This paper is a report on the phonological research done in the past two years investigating Podhale Goralian. The data are drawn from our informants in Dzianisz.
The paper establishes the system of surface contrasts in Goralian and identifies instances of complementary distribution. It is claimed that the renowned Podhale Archaism is no longer represented by the vowel [i]. Rather, the vowel has retracted to the central vowel [ɨ]. The original [ɨ], on the other hand, has lowered and fronted and is now best regarded as tense [e]. These transitions of vowels pose challenges for a phonological analysis. A sample of such analysis (Final Tensing) is shown in the framework of Optimality Theory.
At the SHINE-conference in Murcia in 1999 I claimed that sonnet 66 has been largely disregarded by Anglo-American critics whereas, in continental Europe, it has been frequently used as a medium of protest in crucial political situations. In the light of more recent findings I will revise this claim and draw attention to English poets and novelists from the Romantic period to Modernism reworking or working with the sonnet with a political thrust
This essay investigates three women’s cross-dressed service in the military. Hannah Snell (1723-92) served as a British marine and fought the French in India. Deborah Sampson Gannet (1760-1827) fought the British in the American Wars of Independence and Pauline Cushman (1833-1893) claimed to have disguised herself for the Union during the American Civil War. These three are, by no means, the only women to claim action and remuneration as male combatants (Jelinek 53-62),1 when the legal extent of women’s engagement was as unpaid camp followers. However, all three gave accounts of their military exploits to the public through biographies and solo performances on stage.
Each episode of Noah Hawley’s first two seasons of Fargo begins with the same claim: “this is a true story.” The claim might invite the formation of what Thomas Leitch (2007) calls a “privileged master text,” except that Hawley undermines the creation of such a text in at least two ways. On the one hand, Hawley uses his truth claim as a way to direct his audience into the film he is adapting – Joel and Ethan Coen’s (1996) film by the same name. Hawley ensures throughout his first season that those who know or who come-to-know the Coens’ work will recognize his story as an extension of the Coens’s world. Hawley references the Coens’ world so much that his audience is never entirely outside the Coens’ universe, and certainly not in any world a story based on a true event might pretend to occupy. At the same time, Hawley allows different speakers to make the opening truth claim by the end of his second season, which further prevents his truth assertion from locating viewers in any actual world. Hawley’s second move reveals that true stories are always subjective stories, which means they are always constructed stories. In this way, a true story is no more definitive than any other story. All stories are, in keeping with Jorge Luis Borges’ attitude toward definitive texts, only a draft or a version of a story. Every telling invites another, alternative retelling. A true story is, therefore, above all a story.
The present paper comments on signs of American Sign Language in the perspective of relevance theory. The main claim is that classifiers encode procedural instructions to help the addressee pick out the intended referent for the procedural referring expressions made with classifier constructions. The author explains how three classes of classifiers differently manipulate concepts to instruct the addressee to create ad hoc concepts though the use of inference, narrowing, and broadening. It is also claimed that classifier constructions do not encode a conceptual meaning, but a procedural instruction. The discussion includes illustrations of how the speaker’s using classifier constructions instead of lexical signs may increase the number of cognitive effects on the part of the addressee.
Goodwin and Innocenti (2016) have contended that giving reasons may be a form of enactment, where a claim is supported by the very activity of making the claim. In my view, the kind of interaction that these authors are considering should be analysed as a form of advocacy, and therefore as an exercitive speech act. In this paper I will suggest that acts of advocating, qua illocutions, institute a normative framework where the speaker’s obligation to justify cannot be redeemed by a mere “making reasons apparent”. In general, giving reasons is part of the procedure in virtue of which the advocate’s authority to exert influence is recognised by their addressees. This illocutionary effect should be distinguished from other perlocutionary consequences.
One of the central aims in research on anaphora is to discover the factors that determine the choice of referential expressions in discourse. Ariel (1988; 2001) offers an Accessibility Scale where referential expressions, including demonstratives, are categorized according to the values of anaphoric (i.e. textual) distance that each of these has in relation to its antecedent. The aim of this paper is to test Ariel’s (1988; 1990; 2001) claim that the choice to use proximal or distal anaphors is mainly determined by anaphoric distance. This claim is investigated in relation to singular demonstratives in a corpus of Classical Arabic (CA) prose texts by using word count to measure anaphoric distance. Results indicate that anaphoric distance cannot be taken as a consistent or reliable determinant of how anaphors are used in CA, and so Ariel’s claim is not supported by the results of this study. This also indicates that the universality of anaphoric distance, as a criterion of accessibility, is defied.
This article examines the category of present habitual in Irish English, Irish and Scots Gaelic. The latter two are frequently claimed to have had an influence on the development of the tense and aspect systems of their respective contact varieties of English. It is argued that Scots Gaelic, in contrast to Irish Gaelic, has no separately marked habitual present system, and therefore there may have been less pressure to introduce distinct habitual-present aspect into Scottish English, an assessment which is in line with research in contact linguistics.
In their Insensitive Semantics (2005) Cappelen and Lepore argue for the Controversial Aspect (CA) which is a part of their Speech Act Pluralism and which says that speakers don’t have privileged access to what they say. Gross (2006) criticizes C&L’s argument for CA and urges them to abandon that claim. I argue that on C&L’s broad understanding of the notion of what is said, CA (and whole SAP) is trivial, whereas on a more restricted understanding CA is indeed controversial and plausibly false. Moreover, the broad reading of what is said is incompatible with one of C&L’s tests for context-sensitivity.
The paper examines the use of the modal verb SHALL in the if clauses of conditionals found in legal English. The study traces the history of such usages and compares them to two uses of WILL attested in the same grammatical environment: a temporal use and a nonepistemic modal use. The comparison provides the foundation for examining the use of SHALL in Biblical translations, where this verb has outlived its demise in general English, and both of these sources inform the analysis of SHALL in legal conditionals. Specifically, it is claimed that SHALL is not inherently deontic in legal English but is used as an explicit marker of the authority vested in the author or authors of spoken and written texts. This approach explains why authority conscious drafters can use SHALL in the if clauses of conditionals and in temporal clauses whenever they want to and why the proponents of the plain language movement advocate simply deleting SHALL from legal writing and not replacing it with more popular modals expressing deontic meanings, e.g. HAVE TO, MUST, etc. It is claimed that no such replacements are recommended because there is no deontic meaning to replace and the authority designated by SHALL can be inferred from the context.