The literature on sovereign default is abundant and uniformly admits that since the government cannot be forced to repay its debts, the explanation of why in spite of this it usually honors its obligations, is not straightforward. The literature that aims to explain this phenomenon points to several factors that affect the probability of sovereign default.
A thorough summary of the literature on sovereign default can be found for example in Panizza et al ., (2009); hence, we provide below just a very brief recapitulation of the main arguments, pointing to the
Articles 31– 33. See Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad) , Judgment of 3 February 1994, ICJ Reports 1994, pp. 21–22, para. 41. In any case, a different customary international law existed in 1962, when the International Law Commission (ILC) initiated work aimed to codify international rules on treaty interpretation. If claims are made that the rules laid down in Articles 31–33 of the VCLT are identical with customary rules on treaty interpretation, consequently, this cannot explain why Articles 31–33 are always relevant for the interpretation of tax treaties concluded by
to put forward a revised CCCTB proposal in autumn 2016, but it seems to anticipate that an agreement on this proposal cannot be obtained quickly. Accordingly, the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package, including the ATA Directive, should represent a pragmatic approach that sets out initiatives, which can take effect prior to agreement and introduction of the CCCTB.
Having the aim of combating tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market, the ATA Directive, thus, lays down anti-avoidance rules in the following six specifc fields