October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity. • Council, 2006, Review of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy – Renewed Strategy , Brussels, 9 June 2006, 10117/06. • Environment Group, 2006, Sustainable Development: A Review of International Literature , The Centre for Sustainable Development, University of Westminster and the Law School, University of Strathclyde, Scottish Executive Social Research. • Felber Christian, 2015, Change Everything: Creating an Economy for the Common Good
H. Peter Langille
Tiago de Melo Cartaxo
Environmental protection and sustainable development are competences that the EU is entitled to integrate into the definition and implementation of its policies. However, shared competences in these areas are still a reality, as a margin of discretion persists for Member States, aimed at maintaining a high level of decentralisation, particularly where issues related to national policies and more (nation) specific sectoral legislation are concerned. This paper intends to analyse the application of the principle of subsidiarity to environmental issues within the EU, to examine the characteristics of a possible path to the future of green federalism in Europe.
The difference between ASEAN and EU in the political and economic realm has an interesting parallel in the system of values and “rights” that are sustained by the two organisations. In effect if we look to ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (2012) or general political principles adopted inside ASEAN we will find several value-oriented peculiarities that distinguish it from EU political and juridical fundamental principles. At the same time such a system of values does not fit with the “Asian Values approach”. Thus the ASEAN Sonderweg results as an original hybrid of western and local values that goes beyond the “Orientalist” mask of Asia, defining an identity that assumes a singular inclination that could be defined as a difficult and problematic effort towards a “decolonial” option.
The Euro Area (Eurozone, or EZ) is navigating uncharted waters; it has started, in slow motion, to slide towards a fiscal federation, while still lacking both the fiscal capacity and the democratic qualification to achieve this goal. Strengthening the EMU’s democratic profile is a fundamental requirement for the sustainability of the EMU as much as its completion with a fiscal and economic arm. Yet, according to the Five Presidents Report released in 2015, no substantial progress is expected to be achieved before 2025. Against this background, this paper is structured in two parts. The first part analyses the most recent trends in the Governance of the Eurozone. The second part discusses whether a transition from governance to government of the Monetary Union is both feasible and effective, advancing a new proposal -a Joint Budgetary Procedure-tailored to strengthen the European Semester with stronger incentive mechanisms, greater reach and stronger governance.
Austria’s federal system is determined by an apparent contrast between formal and real constitution having its roots in foundational defects shaping the system to the present day. As for the formal dimension, Austria has a rather uneven balance with regard to powersharing. No wonder that, given the structural bias between central state and substates, informal forces are at work in order to make up for the shortcomings of the federal architecture. In this context, sub-national constitutionalism at first sight appears to be marginal. Astoundingly, though, in recent time a lot of constitutional changes and amendments, quite possibly paving the way for a sustainable redesign of the federation as a whole have taken place.
The article starts with a historical outline of the Austrian federation’s origins. In chapter 2, the interplay of formal and informal rules and practices is discussed. Chapter 3 deals with scope, contents and dynamics of sub-national constitutionalism under the given framework. The article concludes with assessing the efficacy of subconstitutional politics in relation to the capacities of the federal constitution.
References • Afionis Stavros, 2009, ‘European Union Coherence in UNFCCC Negotiations Under the New Treaty of Lisbon (Reform Treaty).’ Sustainable Development Law & Policy , IX(2): 43-47. Accessed March 18, 2016. http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp/vol9/iss2/15/ . • Castaldi Roberto, 2012, ‘The Dangers of Unbundling the Federal Union’, in CSF Comments . Accessed March 18, 2016. http://gestione.csfederalismo.it/index.php/it/pubblicazioni/commenti?start=44 . • de Grauwe Paul, 2013, ‘Debt Without Drowning.’ Project Syndicate . Accessed
March 2009 on the Mid-term Review of the 2007-2013 Financial Framework’ (2008/2055(INI)). • European Parliament, 2011, ‘Resolution of 8 June 2011 on Investing in the future: a new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for a competitive, sustainable and inclusive Europe’ (2010/2211(INI)). • European Parliament, 2016, ‘Resolution of 6 July 2016 on the preparation of the post-electoral revision of the MFF 2014-2020: Parliament’s input ahead of the Commission’s proposal’ (2015/2353(INI)). • Fuest Clemens, Heinemann Friedrich and Ungerer Martin, 2015