Four Basic Arguments in Defence of Preservation of Sovereign Statehood
European integration entity ceased to be just a forum for negotiations between independent and sovereign nation states. To some extent it overlaps with the states and becomes their competitor. In this context, the classical concept of state sovereignty loses its original content and meaning. The participation in the integration project opens the question whether it takes away or weakens sovereignty of Member States? This paper puts on four arguments to proof the hypothesis that Czech Republic continues to be a sovereign country even aft er accession to the European Union.
This paper analyses the question of how to perceive the traditional theoretical concept of state sovereignty vis-á-vis European integration. Within the European project we face the paradox of having two authorities claiming autonomy and dominance. It is undisputable that the European Union is behaving like an autonomous public power - the new sovereign of its kind. But at the same time the Member States also maintain their sovereign statehood. This duality cannot be comprehended together with the old characteristics of sovereignty, which accepts only one holder of this feature. To reconcile the phenomena of European integration and the concept of sovereignty, we must shift into new definitions of the latter. This paper argues in favour of the acceptation of a shared sovereignty concept.
Free movement of capital and payments represents the youngest of the freedoms within the single internal market of the European Union. Th e title “youngest” points on the very slow release of capital markets within the European Community and the European Union which leads to the tardy development of this freedom. It is young also from the view of the legal effects because it was the last of the freedom where direct effect of basal Treaty provision was accepted by the Court of Justice. In the heading of this article I awarded the forth freedom with the adjective “overlooked” which is clearly my subjective opinion on the approach of the EU law scholars to this part of the internal market law. In the most of the substantive textbooks and casebooks we may find only marginal space devoted to this field, especially in comparison with the other market freedoms. My objective is to off er and general introductive insight to this area and to certain extent cover the emerging gap.
The paper focuses on the very topical issue of conclusion of the membership of the State, namely the United Kingdom, in European integration structures. The question of termination of membership in European Communities and European Union has not been tackled for a long time in the sources of European law. With the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), the institute of 'unilateral' withdrawal was introduced. It´s worth to say that exit clause was intended as symbolic in its nature, in fact underlining the status of Member States as sovereign entities. That is why this institute is very general and the legal regulation of the exercise of withdrawal contains many gaps. One of them is a question of absolute or relative nature of exiting from integration structures. Today’s “exit clause” (Art. 50 of Treaty on European Union) regulates only the termination of membership in the European Union and is silent on the impact of such a step on membership in the European Atomic Energy Community. The presented paper offers an analysis of different variations of the interpretation and solution of the problem. It´s based on the independent solution thesis and therefore rejects an automatism approach. The paper and topic is important and original especially because in the multitude of scholarly writings devoted to Brexit questions, vast majority of them deals with institutional questions, the interpretation of Art. 50 of Treaty on European Union; the constitutional matters at national UK level; future relation between EU and UK and political bargaining behind such as all that. The question of impact on withdrawal on Euratom membership is somehow underrepresented. Present paper attempts to fill this gap and accelerate the scholarly debate on this matter globally, because all consequences of Brexit already have and will definitely give rise to more world-wide effects.
The paper deals with the non-normative impacts of the EU law in the national legal systems (Czech Republic in particular) and focuses on the approach of the Czech Constitutional Court (CCC) towards the so-called principle of indirect effect of EU law. The authors examine the case law of CCC and offer the conclusions about the place, constitutional relevance and (national) limits of the EU-consistent interpretation of national law. CCC up to date case law clearly indicates that a EU-consistent interpretation is the most ideal tool for meeting the Czech Republic’s membership obligations. But it is simultaneously a tool for preserving the autonomy of the national authorities applying law and reduces possible tensions between supranational and nation law. CCC accepts the indirect effect broadly and used this concept even in controversial cases (European arrest warrant, State responsibility for damages etc.). But still it does not approach this effect without reservations. CCC points on the necessity to protect the fundamental constitutional values (‘Solange’ concept) even in connection with the duty of EU-consistent interpretation.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate and differentiate between the phenomena of cyberwarfare and information warfare, as manifestations of what we perceive as postmodern warfare. We describe and analyse the current examples of the use the postmodern warfare and the reactions of states and international bodies to these phenomena. The subject matter of this paper is the relationship between new types of postmodern conflicts and the law of armed conflicts (law of war). Based on ICJ case law, it is clear that under current legal rules of international law of war, cyber attacks as well as information attacks (often performed in the cyberspace as well) can only be perceived as “war” if executed in addition to classical kinetic warfare, which is often not the case. In most cases perceived “only” as a non-linear warfare (postmodern conflict), this practice nevertheless must be condemned as conduct contrary to the principles of international law and (possibly) a crime under national laws, unless this type of conduct will be recognized by the international community as a “war” proper, in its new, postmodern sense.