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Shaho Gandoman Heidari and Gerasimos Soldatos

Abstract

The present paper attempts to investigate the challenges of taxation in Iran based on the tax behavior of construction companies in Kurdistan Province. From a 165 questionnaires, Scheffe and Friedman tests were applied to test the following research hypotheses: Efficiency of tax laws, the role of tax experts in filing correct tax reports, the extent to which willing or unwilling tax noncompliance is detectable, and the effectiveness of penalties considering the case of construction companies. The evidence rejects tax law efficiency as well as the efficiency of the penalty-reward system and confirms the negative impact of tax noncompliance on tax revenue. Also, interestingly enough, neither the input of financial expertise in filling out tax reports nor the role of accounting information when taxable income is reported is shown to be statistically significant. Altogether these results point to a highly problematic tax regime in Iran at least in so far as corporate tax from construction companies in Iranian Kurdistan is concerned.

Open access

Gerasimos T. Soldatos

Abstract

This paper investigates the economic conditions under which the performance of a Judiciary does not impede non-coercive fair socioeconomic allocations under “Strotz-myopia” regarding the law variable, i.e. under a static view of it in an otherwise dynamic context. The law, here, is the positive factor by which consumption volume is multiplied as a result of law introduction in an otherwise fully private social economy. Lexicographic preferences regarding the law is the keyword in establishing non-coercive equilibria either in the static context of a stone-age economy or in the dynamic context of a jungle economy, given in the latter the presence of farsightedness. Nevertheless, such equilibria are found here to exist even under myopia and regardless the presence of lexicographic preferences. We first detect them within a fully private social economy, and we next qualify them by introducing the Judiciary as state officials. The optimality regarding state finances imposes additional restrictions in establishing myopic noncoercive equilibria. In any case, an equilibrium will be stable if it is not influenced by the homotheticity or not of the preferences, i.e. by income distribution considerations. So, any suboptimal behaviour of the Judiciary should be attributed exclusively to the suboptimality of state finances: Macroeconomics does affect law administration.