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Jan Hanska

1 Introduction By the 1970s and especially into the eighties, the ideas of these thermonuclear Jesuits would have so thoroughly percolated through the corridors of power […] that, at least among fellow members of the congregation, their wisdom would be taken almost for granted, their assumptions worshipped as gospel truth, their insight elevated to an almost mystical level and accepted as dogma. […] [for they were the men who pondered mass destruction, who thought about the unthinkable, who invented nuclear strategy]. ( Kaplan 1983 : p. 11) The people

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Ralph Savelsberg

. (2007). GUI Missile Flyout: A General Program for Simulating Ballistic Missiles. Science and Global Security , 15, 133-146. Forden, G. E. (2009a, April 20). DPRK: U'nha-2 powered trajectory. Retrieved November 6, 2012, from Arms Control Wonk: http://forden.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2262/dprk-unha-2-powered-trajectory Forden, G. E. (2009b, May 15). DPRK: Why did the 2006 launch fail? Retrieved November 6, 2012, from Arms Control Wonk: http://forden.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2298/dprk-why-did-the-2006-launch

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Juho Roponen and Ahti Salo

). Analysis of national strategies to counter a country's nuclear weapons program. Decision Analysis, 8(1), 30-45. Churchill, D., Saffidine, A., & Buro, M. (2012). Fast Heuristic Search for RTS Game Combat Scenarios. In AIIDE. Davis, P. K., & Blumenthal, D. (1991). The base of sand problem: A white paper on the state of military combat modeling (No. RAND/N-3148-OSD/DARPA). Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington VA. Golany, B., Kaplan, E. H., Marmur, A., & Rothblum, U. G. (2009). Nature plays with dice

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Ilmari Käihkö

Introduction: why does the West not win? In his 1995 essay, A. J. Bacevich wrote about the “persistent limitations of professional orthodoxy” within the US armed forces, which provided enemies with vulnerabilities ripe to be exploited (1995: 60). This was a problem that Hew Strachan returned to when he argued that the end of the Cold War made the past decades’ strategic vocabulary obsolete (2013: 41). Arguably, the polarization between the two superpowers and the mutual possession of nuclear weapons meant that war had lost its rationality: no justification