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outsiders” Richard S. Katz & Peter Mair, Changing Models of PartyOrganization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party , 1 Party Politics 5, 16 (1995). which, itself, “counts as a problem of corruption.” Johnston , supra note 26, at 1. In campaign finance adjudication, there has been explicit and longstanding judicial recognition that both existing regulations and proposals for reform may be designed as mechanisms of power-holding or maintenance, intended to “serve the interests of the ‘ins’ … in resisting the incursions of the ‘outs’.” Buckley v
reveals no urgency that would render a congressional role impossible or impractical. In fact, speedier technology would make it much easier today to gather Congress and present it with information than was true centuries ago. One change that might argue for a more aggressive role is the atrophying of the Electoral College—the Framers believed it would guard against demagogues—and the recent weakening of political partyorganizations—party bosses tended to prefer candidates more moderate than party activists. But by themselves, these changes would not seem sufficiently