, “perceived” or “actual.” Id .
An analogous paragraph to the above paragraph applies to law students and lawyers in the sense that improving the happiness, mental health, and quality of life for law students and lawyers can and should be priorities for them, their clients, and our society-at-large. Happy and healthy law students learn how to be happy and healthy lawyers who can more effectively serve their clients. Learning to live with a growth mindset, more balance, better and more sleep, more resilience, and stress management are perspectives and skills that law
, 29 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Scalia worked to eliminate prudential doctrines, preferring in the absence of perceived constitutional limits to define the right of individuals to sue by reference to the text of applicable legislation. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). In all of these settings, Justice Scalia played a leading role in re-shaping jurisdictional law that runs counter to his professed adherence to the method of originalist interpretation.
In tracing the arc of Justice Scalia
dignity of human life increases.”); D AVID S. B OGEN , P RIVILEGES AND I MMUNITIES . A R EFERENCE G UIDE TO THE U NITED S TATES C ONSTITUTION (2003).
The purpose of this article is partially to fill this gap by analyzing early American courts’ use of the term “fundamental right”. First, we will consider in what instances the courts used the term “fundamental rights” and what they considered those rights to be. Secondly, we will look at what the courts perceived to be the source of fundamental rights. Were the rights bestowed upon the individual person by the
should we be by the promise of eventual victory? Before it was accepted that the earth revolves around the sun, dozens of generations lived and died, confident in believing the opposite. Also, Milton posits “free and open” encounters, but how common are they, given the advantages typically enjoyed by the status quo? Do we really choose beliefs in the marketplace of ideas in the same way we choose, say, deodorant or beer, in the marketplace of products? For we overvalue our pre-existing beliefs as a way of saving us from having to admit mistakes; we perceive (or
is necessary elsewhere as well. I expect that the same cognitive scientists whom Schauer references seek to use terms precisely, and without internal contradictions, in their work rather than think like ordinary people. “Moreover, people think of concepts and categories in terms of properties—like flying for birds and grapes for wine—that may not hold even for all of the central cases of the category. And although cognitive scientists debate about many things, this is not one of them, for it is widely recognized that a picture of concept formation that stresses
. 113–138, at pp. 113–121. Koerber, as John Deak put it, »used administrative reform in place of constitutional or political reform«, Deak: State, p. 235. and trust (or the lack thereof) served to describe the problem, i.e. the monarchy’s (perceived or real) lack of legitimacy among the populace, and the way to its solution. The monarchy’s administration, Koerber remarked in his »Studien über eine Verwaltungsreform«, had the flaw that those »institutions of social welfare, the benefits of which are felt immediately by the population and which the populace
Frits van der Meer, Gerrit Dijkstra and Toon Kerkhoff
what is perceived as proper personnel policies. In order to guarantee these merit principles of the best and most fitting, employment decisions have been governed by uniform and impersonal policies and procedures. From this definition it becomes clear that what is fitting and what is best can differ substantially. Here we arrive at the complexities mentioned earlier. The content of merit can vary according to the requirements of (government) organizations in view of their specific tasks, intervention approach and instruments (see figure 1 ). Even more significantly
A Long Normative History of a Statistical Category in the U.K
practice, an open definition – as already in use in other countries in the second half of the 20 th century – included self-descriptions or self-assessments of historical actors and changes in society as perceived by members of the society rather than through social scientists’ categories. While feminists and other historical actors in different states already criticised the normative bias of the definition in the 1960s and 1970s, a different question seems to be of equal or even greater importance to the historian: How, when and why did different nations and