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: Hackett Publishing Company. Oms, Sergi. 2010. Truth-functional and penumbral intuitions. Theoria 25: 137-147. Priest, Graham. 1994. The structure of the paradoxes of self-reference. Mind 103: 25-34. Priest, Graham. 2002. Beyond the Limits of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Priest, Graham. 2010. Inclosures, vagueness, and self-reference. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51: 69-84. Soames, Scott. 1999. Understanding Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tappenden, Jamie. 1993. The liar and sorites paradoxes: toward a unified treatment. Journal of Philosophy

: 10.2307/2214792. Prosser, Simon. 2015. Why are indexicals essential? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11: 211-233. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2015.00392.x. Prosser, Simon and Récanati, François. 2012. Immunity to Error through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9781139043274. Ryle, Gilbert. 1949. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson. Shoemaker, Sydney. 1968. Self-reference and self-awareness. The Journal of Philosophy 65(19): 555-567. doi: 10.2307/2024121.

Necessity. Philosophical Review 111: 497-537. Shoemaker, Sidney. 1968. Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. Journal of Philosophy 65: 555-67. Siegel, Susanna. 2002.. The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference. Philosophers’ Imprint 2 (1) ( ). Smithies, Declan. Forthcoming. What is the Role of Consciousness in Demonstrative Thought? Journal of Philosophy , forthcoming. Snowdon, Paul. 1992. How to Interpret ‘Direct Perception’. In The Contents of Experience , ed. by Crane, Tim. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sun

& Jonathan Cohen, 117-138. Oxford: Blackwell. Higginbotham, James. 2003. Remembering, Imagining, and the First Person. In Epistemology of Language , ed. by Alex Barber, 496-533. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Howell, Robert. 2006. Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72: 44-69. Kaplan, David. 1989. Demonstratives. In Themes from Kaplan , ed. by Joseph Almog, John Perry and Howard Wettstein, 481-563. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kölbel, Max. 2004. Indexical Relativism vs Genuine Relativism. International Journal of

everything). We saw that Field dismisses (a). He also dismisses (b) because he does not want to impoverish in a drastic way the expressive resources of our language. Banning self-reference, for instance, would require dramatic changes in our language, as contingent cases of self- reference — like Epimenides’s utterance of ‘All Cretans are liars’ — show. For these reasons, Field mainly discusses strategies (c) and (d). Book Reviews 96 The second part of STFP is a critical survey of theories of truth that follow strategy (c). These theories, which try to validate as

block (chapters 2, 3 and 6), like the one reconstructed below, result more attractive to us, but this does not prevent us 95Book reviews from feeling some dissatisfaction with Kabay’s exposition of some of them, though. For example, his treatment of Curry paradox and its implications for trivialism (pp. 52f) is very bald. If someone would ask us to tell her how Curry paradox could be a defense of trivial- ism, we would recommend Greg Restall’s ‘Curry’s Revenge: The Costs of Non-Classical Solutions to the Paradoxes of Self-Reference’ (in Revenge of the Liar: New

, BonJour has recognized that an adequate epistemology must take into consideration the relationship between the world and the empirical judgements made about that world, and it remains unclear on his reading how Kant addresses — or could address — the point. It should also be noted that this very question has been the source of a long controversy among Kant scholars, including Jaako Hintikka, Charles Parsons, Manley Thompson, and many others. 10 “Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference, and Pragmatism” in Bieri, Horstmann, and Krüger (eds.), Transcendental Arguments and

conhecimento de si próprio e o emprego do conceito de critério entendido como o par <Ki,P> é elegantemente exposto por Shoemaker, Sydney, «Self-Reference and Self-Awareness» in The Journal of Philosophy, volume LXV, n.º 19, 1968. A Refutação da Teoria Empirista da Consciência 229 privada de dor nem a imagem mental privada são essenciais na eluci- dação do sentido do termo. No parágrafo 271 de Philosophische Unter- suchungen refere-se Wittgenstein, num exemplo, a uma pessoa que não conseguisse conservar na sua memória o sentido do termo «dor», que utilizasse o termo