), the Ronald Reagan Centennial celebrations were used to shore up the American alliance in Central and Eastern Europe. Unlike that display, the Centennial was not driven by current U.S. government officials, and it articulated responses to threats beyond terrorism. Ostensibly a year’s worth of programming to celebrate the 100th anniversary of Reagan’s birth in 2011, the Centennial’s message was a transatlantic call for standing firm against not only terrorism but also Russian encroachment on the region. This article argues that because of the status of its drivers and
. Instead, although in a different intensity, various fears of others, of their national, cultural, and religious identity, are used in the public discourse as “reasons” to keep the refugees out. The governments of the Visegrad countries feature among the least hospitable. In December 2017, the European Commission decided to take action against Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, for refusing to participate in the refugee relocation scheme, and referred these three countries to the European Court of Justice. See https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central
exceptional” ( Kaya 2015 , 452). This is debatable or even disputable for western scholars, however, his criticism can be fully applied to the scarce number of academic works on Islamophobia issued so far in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
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As for the CEE context, apart from Russia, post-Soviet areas and the Balkans, there was scarce evidence of scholarly interest and literature on Islamophobia there until recently. Ivan Kalmar commented on the very recent situation as follows:
Although the severity of the Islamophobia evidenced in the response of the political
, Religion and Culture in Postsecular Society (Faenza, 13-14 May 2011)”, PECOB—Portal of East Central and Balkan Europe . http://www.pecob.eu/flex/cm/pages/ServeAttachment.php/L/EN/D/7%252Fd%252F1%252FD.1f1f8fddc2dd41df40ac/P/BLOB%3AID%3D3100 Stoeckl Kristina. 2011 Working paper “Defining the Postsecular.” In Document Collection of the Italian-Russian Workshop “Politics, Religion and Culture in Postsecular Society (Faenza, 13-14 May 2011)”, PECOB—Portal of East Central and Balkan Europe http://www.pecob.eu/flex/cm/pages/ServeAttachment.php/L/EN/D/7%252Fd%252F1
coined by Max Weber and used in order to describe a long historical development toward a more natural and secular understanding of the world, from the prophets of the Old Testament up to the modern critique of religion. However, Joas takes issue with the description of a one-way development toward a secular modern world, when it comes to religion as well as politics. On the one hand, Europe has seen a significant decrease in religious observance (often referred to as “secularization”), but morality has not collapsed although Christianity lost influence and authority
What is forgotten need not necessarily be lost forever .
CentralEurope and its diverse societies faced significant border changes and political regime shifts during the 20th century. Ethnically, nationally, or religiously defined groups of people found themselves fluctuating between favored and disadvantaged social positions, at times identifying with the majority and at other times identifying as minority. The cases of German and Hungarian populations in the territory of today’s Slovakia were no exception. After the end of
national movements modeled on the examples from CentralEurope, such as the German nation-state founded in 1871 or the nation-states of Estonians, Hungarians, Poles, or Ukrainians established in the wake of the Great War. The success arrived with the establishment of the Jewish nation-state of Israel in 1948 and of the Armenian nation-state in 1991 after the break up of the Soviet Union. Hence, Ivrit written in the Hebrew script is the sole official and national language of the Jews and Armenian written in Armenian letters is the sole national language of the Armenians
reestablished in Hungary, Fidesz’s main opponents, i.e. the social democrats and the liberals, did not display any strong commitment to devise their own overall vision of history. By and large, they simply subscribed to the rhetoric of CentralEuropean states returning to Europe, a vision best epitomized by Kundera’s concept of “Occident kidnappé” (1983). However, it must be noted that the CentralEuropean states did not share the same rationale behind their similar stance towards history. Political calculus was the main reason for the post-communists’ reluctance to deal with
, Western Europeans demonstrate acceptance of Muslims as their fellow citizens, and even as members of their families, as evidenced by a series of surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center between 2015 and 2017 in 34 Western, Central, and Eastern European countries ( “Eastern and Western Europeans Differ¼” 2018 ). More than a half of Western members of the EU say they would accept a Muslim into their family. The percentage of those who say so in the top five EU countries with the biggest Muslim population varies between 60% and 90% ( Table 2 ).