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I argue that relations between non-identical times, such as the relations, earlier than, later than, or 10 seconds apart, involve contradiction, and only co-temporal relations are non-contradictory, which would leave presentism the only non-contradictory theory of time. The arguments I present are arguments that I have not seen in the literature.
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If Pegasus existed, he would indeed be in space and time, but only because the word ‘Pegasus’ has spatio-temporal connotations, and not because ‘exists’ has spatio-temporal connotations. If spatio-temporal reference is lacking when we affirm the existence of the cube root of 27, that is simply because a cube root is not a spatio-temporal kind of thing.
Many philosophers of physics take the failure of the laws of physics to be invariant under the time reversal transformation to give us good reason to think that spacetime is temporally anisotropic, yet the details of this inference are rarely made explicit. I discuss two reasonable ways of filling in the details of this inference, the first of which utilizes a symmetry principle proposed by John Earman and the second of which utilizes Harvey Brown’s account of spacetime. I contend that neither of the resulting arguments is sound.
The structure of Yablo’s paradox is analysed and generalised in order to show that beginningless step-by-step determination processes can be used to provoke antinomies, more concretely, to make our logical and our ontological intuitions clash. The flow of time and the flow of causality are usually conceived of as intimately intertwined, so that temporal causation is the very paradigm of a step-by-step determination process. As a consequence, the paradoxical nature of beginningless step-by-step determination processes concerns time and causality as usually conceived.
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