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Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA) builds on statistical risk analysis and game theory to analyze decision situations involving two or more intelligent opponents who make decisions under uncertainty. During the past few years, the ARA approach-which is based on the explicit modelling of the decision making processes of a rational opponent-has been applied extensively in areas such as counterterrorism and corporate competition. In the context of military combat modelling, however, ARA has not been used systematically, even if there have been attempts to predict the opponent’s decisions based on wargaming, application of game theoretic equilibria, and the use of expert judgements. Against this backdrop, we argue that combining ARA with military combat modelling holds promise for enhancing the capabilities of combat modelling tools. We identify ways of combining ARA with combat modelling and give an illustrative example of how ARA can provide insights into a problem where the defender needs to estimate the utility gained from hiding its troop movements from the attacker. Even if the ARA approach can be challenging to apply, it can be instructive in that relevant assumptions about the resources, expectations and goals that guide the adversary’s decisions must be explicated.
Strategic communication has replaced information warfare. As Art of War has been replaced by science, the representations of war and the role of the military have changed. Both war and military forces are now associated with binary roles: destruction vs. humanity, killing vs. liberating. The logic behind ‘bombing for peace’ is encoded in the Grand Military Narrative. This narrative is hidden in American (and NATO) strategies such as Effects Based Operations, which rely heavily on technology. As people aim to rationalize the world with technology, they fail to take into account the uncertainty it brings. In warfare, that uncertainty is verbalized as “friendly fire”, “collateral damage” or simply as “accident”. Success and failure are up to technology. Technology is no longer a tool, but an ideology and an actor that not only ‘enables’ the military to take action, but legitimizes it.
This article aims to contribute to military studies by analyzing, in the spirit of critical discourse analysis, American ‘Grand Military Narrative’ and he standard and trends of rhetoric it creates. The article focuses on pinpointing some of the linguistic choices and discourses that define the so-called ‘techno-speak’, the product of modern techno-ideology. These discourses result in representations of techno-centered binary values, which steer military strategy and foreign policy.
The clearance of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) containing shaped charge warheads poses a particular technical hazard to consider for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel. The wide use of light anti-tank weapons, such as rocket propelled grenades and the scattering of sub-munitions in different conflict areas have made the clearance of shaped charge ammunition a frequent task. However, unlike other hazards, for shaped charges, EOD personnel lack adequate means for the establishment of the maximum hazardous area and for the design of measures for hazard confinement against the shaped charge effect.
In this article two different models are suggested, which together give guidance for protective measures during clearance of shaped charge ammunition. The development of these models is based on their military utility, by consideration of the limited information availability, the short time frames, the working methods and the technology level that are characteristic for EOD operations. The two suggested models are developed further into a complete set of design rules for protective measures, giving a versatile tool to replace today´s rough estimates and guesswork, in these safety-related decisions.
The effectiveness of a coaching process called Deep Lead, deriving from the leadership training of the Finnish Defence Forces, has not been studied efficiently in different civil organisations. This article presents an insight into the effectiveness of this coaching method in two different work communities (PVO-Vesivoima and TAC Finland Inc. Service). The main research question in this article is how to ensure the effectiveness of this particular type of leadership coaching / training. To achieve the best possible results, methodological triangulation was needed in this survey. In this article, two contributing models were introduced (figures 2 and 3) for examining coaching or training effectiveness. By means of these, it can hopefully be examined in the future whether the coaching / training process remains to be a cost, or whether it is an essential investment for the work communities. According to the leadership coaching effectiveness research results of the study at PVO-Vesivoima, such areas as co-operation, interaction and feedback culture were strengthened. As a conclusion, it can be stated that this leadership coaching process works as a practical leadership tool for management in developing the work community both internally and externally. Another example was a work community (TAC Finland Inc Service) that aimed to improve customer satisfaction, evoke know-how, and improve profits by using the deep lead -coaching method. According to the research results, remarkable improvements were accomplished in every field mentioned compared to the time preceding the leadership coaching process or the beginning of the leadership coaching process. In both examples, results were studied using different indicators, different time spans, different methods, and by different reports done by different people. As an outcome of these researches, the leadership coaching process was considered to be effective in PVO-Vesivoima and in TAC, and in the conclusion a practical description of leadership coaching / training or other educational intervention verified on an individual level is introduced.
The paper presents a new concept, Usability Monitoring, and applies it for situational awareness applications in military Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance systems (C4ISR). Usability Monitoring means taking measurements of technical Quality of Service (QoS) parameters in end systems and comparing them to target values of reference cases. The concept differs from QoS monitoring in the goal and in the placement of measurement points: In QoS monitoring the goal is to verify that the network provides the promised service quality in the user system - network interface. QoS monitoring does not capture the actual end user experience, which is influenced also by the end system, and therefore it does not directly correspond to the service quality that a user sees. Usability Monitoring has exactly this goal. The Observe-Orient-Decide-Act-Loop (OODA) is a decision making concept that is widely used in the network-centric approach and it emphasizes fast decision making. The presented model for Usability Monitoring is based on the OODA-loop. It includes QoS measurements not only in the Act-phase, i.e., can the user perform the actions s/he wants or are there delays and losses that make the system less usable, but also in the Observe-phase, i.e., does the user get the information s/he subscribes to, and in the Orient-phase, i.e., does the user get confusing information and cannot orient, and also the Decide-phase, i.e. is the user able to make right decisions based on the previous steps. The measured technical QoS parameters are connected to user experience by Mean of Score (MOS) functions that are obtained by usability tests.
A case study for partially evaluating the Usability Monitoring concept is from MNE5 MSA (Multinational Experimentation 5, Maritime Situational Awareness) Experimentation Event 3 that was conducted in partnership with the Navy Command Finland, Naval Warfare Centre of Sweden and NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and the Singaporean Armed Forces (SAF) Future Systems Directorate. In the MNE5 MSA experimentation we were able to monitor end user experience, how the user sees the services and is able to work with the current tools and capabilities. In this article we describe how Usability Monitoring was addressed in the MNE5 MSA case study: meters for Usability Monitoring were selected and we investigated what aspects of usability affect the phases of the OODA-loop.
end result would not be pretty. After calculations of possible contingencies, he argued that the big question would be
“Will the survivors envy the dead?” It is in some sense true that one may never recuperate from a thermonuclear war. The world may be permanently (i.e., for perhaps 10,000 years) more hostile to human life as a result of such war. ( Kahn 1960 : p. 21)
4 Escalation ladder as a nuclear war metaphor’
The reason for creating scenarios of escalation is the same as always: deterrence is not an absolutely fool-proof tool to eliminate war. As Kahn
Johansson and Falkman (2008)
Develop a threat evaluation system in an air defence scenario. The BBN-based approach makes it possible to handle imperfect observations.
Wang et al. (2012) and Hou et al. (2010)
Use a dynamic BBN for Air Defence threat assessment. The advantage of using BBN is that it can modify the threat assessment knowledge repository dynamically, which enables the assessment model to possess better adaptability for producing more accurate assessment results.
Hudson et al. (2001)
Describe a software tool
caution for any generalizable findings.
Practical considerations from this study’s findings include the need for the Swedish Armed Forces to consider additional soft skill assessments and use of training tools for the recruitment of leaders and military staff members. Training in soft skills, including organizational Political skills, may improve the armed forces’ military staff performance. It could also be useful in developing collaborative and negotiation abilities in internal (between military departments) and external contexts of the organization (in
Helga Myrseth, Sigurd William Hystad, Reidar Säfvenbom and Olav Kjellevold Olsen
management tool: Harnessing Pygmalion. Academy of Managment Review , 9 , pp. 64-73. 10.5465/amr.1984.4277938 Eden D. 1984 Self-fulfilling prophecy as a management tool: Harnessing Pygmalion Academy of Managment Review 9 64 73
Eden, D., Geller, D., Gewirtz, A., Gordon-Terner, R., Inbar, I., Liberman, M., et al. (2000). Implanting Pygmalion leadership style through workshop training: Seven field experiments. The Leadership Quarterly , 11 , pp. 171-210. 10.1016/S1048-9843(00)00042-4 Eden D. Geller D. Gewirtz A. Gordon-Terner R. Inbar I. Liberman M. 2000 Implanting