingadministratie (1963) ECR 31
4. Case C-283/81 - Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health. (1982)
5. Case C-224