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Open access

Susan E. McGregor, Franziska Roesner and Kelly Caine

Abstract

A free and open press is a critical piece of the civil-society infrastructure that supports both established and emerging democracies. However, as the professional activities of reporting and publishing are increasingly conducted by digital means, computer security and privacy risks threaten free and independent journalism around the globe. Through interviews with 15 practicing journalists and 14 organizational stakeholders (supervising editors and technologists), we reveal the distinct - and sometimes conflicting-computer security concerns and priorities of different stakeholder groups within journalistic institutions, as well as unique issues in journalism compared to other types of organizations. As these concerns have not been deeply studied by those designing computer security practices or technologies that may benefit journalism, this research offers insight into some of the practical and cultural constraints that can limit the computer security and privacy practices of the journalism community as a whole. Based on these findings, we suggest paths for future research and development that can bridge these gaps through new tools and practices.

Open access

Hamza Harkous, Rameez Rahman, Bojan Karlas and Karl Aberer

Abstract

Third party apps that work on top of personal cloud services, such as Google Drive and Drop-box, require access to the user’s data in order to provide some functionality. Through detailed analysis of a hundred popular Google Drive apps from Google’s Chrome store, we discover that the existing permission model is quite often misused: around two-thirds of analyzed apps are over-privileged, i.e., they access more data than is needed for them to function. In this work, we analyze three different permission models that aim to discourage users from installing over-privileged apps. In experiments with 210 real users, we discover that the most successful permission model is our novel ensemble method that we call Far-reaching Insights. Far-reaching Insights inform the users about the data-driven insights that apps can make about them (e.g., their topics of interest, collaboration and activity patterns etc.) Thus, they seek to bridge the gap between what third parties can actually know about users and users’ perception of their privacy leakage. The efficacy of Far-reaching Insights in bridging this gap is demonstrated by our results, as Far-reaching Insights prove to be, on average, twice as effective as the current model in discouraging users from installing over-privileged apps. In an effort to promote general privacy awareness, we deployed PrivySeal, a publicly available privacy-focused app store that uses Far-reaching Insights. Based on the knowledge extracted from data of the store’s users (over 115 gigabytes of Google Drive data from 1440 users with 662 installed apps), we also delineate the ecosystem for 3rd party cloud apps from the standpoint of developers and cloud providers. Finally, we present several general recommendations that can guide other future works in the area of privacy for the cloud. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work that tackles the privacy risk posed by 3rd party apps on cloud platforms in such depth.