In the Slovak Republic, a number of internal ministerial advisory bodies, intended to provide high-quality analyses and evidence based policy making for national policy, have been established over the last two years. We have studied how the rational technocratic model of scientific policy advice as a specific mode of governing, acted out through these new institutional sites of expertise, survives in a highly politicised environment of the Slovak public administration. Central to our study was the reconstruction of an intersubjective account central to the work of organising on which the analytical centres and their staff, as well as their patrons, participate. Complementary to this, we focused on intersubjectively shared elements of the analysts’ community and subculture within the dominant CEE public administration culture. The vision of governing with expertise shared by analytical centres rests on the principles of transparency, orientation on professional merit (primarily econometric, analytical skills), voluntarism, conflict avoidance, political opportunism and institutional autonomy. Analytical centres identify themselves as a distinct professional group – in fact, they form a distinct organisational subculture around traits such as demographic characteristics (predominantly young males with economic or mathematical/IT background), symbols, hierarchies, working culture, humour, as well as artefacts. Analysts see their mission in the provision of impartial, objective analytical evidence for informed decision making, yet they negotiate the boundary between politics and expertise on a daily basis, and, as we found, in numerous aspects of analysts’ work politics cannot be entirely bracketed.
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inefficient. Firstly, competition between legal systems might bring a sort of Darwinian evolution where only the most efficient rules survive ( Zywicki, 2003 ). Comparative Law and Economics scholars highlight the importance of evolutionary efficiency as the main argument for the transplantation of foreign laws into the national system ( Smits, 2002 ; Ogus, 1999 ; Mattei, 1994 ). Therefore, the most efficient rules will survive in addition to being transplanted into other legal systems. On the contrary, if the deciding authority is centralised and voters have
sector. It is not difficult to teach them and they do not need to re-learn, they have a large base of knowledge and experience orientation towards achieving a high level of performance, and are actively involved in the tasks of any activity ( Kramer et al., 2019 ). Employees in this category show a high level of work efficiency if the organization has the prospect of stability, professional growth and proper motivation. They are ready to accept the conditions of corporate learning, as they know that they need to increase their competence to break through and survive in