According to rationalists about moral knowledge, some moral truths are knowable a priori. Rationalists often defend their position by claiming that some moral propositions are self-evidently true. Copp 2007 has recently challenged this rationalist strategy. Copp argues that even if some moral propositions are self-evident, this is not enough to secure rationalism about moral knowledge, since it turns out that such self-evident propositions are only knowable a posteriori. This paper considers the merits of Copp’s challenge. After clarifying the rationalists’ appeal to self-evidence, I show why this rationalist strategy survives Copp’s challenges to it.
phenomenology and the brave new world of The Matrix . The Harvard Review of Philosophy 11(1): 18–31.
Hurka, Thomas. 2011. The Best Things in Life: A Guide to What Really Matters . NY: Oxford University Press.
Langan, Thomas. 2000. Surviving the Age of Virtual Reality . University of Missouri press.
Murray, Janet. 2017. Hamlet on the Holodeck: The Future of Narrative in Cyberspace Updated Edition. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia . NY: Basic Books.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1956. Being and Nothingness