In opposition to the traditional empiricist understanding of phantasy as a copy of perception and therefore as a weakened form of experience, this paper interprets phantasy as an independent and creative modus of consciousness that is responsible for the individuation of the subject. The article reconstructs Husserl’s approach to phantasy as a specific kind of intentional operation as well as its relationship with mood-intentionality, bodily-kinesthetic expressivity and with hyletic anticipation as a structure of sensibility. In this way, the bi-valence of human experiential orders is claimed and the concept of bodily phantasy is pointed out. This leads the phenomenological analysis closer to the psychoanalytical approach to fantasy. The latter is investigated with reference to Freud’s concept of primary processual thinking and Gaddini’s understanding of bodily phantasy as a specific individuation factor within the personal history of bonding
Modern empirical research considers happiness to be identical with a subjective feeling of pleasure. This refers to both assessments of actual satisfactions of need and representations of possible satisfactions of need. Thereby, the aspects of cognitive representations of happiness are mainly focused, while the performing subject remains disregarded. The phenomenological approach tries to counteract such a situation. Phenomenology allows us to differentiate ‘striving towards happiness’ and the ‘experienced happiness’ as different polarities of this phenomenon. Based on this three aspects can be distinguished: (1) the present experience of happiness as an experience of satisfying actual urgent needs; (2) the temporally enduring form of (self-)satisfaction in the individual life; (3) the ethical form of happiness as felicity (Glückseligkeit) implying the teleological determination of human existence realized through socialization. In this paper, these aspects are considered phenomenological through intentional genetic analysis and taking into account some psychoanalytic results. This article aims at showing that happiness, particularly in the ethical form of felicity, cannot be considered as merely an individual issue, but is rather closely related to the sociality of human experience and to the intersubjective constitution of our shared reality.