politicians is likely to intensify these effects. Again and again, populists such as Victor Orbán portrayed Muslims as a burden for their host countries’ welfare systems ( Kokot 2015 ). In line with these theoretical arguments, we assume that collective deprivation matters for the support of a Muslim ban.
H9: Individuals who perceive their in-groups as collectively deprived vis-à-vis out-groups are more likely to support a Muslim ban .
At this point, we want to recall that we assume invariant causal effects of the outlined social–psychological drivers of Islamophobia
Slovak regions, as well as my surveys on the state of knowledge and opinions of the Slovak population on the wartime Slovak State and the Holocaust, ironically confirm that both possibilities may be correct. This part of our past is perceived very ambiguously, and not just by the youngest generations of Slovakia. It also reflects family interpretations of this history, the recollections of the times when grandparents or grand-grandparents were doing well… However, this situation is the result of an entire set of causes and processes, with education being just one part
same level since autumn 2015 ( Buchtík and Pilecká 2016 , 5). Securitization is the main trend in depicting the migrants in the media as well ( Břešťan 2016 ; Tkaczyk et al. 2016 ). The Moslems, mainly ignored in the political debates of the 1990s, have been exposed to a steadily growing anti-Islam discourse after 2001, which stresses that they are strangers dangerous for the allegedly “ethnically homogeneous” Czech society ( Topinka 2015 , 31–34). Public opinion demonstrates a constantly high level of distance of the Czechs in regard to the Moslems ( Topinka 2016a
images of a priori negative attitudes to work, which result in accusations of the misuse of the social system and (voluntary) life strategy of living from social benefits, high fertility rate, inappropriate sexual behavior, including family incest, poor hygiene and education, reduced intelligence skills and high crime (for more details, see Mann 2015 , 438–479). ( Mann 2015 , Krekovičová 2015 , Panczová 2015 , Podolinská 2017 ).
In connection with the faster-increasing demographic growth index of the Roma population, constantly accentuated by the media, The
compared to other institutions with more ‘pure’ nature.
The Main Crimean Tatar Institutions and Discourses After Repatriation
After the return of the Crimean Tatar people from the places of deportation to Crimea in the early 1990s, they managed to create a fairly effective system of ethnic institutions to deal with political, legal, socioeconomic, and religious issues of repatriates ( Shevel 2000 , 9-10). Among these institutions, the most influential were the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people and the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea (SAMC