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References [Albers, 1821] Albers, H. C. (1821). Unterricht im Schachspiele . Herold Und Wahlstab, Lüneburg. [Beasley, 2010] Beasley, J. (2010). Towards ECV 3. Variant Chess , 64:174–189. [Cazaux and Knowlton, 2017] Cazaux, J. L. and Knowlton, R. (2017). A World of Chess: Its Development and Variations Through Centuries and Civilizations. McFarland & Company, Jefferson. [der Linde, 1881] der Linde, A. V. (1881). Quellenstudien zur Geschichte des Schachspiels . J. Springer, Berlin. [Markov and Härtel, ] Markov, G. and Härtel, S. Turkish great chess and chinese

References Anonymous (1819). Archiv der Spiele, oder fortlaufende Beschreibung aller Spiele der Vorwelt und Mitwelt. Erstes Heft. Berlin: Ludwig Wilhelm Wittig. - (1846). “Persian Chess”. In: Chess Player’s Chronicle 6, pp. 211-213, 252-253, 278-280. Aslanov, N. (1964). “Shakhmaty v Turkmenskoi SSR”. In: Shakhmatny Slovar. Ed. by G. Geiler. In Russian. Moscow: Fizkul’tura i Sport, pp. 89-91. Chernevski, A. (1877). “Shakhmaty v Turkestane”. In: Shakhmatny Listok 9-10. In Russian, pp. 268-270. Cox, H. (1801). “On the Burmha Game of Chess; compared with the Indian

people with haemophilia (PwH) is influenced by factors that are important to them, including prophylaxis, chronic pain, concomitant conditions and hospital admission. MATERIALS AND METHODS The CHESS study The ‘Cost of Haemophilia in Europe: a Socioeconomic Survey’ (CHESS) study was a cross-sectional, retrospective study carried out in 2015, where patients aged ≥18 years with severe haemophilia in five European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) were invited to participate [ 14 ] . 1,285 patients were recruited by 139 haematologists and haemophilia

References Bock-Raming, A. (1996). Mānasollāsa 5,560-623: Ein bisher unbeachtet gebliebener Text zum indischen Schachspiel, übersetzt, kommentiert und interpretiert, Indo-Iranian Journal 39 : 1–40. Bock-Raming, A. (2001). Das 8. Kapitel des Hariharacaturaṅga: ein spätmittelalterlicher Sanskrittext über eine Form des “Großen Schachs”, Board Game Studies 4 : 85–125. Burckhardt, T. (1969). The symbolism of chess, Studies in Comparative Religion 3 : 91–95. Dixit, A. and Skeath, S. (1999). Games of Strategy , W. W. Norton & Company. Ghosh, M. (1936). Śūlapāṇi

Abstract

The game theory was created on the basis of social as well as gambling games, such as chess, poker, baccarat, hex, or one-armed bandit. The aforementioned games lay solid foundations for analogous mathematical models (e.g., hex), artificial intelligence algorithms (hex), theoretical analysis of computational complexity attributable to various numerical problems (baccarat), as well as illustration of several economic dilemmas - particularly in the case where the winner takes everything (e.g., noughts and crosses). A certain gambling games, such as a horse racing, may be successfully applied to verify a wide spectrum of market mechanism, for example, market effectiveness or customer behavior in light of incoming information regarding a specific product. One of a lot applications of the slot machine (one-armed bandit) is asymptotically efficient allocation rule, which was assigned by T.L. Lai and H. Robbins (1985). In the next years, the rule was developed by another and was named a multi-armed. The aim of the paper is to discuss these social games along with their potential mathematical models, which are governed by the rules predominantly applicable to the social and natural sciences.

Abstract

We introduce a two player game on an n × n chessboard where queens are placed by alternating turns on a chessboard square whose availability is determined by the parity of the number of queens already on the board which can attack that square. The game is explored as well as its variations and complexity.

Abstract

The classic n-queens problem asks for placements of just n mutually non-attacking queens on an n × n board. By adding enough pawns, we can arrange to fill roughly one-quarter of the board with mutually non-attacking queens. How many pawns do we need? We discuss that question for square boards as well as rectangular m × n boards.

Abstract

Certain type of perfect information games (PI-games), the so-called Banach-Mazur games, so far have not been applied in economy. The perfect information positional game is defined as the game during which at any time the choice is made by one of the players who is acquainted with the previous decision of his opponent. The game is run on the sequential basis. The aim of this paper is to discuss selected Banach-Mazur games and to present some applications of positional game

References [1] Bell, J., Stevens, B. “A survey of known results and research areas for n-queens”, Discrete Math, 309, 1-31, 2009. [2] Bodlaender, H., Duniho, F. “Shogi: Japanese chess”, 2017. http://www.chessvariants.com/shogi.html [3] Chatham, D. “The maximum queens problem with pawns”, Recreational Mathematics Magazine, 3(6), 95-102, 2016. [4] Haynes, T.W., Hedetniemi, S.T., Slater, P.J. Fundamentals of Domination in Graphs, Marcel Dekker, New York, 1998. [5] Haynes, T.W., Hedetniemi, S.T., Slater, P.J. (Eds.). Domination in Graphs: Advanced Topics, Marcel

Abstract

Belarus is often considered as ‘the last authoritarian state in Europe’ or the ‘last Soviet Republic’. Belarusian policies are not a popular research topic. Over the past years, the country has made headlines mostly as a regime violating human rights. Since the Russian aggression on Ukraine, Belarus has been getting renewed attention. Minsk was the scene of a series of talks that aim at stopping the ongoing war in Ukraine. Western media, scholars and society got a reminder that Eastern Europe was not a conflict-free zone. This article puts military security policy of Belarus into perspective by showing that Belarus ‘per se’ is not a threat for neighboring countries; Belarus dependency towards Russia is huge; thus, Minsk has a small capability to run its own independent security policy; military potential of Belarus is significant in the region, but gap in equipment and training between NATO and Belarus is really more; it is in the interest of Western countries to keep the Lukashenko’s regime in Belarus.