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Lei Ma

Abstract

The paper presents a method of truth-graph by truth-tables. On the one hand, the truth-graph constituted by truth value coordinate and circumference displays a more visual representation of the different combinations of truth-values for the simple or complex propositions. Truth-graphs make sure that you don’t miss any of these combinations. On the other hand, they provide a more convenient tool to discern the validity of a complex proposition made up by simple compositions. The algorithm involving in setting up all the truth conditions is proposed to distinguish easily among tautologous, contradictory and consistent expressions. Furthermore, the paper discusses a certain connection between the truth graphs and the symbols for propositional connectives proposed by Stanisław Leśniewski.

Open access

Andrea Roselli

Abstract

The Verisimilitudinarian approach to scientific progress (VS, for short) is traditionally considered a realist-correspondist model to explain the proximity of our best scientific theories to the way things really are in the world out there (ʻthe Truthʻ, with the capital ʻtʻ). However, VS is based on notions, such as ʻestimated verisimilitudeʻ or ʻapproximate truthʻ, that dilute the model in a functionalist-like theory. My thesis, then, is that VS tries to incorporate notions, such as ʻprogressʻ, in a pre-constituted metaphysical conception of the world, but fails in providing a fitting framework. The main argument that I will develop to support this claim is that the notions that they use to explain scientific progress (ʻestimated verisimilitudeʻ or ʻapproximate truthʻ) have nothing to do with ʻthe Truthʻ. After presenting Cevolani and Tamboloʻs answer (2013) to Birdʻs arguments (2007), I will claim that VS sacrifices the realist-correspondist truth in favor of an epistemic notion of truth, which can obviously be compatible with certain kinds of realism but not with the one the authors have in mind (the correspondence between our theories and the way things really are).

Open access

Normunds Sūna, Madara Lazdāne, Guntis Karelis and Egils Vītols

Abstract

Sudden unexpected death in epilepsy (SUDEP) is a common cause of mortality in patients with epilepsy, but it is unknown how neurologists disclose this risk when counselling patients. This study was aimed at examining SUDEP discussion practices of neurologists in Latvia, as well as the awareness of the syndrome. Two hundred questionnaires were distributed, and we received 84 responses. We found that the majority of Latvian neurologists (79.0%) do not inform their patients of SUDEP, which is opposite to the findings in other countries. Despite the existing practice, 93.1% of neurologists believed that patients should be informed about SUDEP. A partial explanation for not discussing the negative aspects of epilepsy is that 75.3% of caregivers believe that being informed about SUDEP would cause permanent anxiety in patients, whereas 69.4% believe that it would improve compliance. This study revealed average awareness of SUDEP risk factors and warrants further studies for in-depth analysis of existing counselling practice.

Open access

Jan Woleński

Abstract

The paper discusses the concept of adequacy central for Pertażycki’s methodology. According to Petrażycki any valuable scientific theory should be adequate, that is, neither limping (to broad with respect its actual scope) nor jumping (too narrow with respect to its actual scope). Consequently, adequacy of a theory is a stronger condition than its truth. Every adequacy theory is true, but not conversely. However, there is problem, because scientific laws are conditionals (implications). This suggests that adequacy is too strong conditions, because the consequence of an implication has a wider scope than its antecedent. Thus, laws should have the form of equivalence. The paper shows how model-theoretic characterization of theories allows to recognize truth and adequacy, consistently with Petrażycki’s claims.

Open access

Christoph Raedel

Abstract

Rather than lamenting a crisis of the Ecumenical movement the author suggests that the reader look at promising paradigms that become apparent within the present changes and challenges of World Christianity. He identifies six promising trends, as Christians of different traditions recognize partners in common witness beyond their own church traditions (1), evangelical and Pentecostal churches rise in significance (2), ecumenism becomes increasingly shaped by biographical experience and personal encounter (3), a spiritual ecumenism for the witness in the world emerges (4), the reality of martyrdom deepens the sense of Christian unity (5) and the search for the truth of the Gospel is not given up (6). In their overlapping and sometimes contradictory evidence these paradigms prove Ecumenism to be alive and, therefore, changing its face.

Open access

Elena-Tereza Danciu

Abstract

In his book “The Dacians”, Hadrian Daicoviciu showed that “only a few pages have been preserved of the great book of this people’s ancient history; dozens of pages, undoubtedly among the most interesting, were lost forever and many, perhaps even more interesting, were never written by ancient authors”. There is a text that keeps coming to my mind very often, especially lately, because I have noticed that there is a tendency to remove or skip several pages of our history. The mission of a historian is to try to find out the historical truth with as many pages as possible. We should not overlook, we should not mitigate anything from our past. The lost or unwritten pages of history hinder this mission, it is true, but what should we do about the pages that were written and, deliberately, are not included in the history books?

Open access

Sergi Oms

Abstract

Jamie Tappenden was one of the first authors to entertain the possibility of a common treatment for the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes. In order to deal with these two paradoxes he proposed using the Strong Kleene semantic scheme. This strategy left unexplained our tendency to regard as true certain sentences which, according to this semantic scheme, should lack truth value. Tappenden tried to solve this problem by using a new speech act, articulation. Unlike assertion, which implies truth, articulation only implies non-falsity. In this paper I argue that Tappenden’s strategy cannot be successfully applied to truth and the Liar.

Open access

Jared Schroeder

Abstract

Truth as a fundamental ingredient within the flow of discourse and the application of freedom of expression in democratic society has historically received considerable attention from the U.S. Supreme Court. Many of the Court’s central precedents regarding First Amendment concerns have been determined by how justices have understood truth and how they have conceptualized the complex relationship truth and falsity share. Despite the attention truth has received, however, the Court has not provided a consistent understanding of its meaning. For these reasons, this article examines how the Supreme Court has conceptualized truth in freedom-of-expression cases, ultimately drawing upon the results of that analysis, as well as pragmatic approaches to philosophy, the so called “pragmatic method” put forth by American philosopher William James, to propose a unifying conceptualization of truth that could be employed to help the Court provide consistency within its precedents regarding the meaning of a concept that has been central to the Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment since, in many ways, another pragmatist and friend of James’s, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, substantially addressed truth in his dissent in Abrams v. United States. The article concludes by proposing that the courts conceptualize the nature of truth via three substantially related understandings: that truth is a process, that it is experience-funded, and that it is not absolute and is best approached without prejudice. Each of the three ingredients relates, at least to some extent, with thematic understandings put forth by the Court in previous freedom-of-expression cases, and therefore does not represent a significant departure from justices’ traditional approaches to truth. The model, most ideally, does seek, with the help of pragmatic thought and ideas put forth by Justice Holmes, to encourage consistent recognition of certain principles regarding truth as justices go about considering its nature in First Amendment cases.

Open access

Joshua Rodda

Abstract

This article reaches out to the audience for controversial religious writing after the English Reformation, by examining the shared language of attainable truth, of clarity and certainty, to be found in Protestant and Catholic examples of the same. It argues that we must consider those aspects of religious controversy that lie simultaneously above and beneath its doctrinal content: the logical forms in which it was framed, and the assumptions writers made about their audiences’ needs and responses. Building on the work of Susan Schreiner and others on the notion of certainty through the early Reformation, the article asks how English polemicists exalted and opened up that notion for their readers’ benefit, through proclamations of visibility, accessibility and honest dealing. Two case studies are chosen, in order to make a comparison across confessional lines: first, Protestant (and Catholic) reactions against the Jesuit doctrine of equivocation in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, which emphasized honesty and encouraged fear of hidden meaning; and second, Catholic opposition to the notion of an invisible-or relatively invisible-church. It is argued that the language deployed in opposition to these ideas displays a shared emphasis on the clear, certain, and reliable, and that which might be attained by human means. Projecting the emphases and assertions of these writers onto their audience, and locating it within a contemporary climate, the article thus questions the emphasis historians of religion place on the intangible-on faith-in considering the production and the reception of Reformation controversy.

Open access

Krystyna Rybińska

Abstract

This article attempts to re-signify the already extensively discussed conception of the absurd attributed to the aesthetic phenomenon presented by the so-called theatre of the absurd by critically reconsidering its paradigmatic work Waiting for Godot in relation to philosophical hermeneutics (Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur). The fact that Beckett’s artistic method invalidates the transparency of the mirror-like relation between reality and art is known, and yet the potential theoretical consequences of such a literary revolution do not seem to have been exhausted - particularly in respect to the category of the absurd. Hence, the presented inquiry aims to view the phenomenon quite against its common conceptualizations derived from existentialist philosophy in order to indicate a possible route of exploring it from a hermeneutic perspective and thereby challenging, to some extent, Simon Critchley’s (2004: 165) famous assertion that Beckett’s oeuvre seems “uniquely resistant to philosophical interpretation”.