The corporate governance quality has always been a decision criterion for investments, many recent studies trying to define metrics in order to help investors in their decision process. In this paper we investigate whether the clustering of companies’ information concerning their corporate governance politics and financial information could be mapped with the help of clustering. Our approach is to build clusters using machine learning techniques, based on corporate governance and financial variables from a number of 1400 listed companies. We evaluate the obtained clusters by matching them with the classes of two well-known indicators (Tobin’s Q and Altman Z-score), used to estimate the companies’ performance. We obtain partial matches of the benchmark variables and we compare the performances of the used algorithms.
The executive remuneration policy of financial institutions has been indicated as one of the key factors that led to the recent financial crisis. As a consequence a number of legislative initiatives and best practices have been imposed,aimed at strengthening existing and creating new standards of good corporate governance at banks. The purpose of this article is to assess the effectiveness of Poland’s new regulations concerning banks' executive pay, which were introduced in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. The research results indicate that the new legal rules have not been fully enforced. Public banks in Poland are not fulfilling the reporting obligations imposed by law and international principles. Given the crucial importance of executive remuneration policy in the financial sector to the stability of the banking sector, the inability to evaluate the progress made in the adjustment of executive remuneration practices to the new regulations may be perceived as one of the important risk factors that has not been effectively eliminated or even reduced in Poland yet.
Purpose: This study is aimed at analyzing the influence of the size of the board of directors, audit committee, institutional ownership and managerial ownership on the financial performance of manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange.
Methodology: The study analyses 156 Indonesia firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange using linear regression analysis.
Findings: The results indicated that the size of the board of directors has a positive effect on financial performance, while the size of the audit committee, institutional ownership and managerial ownership has no effect on the financial performance. While on the simultaneously testing, it showed that the size of the board of directors, audit committee size, institutional ownership and managerial ownership influence the financial performance.
Research limitations/implications: The research has been limited to the manufacturing sector of Indonesian companies and the internal mechanism of corporate governance. The study suggests considering an external mechanism of corporate governance as predictor variables.
Originality: The study adds to the literature of corporate government and firm performance in emerging countries. The study implies that corporate governance mechanism for audit committee, managerial ownership and institutional ownership do not enhance company performance. The average size of an audit committee just to fulfill the regulation. Corporate governance mechanism that improve financial performance is size board director. Improvement in board performance as board size increase has positive impact that enhance financial performance of company.
Respecting the importance of corporate governance (CG), particularly various corporate governance mechanisms for improving corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, the paper highlights relevant CG–CSR synergies from the perspective of systems thinking. The paper further aims to demonstrate the ways in which selected systems methodologies can support CG–CSR synergies. Accordingly, we selected appropriate systems methodologies, such as dialectical systems theory, soft systems methodology, and system dynamics. We defined the dialectical system, consisting of essential corporate governance mechanisms, which contribute to CSR; we also identified the key stakeholders and their perceptions of CG–CSR relations through CATWOE analysis; thus, the appropriate root definition and conceptual model, including the activities that are relevant for CG–CSR relations, were developed. Developed systemic framework provided a relevant methodological support to highlight the various issues of corporate governance, such as institutional framework, market for corporate control, ownership structure, board structure, and their contribution to CSR.
The central point of this paper is to present the results of comparative case study research concerning the impact of the interplay between formal and informal institutions in the corporate governance systems (CGS) of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). Particular focus was put on the values of the corporate governance codes (CGC) of CEECs, as well as on transparent ownership structures, transactions with related parties, the protection of minority shareholders, independent members of supervisory boards, and separation between the CEO position and the chairman of the board of directors. The main subject of interest concerns two research areas: the character of the relationship between formal and informal institutions, as well as whether the interplay between them is relevant to the CGSs of CEECs. Moreover, the author investigates whether the CGCs of CEECs consist of regulations that are compatible with the values set up in preambles using research methods such as individual case study or deductive reasoning. The conclusion presented in the paper was drawn on the basis of a review of the literature and research on national and European corporate governance regulations, as well as the CGC of CEECs. The primary contribution this article makes is to advance the stream of research beyond any single country setting, and to link the literature on the interplay between formal and informal institutions related to CGSs in a broad range of economies in transition (‘catch up’ countries) like CEECs. This paper provides an understanding of how the interplay between formal and informal institutions may influence the CGCs of CEECs.
Ibrahim S. Alley, Abimbola L. Adebayo and Blessing O. Oligbi
Most studies on corporate governance recognize endogeneity in the nexus between corporate governance and financial performance. Little attention has, however, been paid to the direction of causality between the two phenomena, and hence the Vector Error Correction (VEC) model, which allows for endogenous determination of the direction of causality, has not been widely employed. This study fills that gap by estimating the nexus and the direction of causality using the VEC model to analyze panel data on selected listed firms in Nigeria. The results agree with the findings of most previous studies that corporate governance significantly affects financial performance. Board skills, board composition and management skills enhanced financial performance indicators – return on equity (ROE), return on asset (ROA) and net profit margin (NPM); in many occasions, significantly. Board size and audit committee size did not, and can actually undermine financial performance. More importantly, financial performance did not significantly affect corporate governance. On the basis of the lag structure of the VEC model, this study affirms unidirectional causality in the nexus, running from corporate governance to financial performance, nullifying the hypothesis of bidirectional causality in the nexus.
The article presents a view (on the basis of theoretical and empirical analysis) of corporate governance models used in Polish family businesses through financial performance. The empirical analysis covered a sample of 24,000 Polish family businesses in the period of 2008–2013. The use of linear regression has allowed the authors to verify the hypothesis concerning the occurrence of differences in profitability ratios in groups of family businesses using variant management models and allowed verifying the relationship between the degree of control and involvement of the owners in management and financial performance. The received results, though inconclusive, indicate that the involvement of the owner in the governance process can affect the financial aspect of a business. The prepared empirical analysis and conclusions of the article contribute to a better understanding of the measures taken on management and control decisions; what is more, they can provide guidance to the owners of family businesses in shaping the corporate governance model.
The paper aims to develop our understanding of the processes and mechanisms leading to economic instability. The research design and methods: the paper employs a simple game-theoretic model aimed at depicting why the mechanism connecting nonmaterial motivation of managers and the propensity of economic systems is unstable. The findings are as follows: managers, driven by the nonmaterial value of work, choose strategies that maximize the likelihood of prolonging their employment. Shortsighted CEOs may prefer strategies that offer smooth returns and an unlikely “catastrophic event.” If the unification of strategies occurs, the situation leads to a crisis and recession in the long run. The model put forth in this paper is shown to resemble the mechanism of the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
Zuzana Brinčíková, Marek Kálovec, Colin W. Lawson and Eva Muchová
Fourteen Slovak state-owned enterprises were studied, using published data and structured interviews with management. A novel methodology is used to assess SOE autonomy, effectiveness, accountability and governance. Variations in operating conditions reflect different government objectives and different ownership models. Mixed state-private firms performed more like competitive firms than did wholly state-owned SOEs. This information was fed into an assessment of Slovak SOEs’ compliance with the 2015 OECD Guidelines on SOE Corporate Governance. There are many differences between Slovak practice and the Guidelines. This may reflect a choice to favour government interests, rather than the OECD’s inclusion of a wider group of stakeholders. One cost is foregone efficiency gains. Another is the perception that the present highly opaque governance system hides corruption.