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Open access

Eglė Murauskaitė

Abstract

The article explores threats related to illicit trafficking of radioactive materials and dual-use goods applicable in state level nuclear programs, actualizing the global trends for the Baltic region. The article points to Eastern Europe’s changing risk profile in this respect, as increasing penetration of Russian criminal groups inside Ukraine and the destabilized situations in neighboring countries create an environment where the risk of nuclear smuggling is on the rise. Criminal entities can be seen forming new bonds, with trafficking routes intersecting and zones of influence shifting - consequently, an unusual level of criminal involvement in nuclear smuggling is observed, alongside a geographic shift of smuggling patterns. In addition, states seeking materials and technologies for their military programs have taken a notable interest in this region as a way of circumventing international transit regulations. The article looks at the likely implications of these new nuclear smuggling trends for the security of the Baltic states. It suggests that Lithuania may soon be facing a relatively new threat, and one that it is ill-prepared to counter. The article discusses the risk factors and indicators to watch before that risk becomes reality, and offers ways for Lithuania to contribute to addressing these increasingly acute problems on a regional level.

Open access

Karolis Aleksa

Abstract

This article presents an interpretation of the US capacity to force North Korea to abandon the development of nuclear weapons, based on the analysis of the conventional balance between the U.S. and North Korea. It is also an attempt to evaluate the impact of the US military transformation on defence policy decisions of the potential opponents of the US. The first (theoretical) part of the article presents the assumptions of theoretical interpretation as well as the fundamentals of evaluating the conventional balance between the US and North Korea. The second part of the article highlights the key moments of the US and the international community’s so far unsuccessful attempts to force North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons and explains the reasons for such unsuccessful policy. The third part of this paper analyzes the conventional balance between the US and North Korea, taking into account the conventional forces of those countries, their long range conventional strike programmes as well as the missile defence programmss - this analysis presupposes the failure of the US to prevent North Korea from nuclear weapon development

Open access

Lucia Husenicova

References Bernholz, P. (2007) Ideology, sects, state and totalitarianism. In Maier, H., & Schäfer, M. Totalitarianism and Political Religions, Volume II. Concepts for the comparison of dictatorship, 246-271. London: Routledge. Buzo, A. (2003). Partyzánská dynastie. Politika a vedení Severní Koreje. Praha: BB Art Cheon, S. (2013). The Kim Jong-un Regime’s „Byungjin“ (Paralled Development) Policy of Economy and Nuclear Weapons and the ‘April 1st Nuclearization Law‘, Korean Institute for National Unification

Open access

Jan Hanska

1 Introduction By the 1970s and especially into the eighties, the ideas of these thermonuclear Jesuits would have so thoroughly percolated through the corridors of power […] that, at least among fellow members of the congregation, their wisdom would be taken almost for granted, their assumptions worshipped as gospel truth, their insight elevated to an almost mystical level and accepted as dogma. […] [for they were the men who pondered mass destruction, who thought about the unthinkable, who invented nuclear strategy]. ( Kaplan 1983 : p. 11) The people

Open access

Ralph Savelsberg

. (2007). GUI Missile Flyout: A General Program for Simulating Ballistic Missiles. Science and Global Security , 15, 133-146. Forden, G. E. (2009a, April 20). DPRK: U'nha-2 powered trajectory. Retrieved November 6, 2012, from Arms Control Wonk: http://forden.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2262/dprk-unha-2-powered-trajectory Forden, G. E. (2009b, May 15). DPRK: Why did the 2006 launch fail? Retrieved November 6, 2012, from Arms Control Wonk: http://forden.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2298/dprk-why-did-the-2006-launch

Open access

Arūnas Molis, Claudia Palazzo and Kaja Ainsalu

References Associated Press 28 May 2018, Poland says Russian gas pipeline is a ‘new hybrid weapon’. Available at: https://www.apnews.com/ eba0b8e4ba8e4a9b9b107cf166213508 [Accessed 20 October 2018] Bankauskaite, D, 2017, Disinfo Goes Nuclear in the Baltics, CEPA Stratcom Program. Available at: Dickel et al. (2014) Dickel, R., Hassanzadeh, E., Henderson, J., Honoré, A., El-Katiri, L., Pirani, S., Rogers, H., Stern, J., Yafimava, K. “Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas: distinguishing

Open access

Juho Roponen and Ahti Salo

). Analysis of national strategies to counter a country's nuclear weapons program. Decision Analysis, 8(1), 30-45. Churchill, D., Saffidine, A., & Buro, M. (2012). Fast Heuristic Search for RTS Game Combat Scenarios. In AIIDE. Davis, P. K., & Blumenthal, D. (1991). The base of sand problem: A white paper on the state of military combat modeling (No. RAND/N-3148-OSD/DARPA). Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington VA. Golany, B., Kaplan, E. H., Marmur, A., & Rothblum, U. G. (2009). Nature plays with dice

Open access

Viljar Veebel and Illimar Ploom

://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a475775.pdf Shlapak, D.A.; Johnson, M. (2016): Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html Sliwa, Z.; Veebel, V., Lebrun, M. (2018). Russian Ambitions and Hybrid Modes of Warfare, Estonian Journal of Military Studies, 7/2018 Smith, E. A. (2006): Effects-based Operations: Applying Network-Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War. Washington, DC: Command and Control Research Program

Open access

Ilmari Käihkö

Introduction: why does the West not win? In his 1995 essay, A. J. Bacevich wrote about the “persistent limitations of professional orthodoxy” within the US armed forces, which provided enemies with vulnerabilities ripe to be exploited (1995: 60). This was a problem that Hew Strachan returned to when he argued that the end of the Cold War made the past decades’ strategic vocabulary obsolete (2013: 41). Arguably, the polarization between the two superpowers and the mutual possession of nuclear weapons meant that war had lost its rationality: no justification

Open access

Laviniu Bojor

-storyarchive/intelligence-human-intelligence.html [10] Nuclear spy ring consists of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Harry Gold, Klaus Fuchs, David and Ruth Greenglass [11] Kim Plilby [12] https://spywriter.wordpress.com/2011/02/12/using-sex-in-espionage/ [13] https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2018-featured-storyarchive/romeo-spies.html [14] Dangle - A person sent by the intelligence agency of his or her own country who approaches an intelligence agency in the hope of being recruited as a spy so as to allow a double agent operation