of development of sectors other than fisheries and agriculture slowed the recovery of economy, GDP contracted by 1.3% in 1967 and by 5.5% in 1969 ( Hagstofa Íslands 2019a ,b).
In 1970, Iceland joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and the national system of taxes and duties had to be revised. The then-existing tax system had been adapted to the needs of strong special interest groups, especially those involved in fisheries and agriculture. Icelandic agriculture based its existence largely on subventions. Fishing firms paid considerably lower taxes
decisive moment is the transaction date . Here, predictability and management’s need to be able to plan proactively are of great importance for the market economy. However, when assessments are made as per the end of the fiscal year , it seems more rational to let these be oriented mainly towards objective factors. In these cases, so to speak, the debt or the asset already exists, leaving less room for proactivity, However, it should be noted that there may be reason for management to act proactively also before the final day of the tax year , for example, so that
retrenchment in the target companies, unsustainable debt levels, compensation levels of fund managers, and, last but not least, tax issues. Cf. J. Robertson, Private Equity Funds , 14 New Political Economy 4, p. 545-555 (2009), and H. Ordower, The Regulation of Private Equity, Hedge Funds, and State Funds , 58 The American Journal of Comparative Law (supplement), p. 295-321 (2010). For a broader analysis of the development of private equity in Europe, see N. Badu & M. Montalban, Analyzing the uneven development of private equity in Europe: legal origins and diversity of
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Arena M. and Kutner G. (2015), Territorial Tax System Reform and Corporate Financial Policies. Review of Financial Studies, Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming
This article aims to describe the development in the field of corporate tax law in Iceland, from both legal and economic point of view, with a focus on measures taken to protect the tax base and in order to try to make Iceland an attractive place for investment and establishment companies. First, there will be a brief general description of the development of the corporate tax rate in Iceland since 2004 and an overview of new taxes that have been introduced for companies over the past ten years. Second, there will be an analysis of how the Icelandic legal framework provides for incentives for investment and establishment of companies in Iceland. Third, this discussion is to be followed by a section on the steps Iceland has taken in order to combat tax avoidance. Fourth, there is a general description of the economic development for the corporate taxation in Iceland since 1990 and fifth, there is brief discussion of the development of revenues from the corporate tax. Sixth, a short overview of the real investment in the Icelandic economy is given, and finally, the main conclusions of this article will be summed up with a short discussion on the main challenges Iceland is currently facing in the field of corporate taxation in today’s globalised economy.
This paper focuses on tax evasion and tax avoidance in Iceland, and on how special interest groups have shaped the taxation system to serve their own ends. The period covered is from 1930, when the present Icelandic system of power was established, to the present.
Tax evasion is sometimes an intended, and other times an unintended response to taxation.Willful tax evasion is more likely to occur if consensus regarding fairness and equality of the tax-code is lacking. Tax evasion is an integral part of the “underground economy”, or more formally, the Non-Observed Economy (NOE).Measuring the size and scope of the NOE in general, and tax evasion in particular, is a difficult task.We compare results from three methods for estimating the size of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP): the production approach, the expenditure approach, and the income approach. The results of applying these three methods should, in principle, be identical, but they are not. We use the difference, guided by historical facts and anecdotes, to give an idea of the magnitude of tax evasion during the 20th century.
We suggest that the construction of the tax system to serve special interest groups may have disrupted the social, judicial, political and economic balance of the Icelandic “project”.
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-parent family differs fundamentally from that of a single-person household. The presence of a dependent child, and especially a preschool-aged child, creates an additional work choice. One partner can work at home providing child care and domestic services as an alternative to working in the market and buying in care and related services ( Apps and Rees 2009 ). From this perspective, the family may be viewed as a small economy engaged to varying degrees in untaxed household production and exchange, where the latter creates an implicit wage within the household. This means
Economics and Statistics, 81: 674-680.
Feldstein, M. (1995). The effect of marginal tax rates on taxable income: A panel study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Journal of Political Economy, 103: 551-572.
Fjaerli, E. and Lund., D., 2001. The choice between owner's wage and dividends under the dual income tax. Finnish Economic Papers, 14, 104-119.
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questions then arise. Is the current economy on the left or right side of the Laffer curve’s peak? And how far is the revenue maximizing tax rate, that is, what is the fiscal space? In a seminal paper, Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) characterize Laffer curves for the United States and a number of European countries using a neoclassical general equilibrium framework. The results show that the peak, that is, the revenue maximizing tax rate, of the (labor income) Laffer curve is located between tax rates of 55% and 68%, depending on the country. Furthermore, the authors find