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The Loss of the Great Outdoors: Neither Correlationist Gem nor Kantian Catastrophe

. Gallois, A. (1974). ‘Berkeley’s Master Argument’. The Philosophical Review, 83(1), pp. 55-69. Grier, M. (2001). Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Guyer, P. (1987). Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Harman, G. (2015). Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Hegel, G. W. (2010). The Science of Logic (G. D. Giovanni, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

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The Situational Structure of Primate Beliefs

Abstract

This paper develops the situational model of primate beliefs from the Prior-Lurz line of thought. There is a strong skepticism concerning primate beliefs in the analytic tradition which holds that beliefs have to be propositional and non-human animals do not have them (e.g., Davidson 1975, 1982). The response offered in this paper is twofold. First, two arguments against the propositional model as applied to other animals are put forward: an a priori argument from referential opacity and an empirical argument from varieties of working memory. Second, the Prior-Lurz situational model based on state of affairs as opposed to propositions is introduced and defended with two significant modifications. With this model of primate beliefs we can make progress in understanding how other primates can have certain mindreading capacity.

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The Verisimilitudinarian approach to ‘the Truth’

Abstract

The Verisimilitudinarian approach to scientific progress (VS, for short) is traditionally considered a realist-correspondist model to explain the proximity of our best scientific theories to the way things really are in the world out there (ʻthe Truthʻ, with the capital ʻtʻ). However, VS is based on notions, such as ʻestimated verisimilitudeʻ or ʻapproximate truthʻ, that dilute the model in a functionalist-like theory. My thesis, then, is that VS tries to incorporate notions, such as ʻprogressʻ, in a pre-constituted metaphysical conception of the world, but fails in providing a fitting framework. The main argument that I will develop to support this claim is that the notions that they use to explain scientific progress (ʻestimated verisimilitudeʻ or ʻapproximate truthʻ) have nothing to do with ʻthe Truthʻ. After presenting Cevolani and Tamboloʻs answer (2013) to Birdʻs arguments (2007), I will claim that VS sacrifices the realist-correspondist truth in favor of an epistemic notion of truth, which can obviously be compatible with certain kinds of realism but not with the one the authors have in mind (the correspondence between our theories and the way things really are).

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Transcendental Phenomenology and Unobservable Entities

of Responsibility, Cham: Springer. Vallor, Shannon (2009): “The Pregnancy of the Real: A Phenomenological Defense of Experimental Realism,” Inquiry 52, 1, 1-25. Wiltsche, Harald (2017): “Science, Realism and Correlationism. A Phenomenological Critique of Meillasoux’ Argument from Ancestrality,” European Journal of Philosophy 25, 3, 808-832. Wiltsche, Harald (2012): “What is Wrong with Husserl’s Scientific Anti-Realism?” Inquiry 55, 2, 105-130.

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