Justices to umpires in a baseball game:
Judges and justices are servants of the law, not the other way round. Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make rules, they apply them. The role of the umpire and the judge is critical. They make sure everyone plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see an umpire … I have no agenda, but I do have a commitment. If I am confirmed, I will confront every case with an open mind. I will fully and fairly analyse the legal arguments that are presented. I will be open to the considered views of
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Brosig, J. (2002). Identifying cooperative behavior: some experimental results in a prisoner’s dilemma game
Authoritarian governments are by their very nature unconstitutional. Such government thinks of themselves as above the law, and therefore sees no necessity for separation of powers or representative governance. Constitutional democracy on the other hand, is however based on the notion of people’s sovereignty, which is to be exercised in limited manner by a representative government. Accordingly, judicial activism in this paper is employed to establish the theory of popular participation of courts in the decision making processes through settlement of disputes, interpretation or construction of laws, determination of propriety of legislations, legislative and execution actions within the doctrine of separation of powers for the purpose of enforcement of the limitations in government on constitutional ground. This paper thus examines the concept of judicial activism, its legitimacy and as a mechanism for providing checks and balances in the Nigerian government. The paper demonstrates a game theory of judicial legislative interaction within their function and contends that the notion of judicial supremacy does not hold water because the legislature always has the second chance of invalidating the judgment of courts exercising the legitimate powers. The paper concludes that judicial activism in these countries is a veritable tool in advancing the compliance with the rule of laws on the ground of the Constitution.
versions of key theorems. Kuhn told us engaging anecdotes and personal stories about iconic figures in the field of mathematical economics during the frenzy and heyday of cold war research into activity analysis, decision theory, game theory, mathematical programming, and welfare economics.
Although professors Fefferman and Kuhn had very different mathematical research interests, teaching styles and classroom presentation methods, both clearly had a passion for advancing the frontiers of research by creating knowledge and sharing their enthusiasm for learning by
)Taking Hart , 119 Harv. L. Rev. 852, 861 (2006). Not all agree that Hart had no such aversion. The most famous example used by Wittgenstein is “game,” which he claimed had no feature common to all the different core or central—and not just marginal—uses of the concept. Wittgenstein, supra note 23, at 3f. Instead, he claimed, strands of similarity ran through different core instances of games as through a rope but that no one strand, no one property, ran through all of them. This is like a family, he said, whose members often share certain traits such as eye color or
frustrated, powerless, open to demagoguery, and attracted to the attentions of opportunistic politicians at all extremes. Politicians that are more centrist often jump on the resulting bandwagon. This process tends to produce additional interventions, each of which presents a continuing stream of opportunities for officials to reward elites within programs characterized and even intended as remedial.The process is a negative-sum game that, unchecked, may eventually have an unhappy Jeffersonian ending. Violent revolution in America may be a long shot, but not for lack of
, Oct. 12, 2011, https://news.gallup.com/poll/150038/Congress-Approval-Ties-Time-Low.aspx; Georg Vanberg, Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review , 45 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 346 (2001). But such a response presumes that the President thinks in institutional terms, and has a resulting sense of humility and an inclination to defer to a more popular branch. These conclusions aren’t obviously supported by his behavior, demeanor, or the terms under which he assumed power. Clare Malone, Americans Don’t Trust Their Institutions
Commission . 483 U.S. 825 (1987). The Court has also applied principles of necessary implication to address intergovernmental immunities. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (no suit against state by Indian tribe under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, by a five-to-four vote); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (no suit under Fair Labor Standards Act against states in federal court, by a five-to-four decision). One can also point to the Court’s approach to questions of immunity from taxation as between state and federal governments, McCulloch v
have a tendency to gather information in a self-serving way and also to process that information in a way that is self-serving. Fans of two teams watching a video of a football game between the two will tend to disagree completely about which team got the most breaks from the referees. Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study , 45(1) J. Abnormal Psychol. 129-34 (1954). Studies show that even people who are trained to be objective and skeptical, such as auditors and scientists, tend to find more persuasive the information that is consistent
Trade Organization (WTO), regional trade agreements, and bilateral investment treaties (BITs). To this list, a fourth criterion is sometimes added, namely the ability of the agreement to transform into a pillar of economic governance. See Global Agenda Council on Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: Game-Changers or Costly Distractions for the World Trading System? (2014) 7, available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC/2014/WEF_GAC_TradeFDI_MegaRegionalTradeAgreements_Report_2014.pdf ; see also Peter Draper, Simon Lacey & Yash