), the Ronald Reagan Centennial celebrations were used to shore up the American alliance in CentralandEasternEurope. Unlike that display, the Centennial was not driven by current U.S. government officials, and it articulated responses to threats beyond terrorism. Ostensibly a year’s worth of programming to celebrate the 100th anniversary of Reagan’s birth in 2011, the Centennial’s message was a transatlantic call for standing firm against not only terrorism but also Russian encroachment on the region. This article argues that because of the status of its drivers and
-asia/poland/report-poland/ (accessed 2/6/2018). While at first glance, the religious affiliation of the population of the four countries differs dramatically, ranging from those characterized as predominantly religious (Poland and Slovakia) to those understood as secular (the Czech Republic and Hungary), See, for example, “Religious Belief and National Belonging in CentralandEasternEurope,” Pew Research Centre, 10 May 2017, http://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/religious-affiliation/ (accessed 4/6/2018). the political rhetoric “justifying” the fears frequently includes a claim to be upholding
, Religion and Culture in Postsecular Society (Faenza, 13-14 May 2011)”, PECOB—Portal of East Centraland Balkan Europe . http://www.pecob.eu/flex/cm/pages/ServeAttachment.php/L/EN/D/7%252Fd%252F1%252FD.1f1f8fddc2dd41df40ac/P/BLOB%3AID%3D3100 Stoeckl Kristina. 2011 Working paper “Defining the Postsecular.” In Document Collection of the Italian-Russian Workshop “Politics, Religion and Culture in Postsecular Society (Faenza, 13-14 May 2011)”, PECOB—Portal of East Centraland Balkan Europe http://www.pecob.eu/flex/cm/pages/ServeAttachment.php/L/EN/D/7%252Fd%252F1
coined by Max Weber and used in order to describe a long historical development toward a more natural and secular understanding of the world, from the prophets of the Old Testament up to the modern critique of religion. However, Joas takes issue with the description of a one-way development toward a secular modern world, when it comes to religion as well as politics. On the one hand, Europe has seen a significant decrease in religious observance (often referred to as “secularization”), but morality has not collapsed although Christianity lost influence and authority
exceptional” ( Kaya 2015 , 452). This is debatable or even disputable for western scholars, however, his criticism can be fully applied to the scarce number of academic works on Islamophobia issued so far in CentralandEasternEurope (CEE).
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As for the CEE context, apart from Russia, post-Soviet areas and the Balkans, there was scarce evidence of scholarly interest and literature on Islamophobia there until recently. Ivan Kalmar commented on the very recent situation as follows:
Although the severity of the Islamophobia evidenced in the response of the political
Introduction: Islamophobia in EasternEurope?
A specter is haunting Europe – the specter of Islamophobia. At this point, the historically informed reader might question the newsworthiness of our initial statement. Unease, reservation, and even fear and hatred against Islam and Muslims have a long tradition in Europe ( Benz 2017 ). Since Edward Said’s (1978) seminal study on ‘Orientalism’, it is a commonplace to acknowledge that the West has associated Islam with negative images and stereotypes for hundreds of years. The essential novelty of Europe’s old
construction.” Personal Skype interview with Gábor Egry, historian, conducted in March 2017. Thus, to reach a better future, it was enough to manage and supervise the smooth return to the West, embodied by the long sought membership in its institutions, the EU and NATO. As the economist János Kornai puts it, “In every respect, CentralEasternEurope tried to assimilate Western examples” (2006, 25).
Since their first steps in the Hungarian pluralist regime, Fidesz and its charismatic leader Viktor Orbán adhered to a substantially different interpretation of history. They
, Western Europeans demonstrate acceptance of Muslims as their fellow citizens, and even as members of their families, as evidenced by a series of surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center between 2015 and 2017 in 34 Western, Central, andEasternEuropean countries ( “Easternand Western Europeans Differ¼” 2018 ). More than a half of Western members of the EU say they would accept a Muslim into their family. The percentage of those who say so in the top five EU countries with the biggest Muslim population varies between 60% and 90% ( Table 2 ).
. “Migration in Slovakia.” 2018. International Organization of Migration Slovakia . February 16, 2018. https://www.iom.sk/en/migration/migration-in-slovakia.html come from the neighboring countries, Czech, Austrian, Ukrainian, Polish, and Hungarian citizens. following ca. 30% migrants from South-EasternEuropean countries, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia. and there is also a small Asian migrant community. Vietnam, Thailand, China, South Korea. In accordance with the newest data on migration as delivered by Eurostat, Slovakia has the lowest number (1.4) of migrants