Japanese and South Korean Official Development Assistance (ODA): A Comparative Analysis of Rhetoric and Behaviour

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Abstract

This research aims at reviewing the coherence of rhetoric and behaviour of Japanese and South Korean aid policy. By using the theoretical framework of role theory, the role conceptions of Japanese and South Korean policymakers are compared with the actual role performances of the countries. A four step methodological approach is chosen. First, the aid-related rhetoric of policymakers between 2005 and 2012 is analysed. By using qualitative content analysis, six role conceptions are identified (“Bridge”, “Model”, “Respected Member of the International Community”, “Responsible Leader”, “Partner”, “Newcomer”). Second, commitment indicators found in the role conceptions are compared to aid disbursement data from the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System. Third, two case studies—an Asian and an African recipient country (Vietnam and Tanzania)—are presented to provide additional information on qualitative indicators. Finally, role performances are set in the context of the previously derived role conceptions. As a result, role gaps are identified for both donors, whereas in two instances respectively role performance is coherent with role conception. Japan acts as a “Bridge” and “Partner”, while South Korea is a “Newcomer” and to some extent a “Partner”. This research shows that the reliability of aid related commitments of Japan and South Korea is overall quite weak, thereby contributing to a deeper understanding of the two countries’ roles in the international aid community by linking the fields of Foreign Policy Analysis, role theory, and Official Development Assistance.

Keywords: Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), Japan, Official Development Assistance (ODA), Qualitative Content Analysis, Role Theory, Republic of Korea

Introduction

Official Development Assistance (ODA), or commonly known as foreign aid, is an integral tool of foreign policy (cf. Islam 1991; Lancaster 2007; Morgenthau 1962). In essence, it is a mechanism of resource transfer from a developed country government to developing country governments, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), or International Organisations through official public agencies, which has to adhere to previously defined standards (OECD 2008). However, what donors promise to give and what they actually give cannot always be assumed to be the same (cf. Easterly and Williamson 2011). It is thus essential to understand the gaps between official rhetoric and actual behaviour, as they can have tangible impacts on governments and people in the developing world.

In the 1950s and early 1960s, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) was developed as a subfield of International Relations with a focus on actors in the process of foreign policy decision-making (cf. Rosenau 1966; Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 1954; Sprout and Sprout 1965). Holsti (1970) was the first to use sociological role theory for FPA by analysing the roles states took on in the international system. Role theory is rooted in psychological and sociological theories and related to constructivist work on identity, self-images, culture, and norms. It was further developed to understand state’s foreign policy conceptions, behaviour, and expectations by other states (cf. Hermanns 2013; Hook 1995; Kaya 2012; Wish 1980). Breuning (1995) used role theory to compare donors’ aid rhetoric with their behaviour, which sparked the idea for this theoretical framework.

Two donors of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) are considered for this research: Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Amongst DAC donors, Japan stands out not only as one of the largest donors in absolute amounts, but also as one of the most widely criticised based on allegations that it prioritises economic interests over the environmental concerns. The emergence of Japan as a foreign aid power in the late 1980s and during the 1990s led to wide interest in Japanese ODA and its effects (cf. Arase 1995; Ensign 1992; Fukushima 2000; Islam 1991; Lukner 2006; Orr 1990; Rix 1989–1990; Söderberg 1996). The second donor, South Korea, is the newest member of the DAC. South Korea’s transition from an aid recipient to an aid donor and the characteristics of Korean ODA were targeted by recent research (cf. Choi 2011; Chun, Munyi and Lee 2010; Kim, Kim and Kim 2013; Kim and Oh 2012). Kang, Lee and Park (2011) compared the two states in regard to ODA and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), but no research has been conducted that compares the two donors’ ODA rhetoric with their ODA behaviour as done in this study.

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1 Henceforth referred to as “South Korea” or simply “Korea”.

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This paper aims at reviewing the coherence of rhetoric and behaviour of Japanese and South Korean ODA by examining role conceptions and role performances of the two donor states. The comparative approach allows for examining differences and similarities between these donors in order to provide a broader picture of aid policy. The research is guided by three questions: How do Japan and South Korea portray themselves in the international donor community? In what way do actions undertaken by Japan and South Korea with regard to Official Development Assistance support the stated rhetoric? To what extent is a gap between rhetoric and behaviour evident and what similarities and differences between the two donors can be derived?

This research has broad implications for linking role theory research with FPA, as it will show the incoherence in Japanese and South Korean ODA rhetoric and behaviour. The analysis below provides a comprehensive picture of Japanese and South Korean ODA commitments and general rhetoric, their behaviour and the gaps between the two between 2005 and 2012.²

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

A brief overview of the link between role theory and FPA as well as an explanation of the relevant terminology are initially provided in order to explain the chosen methodology. The complexity of the research questions requires both a qualitative and a quantitative approach; thus a multi-step analysis was conducted, which will be explained in this section.

Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)

Role theory is rooted in psychological and sociological theories, which is related to constructivist work on identity, self-images, culture, and norms (Breuning 2011: 22). The underlying assumption of role theory in FPA is that individuals and states, as social collectives, can be compared (Wendt 1992: 397, n. 21; Harnisch, Frank and Maull 2011a: 1). Underlying this conception is the assumption that nation states remain the main actors within the international system due to their control over instruments of coercion and violence (Rosenau 1976: 5). States operate as actors as they create and show the collective identities inherent in state formation (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996: 59). As a result, states are constitutive elements of the

² The time period of examination was chosen due to the endorsement of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 (OECD 2005/2008) and the most recent disbursement data available from 2012. South Korea joined the DAC in 2009, allowing for a comparison of the rhetoric and behaviour shortly before and after the succession.
international, social community, playing exactly that role in the system (Wendt 1999: 327). In the context of official development assistance, transfers must be made by official public agencies, either directly from state or local governments or from executive agencies (OECD 2008). Thus, the advantage of focusing on the nation state allows viewing the actions of these agencies as a reflection of the result of domestic decision-making processes.

Roles are not based on detailed prescriptions but entail a process by which an actor “takes on” a particular role and are thus not constant or predictable (Aggestam 2006: 16), they are the dynamic aspects of an actor’s positions in a social structure (Edström 1988: 8). Role theory strives to understand the cognitive aspects of how roles are perceived by actors in the international environment through the interaction of domestic ideational and material sources (Breuning 2011: 26). Roles are dynamically reconstructed and recreated, but the degree of actual change depends on material and immaterial sources that can hold them constant over a long period of time (Harnisch, Frank and Maull 2011a: 2). Role theory, as the theoretical framework of this research, allows investigating the self-image and actual behaviour of the two donor countries (cf. Aggestam 2006; Breuning 2011; Edström 1988).

Holsti (1970) was the first to adapt a role theoretical model to political science research. He undertook a cross-national study with numerous states in order to understand the perceptions decision-makers have of their own state, thus, providing a subjective dimension of foreign policy (Aggestam 2006: 12). The underlying assumption was that role conceptions direct choices (Holsti 1970) and explain differences in behaviour, which was supported by Wish (1980). Holsti further found that decision-makers reflected several roles depending on issue areas, regions, or relationships (Holsti 1970: 253, 277). Three different role concepts can be distinguished: role expectations, role conceptions, and role performance (cf. Figure 1).

**Role Expectations**

Role expectations or prescriptions are held by other actors in a system and prescribe or set expectations for the behaviour of an actor (Holsti 1970: 240; Aggestam 2006: 18). They can be norms or cultural, societal, institutional, or group expectations for certain positions or statuses in the international system (Holsti 1970: 239). Expectations can be either implicit or explicit and vary in their scope, specificity, communality, and obligation (Harnisch 2011: 8). Other actors can either be another actor in the system or a formal or informal institution, which defines or constrains roles or expectations of roles (Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Keohane 1988; Searing 1991). Normative expectations that are a requirement for the membership in certain institutions can be studied with regard to role expectations, which show how appropriate
foreign policy behaviour for specific roles is perceived by other actors (Aggestam 2006: 19; cf. Edström 1988).

Role Conceptions

Role conceptions are an actor’s self-defined status in the system in relation to others as well as the actor’s perception of others’ expectations (Holsti 1970: 240; Harnisch 2011: 8). In this sense, they are closely related to foreign policy (Edström 1988: 100). In foreign policy, responsibilities and obligations are defined through an actor’s subjective, normative expectations of its own behaviour and provide guidelines and standards effecting decision-making (Aggestam 2006: 19; Wish 1980: 533). Both an actor’s social identity and cultural heritage are as much a determinant for role conception as the interaction with others (Breuning 2011: 25; Harnisch 2011: 8; Searing 1991: 1246). On the other hand, material characteristics have a role to play in the self-conception of actors, based on the perceived and mediated importance given to them by the actors (Breuning 2011: 18; Aggestam 2006: 22). Conceptions are held by agents such as policymakers, who speak on behalf of a state, constitute decisions, commitments, rules, and actions for the state and define its functions in the system (Breuning 2011: 20). Role conceptions are no determinants for policy action, but provide the actor with a set of options and strategies within which he or she can operate. Depending on the formalisation of institutions that guide action, there remains some flexibility for interpretation by the agents (Aggestam 2006: 20–21).

Role Performance

Role performance refers to the characteristic patterns of the behaviour of actors, including attitudes, decisions, and actions, for the implementation of a certain policy. Thus, both verbal (i.e. decisions) and non-verbal (i.e. actions) political behaviour is relevant. It is assumed that role performance originates from or is consistent with role conceptions of national needs and demands, whereas role expectations and critical external events and trends influence both role performance and role conceptions (Aggestam 2006: 20–21; Breuning 2011: 25; Holsti 1970: 240, 243–245). Actions need to be interpreted within a context that implies causal and effectual relationships, as they themselves do not suggest how they are to be interpreted (Graber 1976: 16, 19). The interpretation of role performance is, thus, given by an agent’s verbal presentation of roles (Edström 1988: 100). In this regard, the agents are expected to mean what they say, even though the vagueness of statements as a tool for policymakers can also provide valuable information (Edström 1988:
Thus, both rhetoric and behaviour become important variables for this analysis.

![Role Theory Diagram](Image)

Source: Author’s adaptation based on Breuning 2011: 26; Holsti 1970: 245; Aggestam 2006: 26

**Role Incompatibility and Change**

Incompatibilities can arise between the three role concepts, which have been analytically categorised in previous role research. Most interesting for this study is the notion of role gaps. These occur when incoherence exists either between the role conception of an actor and the role expectations by external actors (Edström 1988: 109–110), or between role conception and performance (Elgström and Smith 2006: 248; Harnisch, Frank and Maull 2011b: 254). Former scholarship on roles of actors has identified the need for further individual and comparative research on the relationship between role conceptions and performances (Elgström and Smith 2006: 248–250; Harnisch, Frank and Maull 2011b: 261), on which this study will focus on with the cases of Japan and South Korea.
Linking Role Theory with Foreign Aid

Understanding statements made by political decision-makers as a speech act—developed by the Copenhagen School\(^3\)—helps to conceptualise rhetoric as a manifestation of state actors’ role conceptions. Speech act statements do not simply describe role conceptions; they constitute them (cf. Kratochwil 1995; Onuf 2013). It can therefore be recognised that the definition of an issue area is socially constructed; subsequently, objective definitions of international norms and standards do not suffice as reference points for donor’s ODA behaviour (cf. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998). The focus on the speech act highlights the decision-making process and creativity of political action (Williams 2003: 520–521). The role of agency is important in this regard, as statements are assumed to be actions with a real or potential consequence (Balzacq 2005: 186, 188). In this context, the Copenhagen School is linked to the constructivist tradition (Watson 2012: 292; Williams 2003: 514). While the School concentrated on securitisation as an important issue of foreign policy (cf. Buzan and Wæver 2003; Gad and Petersen 2011; Huysmanns 2011; Stritzel 2007), ODA seems similarly applicable as the speech act aims to justify ODA for the national audience.

It can therefore be argued that statements by decision-makers influence ODA policy behaviour (Stokke 2009: 16; cf. Breuning 1995). In summary, the Copenhagen School only serves as a tool rather than a guiding theory for this study. By constituting ODA policy as a speech act, issues linked to this policy in the rhetoric of Japanese and South Korean policymakers can be identified. The usefulness of this approach when examining aid practice becomes evident, as many studies found discrepancies between donors’ commitments and their behaviour (cf. Easterly and Williamson 2011; Neumayer 2003; Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998; Yamaguchi 2005). At the same time, a comprehensive comparison of Japanese and South Korean aid, based on their self-defined role conceptions in aid policy, has not been attempted. This study, thus, provides a new approach to Japanese and South Korean foreign aid policy, as well as a contribution to the scholarship of role theory in foreign policy analysis.

Methodology

The objective of this study is to examine the coherence of self-defined role conceptions with role performances of Japanese and South Korean ODA policy. To arrive at roles for comparison, a four-step analysis is chosen to identify role conceptions, role performances, and possible gaps between the two. The time period of examina-

\(^3\) Most influential in the establishment of the Copenhagen School were Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998), who used the analytical tools of speech act theory (Watson 2012: 283).
tion ranges from 2005, when the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was endorsed by the international donor community—including both donor countries (OECD 2005/2008: 12)—to 2012, which marks the most recent disbursement data available. During this time period no new major crises emerged that would have triggered an increased focus of aid to a specific country or region, thus allowing for a rather unbiased analysis of aid disbursements. South Korea joined the DAC in 2009, which makes it possible to compare rhetoric and behaviour shortly before and after the succession. Despite a change of the respective ruling governments of both countries during the time period, no obvious alterations to ODA rhetoric or behaviour are found in this research.

The first step of analysis is the identification of Japanese and South Korean self-defined role conceptions, for which an inductive approach is chosen. A similar methodology was applied by Holsti (1970) and later others (cf. Edström 1988; Kaya 2012; Wish 1980). The centre of interest is the political reality as experienced by agents, such as policymakers (Aggestam 2006: 13; Kaya 2012: 20). The identification of role conceptions in foreign aid is achieved by a qualitative content analysis of 55 Japanese and 46 South Korean speeches and statements by policymakers. Within the Japanese ODA structure, the prime, foreign, and finance ministers are chosen, whereas in South Korea the president, foreign and trade, and strategy and finance ministers best reflect the decision-making authorities on ODA policy. Due to the international aspect of foreign aid, speeches to the international public available in English are preferred. The qualitative content analysis is based on Forschauer and Lueger’s (2003) topic analysis approach.

In the second step, commitment indicator categories for examining the quantitative disbursement data are developed and analysed accordingly. This is done by comparing aid standards as defined in the role conceptions of the donors themselves and previous academic literature on donor aid practices. Commitment indicators are then compared to aid disbursement data from the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) (OECD 2014), a database for official aid flows by donors. The database is chosen due to consistency and comparability with previous research, as well as official enforcers and standardised data collectors (cf. Breunig 1995; Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani 2004; Easterly and Pﬁzte 2008; Easterly and Williamson 2011; Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998; Thiele, Nunnenkamp and Dreher 2007). For indicators not sufﬁciently included in the database, NGO datasets are used (e.g. Freedom House; The Heritage Foundation), as well as other datasets of international organisations (e.g. World Bank, UNDP).

However, some commitment indicators could not be derived from quantitative disbursement data, requiring a qualitative analysis of additional case studies. The case studies of the two major recipient countries during the time period—Vietnam and Tanzania—are undertaken in the third step to provide additional insights into role performance.
Finally, role performances are set in the context of the previously derived role conceptions. Thereby the coherence of roles can be analysed and possible role gaps identified. This final step further allows the comparison between Japanese and South Korean roles and role gaps in foreign aid.

The Rhetoric of Japanese and South Korean Political Decision-Makers on Aid

Even though the qualitative content analysis is inductive, the policy speeches of representatives of both countries show similar role conceptions. In general, five role conceptions—“Bridge”, “Model”, “Respected Member of the International Community”, “Responsible Leader”, “Partner”—in the case of Japan and six—the previous five as well as “Newcomer”—in the case of South Korea are identified in the issue area of foreign aid.

Bridge

Both Japanese and South Korean policymakers specifically mention their countries’ role as “Bridge” in various settings. The most prominent context is bridging between the developed and developing countries, G20 member and non-member states, or advanced and emerging economies. However, Japan goes further to represent itself as a bridge between different civilisations and cultures. In a few cases, both countries express this role by using the term ‘mediator’, indicating that the two parties in question are somehow in conflict. The wider contexts for the role conception of “Bridge” differ for each country.

Based upon the spirit of yu-ai, or “fraternity”, Japan will make utmost efforts to become a “bridge” for the world, between the Orient and the Occident, between developed and developing countries and between diverse civilizations (Prime Minister Hatoyama, September 24, 2009).

In particular, as a recipient-turned-donor country in terms of international aid, Korea will play a role of bridging between developed and developing countries and solidify G20’s standing on the global stage by reflecting the voices of non-G20 countries (Minister of Strategy and Finance Yoon, February 24, 2010).

In the case of the Japanese role conception, a reference is made to the Japanese principle of ‘fraternity’, as in the citation above, upon which Japan intends to act. South Korean policymakers refer to their country’s unique development experience, from being an aid recipient to that of a donor, which qualifies their country to convey messages between various parties, including between donor and recipient coun-
tries. The indebtedness of Korea to the UN in its early years of existence as a Republic is often mentioned (e.g. Ban, October 24, 2005; Kim, November 30, 2011b; Shin, September 25, 2010; Yu, October 20, 2008).

Model

Japan and South Korea explicitly express the conception that their country constitutes a model for others. Model functions are found in the case of economic development or correct behaviour as donors. Even though they seem to be role conceptions, they are often presented to be role expectations held by others.

[…] I have been told that for a great many developing nations and emerging economies, Japan is the model at which they are aiming. […] In that regard I feel that it is altogether appropriate for us to have much more pride in the fact that Japan has been engaged in some very solid activities until now, in the role of a “big brother” to these emerging economies (Prime Minister Kan, January 20, 2011).

Korea is the only country in the world to join the ranks of advanced nations after being one of the poorest nations in just the span of a generation following the end of the War. For this reason, many ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] member nations want to take Korea as their development model rather than advanced nations since they are in a similar situation as Korea was (President Lee, December 10, 2012).

Japanese political leaders mention how developing countries referred to Japan as a model for their own development, while Japan itself is calling upon African nations to find their own model for economic development inspired by the Japanese experience and that of other Asian countries (Fukuda, May 28, 2008). For Foreign Minister Machimura (April 29, 2005), Japan’s developmental experience puts his country into a unique and superior position as a donor, or, as exemplified above, establishes Japan as a “big brother” for emerging economies (Kan, January 20, 2011). Key points of Japan’s aid philosophy in this regard are the promotion of self-reliance of recipients, ownership, and partnership; its belief in growth as an engine for sustainable development and human security (Machimura, September 17, 2005).

South Korea’s development experience is again portrayed as unique, and thus serves as an example of how development could be achieved through aid and cooperation. In both economic and environmental terms, South Korea is seen as a model for other developing countries that find themselves in situations that Korea was able to overcome in a short period of time. In order to share Korea’s experience, various commitments to increase ODA are made over the years (Ban, September 21, 2006; Lee, February 8, 2010; October 9, 2012; December 10, 2012).
Respected Member of the International Community

For both Japan and South Korea, the appreciation of their efforts in the international community and respect for their country by others are emphasised in various policy statements. In this sense, Japan underlines its long-standing contributions to the international community through ODA as a basis for respect. Korea highlights its proactive engagement in holding international high-level conferences, such as the G20 Summit in 2010 or the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011. Through these conferences, Korea’s experience is shared and many countries voice their interest in learning more about the country. Due to numerous reiterations of gaining trust and respect from other actors of the international community, this role conception is termed “Respected Member of the International Community”.

Japan has been making, for a long time, international contributions in various forms such as ODA. This willingness of the Japanese people to contribute to the international community is appreciated throughout the international community (Minister for Foreign Affairs Maehara, January 24, 2011).

The Republic’s efforts to help bring about world peace and common prosperity are a joint investment to ensure a better future for all humanity. This is also the most effective way for our nation to win affection and respect in the international community (President Lee, November 30, 2009).

The specific focus on ODA as a means of ensuring respect of the international community has to be understood in the context of Japan’s constraints on contributing through military means (cf. Leheny and Warren 2010; Palanovics 2010). Japan is presented as a ‘Peace Fostering Nation’, which thrives to be trusted by other nations and holds existing established relationships of trust in high esteem (Koizumi, April 22, 2005; Koumura, January 18, 2008). Thus, policymakers often refer to the Preamble of Japan’s Constitution and the desire of the country to occupy an honoured place in the world (Koizumi, January 20, 2006; Nakasone, January 28, 2009; Machimura, September 17, 2005). In order to do so, effective contributions to peace and stability by other means than military ones have to be undertaken.

The hosting of high-level international conferences, the succession to the OECD/DAC, and Korea’s proactive engagement in development issues support Korea’s perception that it is respected and trusted by the international community (Lee, November 30, 2009; January 11, 2010; February 8, 2010; January 3, 2011; October 29, 2012). In 2008, President Lee promised to boost South Korea’s international standing to an advanced country by making friends and by increasing ODA, resulting in the creation of the brand “Global Korea” (Lee, August 15, 2008; November 30, 2009). In order to honour the international trust, policymakers ensure

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4 For an English version of the Preamble, see the Japan Ministry of Defence (2014).
Korea’s behaviour as an ‘honest broker’. In this regard, Korea voices its commitment to international issues, such as human rights and democracy, and its aspirations of being a faithful representative of global interests as the chair of the G20 and host of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Shin, September 25, 2010; Yoon, February 24, 2010; November 19, 2010; Yu, March 1, 2009).

Responsible Leader

Policy speeches by both countries in question show signs of perceived responsibility and the wish to obtain leadership in foreign aid. In the case of Korea, the way towards becoming a leader is strongly highlighted, while Japan is very specific in referring to itself as an established leader in issues of international development.

Japan will continue to work comprehensively on development assistance in accordance with the concept of human security and lead the efforts of the international community towards meeting the MDGs [Millenium Development Goals] (Prime Minister Kan, September 24, 2010).

To be able to identify the survival and prosperity of the global village with that of the nation is the marking of global leadership and the condition of becoming an advanced society. We are already on that path (President Lee, January 3, 2011).

Japan specifically expresses its role as leader in creating a peaceful world through ODA and peacekeeping measures. The focus of Japanese engagement focuses on furthering international efforts towards achieving the MDGs by leading in the fields of education, health, disaster risk reduction, water and sanitation, climate change mitigation, or defining the post-2015 agenda5 (Gemba, January 24, 2012; September 25, 2012; Hatoyama, September 16, 2009; Kan, June 11, 2010; September 22, 2010; Koumura, February 22, 2008; Matsumoto, May 1, 2011). All these efforts are closely related to the concept of human security, of which Japan is a main advocate (Gemba, December 14, 2011; February 28, 2012; May 24, 2012; Koumura, January 18, 2008).6 By hosting international conferences, such as the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) or the G8 Summit, Japan leads the creation of strategies for development by co-ordinating international diplomatic efforts (Koumura, January 18, 2008; Nakasone, September 25, 2008). Closely

5 The goal for achieving the MDGs was set for 2015. Since 2013, international discussions have commenced on establishing new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to be pursued from 2015 onwards (United Nations 2014).

connected is the pursuit of global peace and stability as a means of achieving national safety and prosperity, as well as the strategic use of ODA (Koizumi, April 22, 2005; September 26, 2005; January 20, 2006; Koumura, September 27, 2007; January 18, 2008; January 24, 2008).

South Korean policymakers speak of Korea’s dream of becoming a leading, advanced nation, undergoing a transition from a rule-taker to a rule-maker, or changing position from the international periphery to the centre stage. Active contributions to international conferences as well as the setting of agenda items on aid are seen to help Korea develop ODA leadership (Bahk, November 30, 2011; Kim, November 30, 2011b; Lee, June 16, 2008; June 17, 2009; January 11, 2010; October 9, 2012; October 29, 2012; Shin, September 25, 2010). Such contributions include references to universal values of human rights, democracy, women and children, the increased disbursement of overseas volunteers, as well as innovative financing for development, such as the establishment of an air-ticket solidarity contribution (Lee, July 14, 2011; Song, September 3, 2007; October 24, 2007; October 30, 2007; Yu, March 1, 2009). The often-mentioned responsibility is set in the context of Korea’s own experience as an aid recipient. Such statements also refer to Korea’s economic capacity or achieved economic weight, which needs to be balanced by corresponding international contributions in the form of ODA and the wish to become a member of the DAC (Bahk, November 30, 2011; Lee, June 17, 2009; Yu, October 20, 2008; March 1, 2009). As a result, it has a responsibility to contribute to UN efforts commensurate with its economic capacity (Ban, September 18, 2005; October 24, 2005; Song, September 28, 2007; October 30, 2007; Yu, March 1, 2009).

Partner

The concept of engaging with recipient countries based on mutual respect and partnership is found in both Japanese and South Korean statements. Recipients are thus seen as equals and rather than focusing solely on the donor’s national interests, their national policies were taken into consideration by the donors. At the same time, emotional words are regularly used when addressing the issue of partnership, such as referring to ‘cordial bonds’ or solidarity and empathy with developing countries. However, partnership also points to equal benefits for both parties involved and national interests are mentioned as legitimisation for providing ODA.

For Japan, the process of reconstruction after the Second World War taught us how important support from our friends is, and how much that support helped us in our reconstruction and development. This is the true nature of “partnership”. This idea of partnership should be shared beyond Japan. I would like to see an exchange of insights and experiences between Africa and Asia, and I hope very much that we can build such partnerships (Prime Minister Fukuda, 28 May, 2008).
We are in the process of forging a new partnership that is based on mutual respect, benefit and sincerity. It is a partnership bound together by similar historical experiences. There is much to share and gain from this partnership (Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Yu, November 24, 2009).

The Japanese understanding of development partnership is closely related to its aid philosophy of ensuring human security. The argument of providing aid is therefore set around Japan’s sympathy for other human beings in developing countries and the hardships they have to endure (Okada, October 26, 2009; January 29, 2010; May 2, 2010). Thereby, Japan underlines its solidarity with African nations as well as Asia (Koizumi, April 22, 2005). Solidarity with developing countries in the form of ODA refers to the promotion of self-help efforts and human security, cornerstones of Japanese aid philosophy (Aso, January 19, 2006; Machimura, April 20, 2005).

South Korea perceives partnership to entail a variety of relations, including partnership between traditional and emerging donors, state and non-state donors, and recipients and donors of ODA (Yu, April 5, 2008). Nonetheless, the concept is used to a great extent for the relationship between recipient countries and Korea as an aid donor. Respecting recipient countries as equal co-operation partners is seen as a new trend in Korean development co-operation. In the process, friendships should be established (Bahk, November 30, 2011; Lee, June 5, 2010; July 14, 2011; Song, September 28, 2007). In this context, policymakers speak of ‘heart-warming Korean development cooperation’ or the ‘universal love for humanity’ as a foundation of Korea’s ODA, and provide examples for addressing basic human needs in development projects (Bahk, November 30, 2011; Lee, November 30, 2009). In more practical terms, Korea seeks to make its aid programs more effective and partner-oriented by ensuring self-sustained growth of partner countries (Kim, November 30, 2011a).

Newcomer

The role conception of “Newcomer” is held only by South Korean policymakers. Having been a donor country for a rather short period of time, South Korea’s role as a newcomer in the international donor community is emphasised in policy statements. This role can be situated before and shortly after Korea joined the DAC as an advanced donor nation. References are made to Korea’s accession to the OECD in 1996, an organisation through which it could learn from “traditional donors”. This phrase distinguishes Korea’s approach from that of OECD/DAC donors in the view of policymakers, who also refer to Korea’s unique contribution of its own development experience. Similarly, Korea calls for more flexibility in international forums for new, emerging donors (Yu, April 5, 2008). On the other hand, Korea’s active engagement in the UN—although it joined the organisation only in 1991—is highlighted (Ban, October 24, 2005), which helps the nation to become a mature member
of the international community (Lee, February 8, 2010). Efforts towards achieving internationally agreed standards are emphasised as a way to further Korea’s stance in the international community, whereas the hosting of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011 also played an important role for Korea as a newcomer.

To the Korean government, still in the learning process in the field of development cooperation, this Forum represents another valuable learning opportunity and experience and I greatly welcome this. […] Furthermore, Korea’s contribution is still modest and needs to be improved compared with those of traditional donor countries. […] For beginners such as Korea, this Forum serves to generate further momentum to improve its aid quality (Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Kim, November 30, 2011a).

Comparison of Rhetoric Commitments and Actual Disbursements

The qualitative content analysis shows the variety of positions Japan and South Korea perceived to take in the international aid regime or set as their goal for policy. All role conceptions entail aid commitments that have to be considered in order to compare them with role performances. In the following, the commitments are clustered into thematic categories, which correspond to identified aid standards in academic literature or international organisations. The identified aid standards are assembled into five indicator categories based on thematic similarity: Overall ODA Disbursements; Distribution of ODA; Universal Values; Quality of Aid; and Aid Philosophy. Table 1 summarises how the various clusters of commitments are linked to the role conceptions. Data of gross aid disbursements were collected from the OECD CRS and compared with the stated commitments.

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<tr>
<th>Name of Category</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Role Conceptions</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Overall ODA Disbursements</td>
<td>• Gross ODA disbursement in USD millions&lt;br&gt; • ODA to Gross National Income (GNI) ratio of donor</td>
<td>Model&lt;br&gt; Respected Member of the International Community&lt;br&gt; Responsible Leader&lt;br&gt; Newcomer</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Distribution of ODA Regional Distribution</td>
<td>• Share of ODA per region and income category&lt;br&gt; • Distribution to top 10 recipients</td>
<td>Model&lt;br&gt; Responsible Leader&lt;br&gt; Partner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Recipient Need
- GNI per capita of recipient
- Share of LDCs among recipients
- Human Development Index (HDI) of recipient

### Mutual Benefit
- Economic openness
- Sectors allocation

#### Model
Responsible Leader Partner

#### Model
Respected Member of the International Community Responsible Leader Partner

### 3. Universal Values
- Human Rights (political freedom and civil liberties)

#### Model
Respected Member of the International Community Responsible Leader

### 4. Quality of Aid
- Share of grants and loans
- Share of tied aid
- Share of aid to multilateral institutions
- Type of aid
- Aid Fragmentation (Number of recipient countries and sectors)

#### Bridge
Model Respected Member of the International Community Responsible Leader Partner Newcomer

### 5. Aid Philosophy
- Self-reliance
- Partnership
- Ownership

#### Bridge
Model Partner

---

Over the research period, Japanese and South Korean policymakers often promise to increase their country’s ODA within a certain period of time. They committed to doubling or tripling the amount in general or for particular regions. In previous literature on foreign aid, the overall volume of donor’s ODA was used as a general indicator for comparing donor countries’ aid efforts and the importance of a certain donor in the international aid architecture. Nevertheless, in the debate on the quality of aid, overall volumes are seen as less indicative than the share of aid within GNI. ODA as a share of GNI allows for a better understanding of the perceived importance of aid in foreign policy and the acceptance of internationally agreed standards (Hook 1995). Japanese aid in absolute amounts experienced a stark fall between 2005–06 and 2007–08. From 2009–10, the levels increased again, surpassing previous amounts in 2011–12. South Korean aid increased steadily from 2006 onwards. With regard to share of ODA within GNI, both countries lay significantly below the DAC average of 0.3 percent between 2005 and 2012. Comparing the overall ODA levels as well as the share of ODA within GNI pledged between 2005 and 2012 with the actual gross disbursements reveals gaps between rhetoric and behaviour for both donors.

The distribution of Japanese and South Korean ODA is analysed by comparing data on ODA by region, top ten recipients, recipients in need, and mutual benefit. The first indicator gives information on the regional focus of ODA, which is further
supported by listing the top ten recipient countries by overall ODA received. Recipient Need indicates the allocation to countries in need based on their income level as defined in the literature and measured with data from the Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP 2013). The income level status is based on the UN and OECD classifications of developing countries into Least Developed (LDCs), Other Low Income (OLICs), Low Middle Income (LMICs), Upper Middle Income (UMICs), and More Advanced Developing Countries and Territories (MADCT). Finally, sector shares of Japanese and South Korean ODA present considerations of mutual benefit when aid is allocated to sectors opportune for the donor’s economic interests.

As “Respected Members of the International Community” and “Responsible Leaders”, Japan and South Korea highlight the need to respect human rights and support democracy in developing countries. Therefore, the human rights and democracy records of the top ten recipients for each donor are assembled. This study uses the Freedom House Index of political rights and civil liberties in recipient countries (Freedom House 2014a), which allows for comparability with other research (cf. Neumayer 2003; Raposo and Potter 2010; Tuman and Ayoub 2004). The countries’ scores are classified according to the three categories of “Free”, “Partly Free”, and “Not Free”, as defined by the Freedom House methodology (Freedom House 2014b). The focus of Japanese aid to countries with better scores of political rights and civil liberties is not given. Similarly, South Korea evidently gives less aid to free countries than to not free or partly free ones.

In various instances, Japan and South Korea promise to improve the quality of their foreign aid. There is no specific definition for “quality” given, only references to international standards are made. In this regard, both donors want to be respected and trusted by the international community and, thus, commit to adhering to its standards. In the literature, quality of aid indicators include the percentage going to multilateral organisations and LDCs, the grant-loan ratio, status of tied aid, and whether the population most in need received assistance, which inclines generosity rather than donor self-interest (cf. Lumsdaine 1993; Mosley 1985). As aid to LDCs and the poorest population is targeted by the indicator of Recipient Need, the focus here lies on the grant-loan ratio, the share of tied aid and multilateral aid, types of aid, and aid fragmentation.

Since the Paris Declaration, new criteria for providing aid were decided by aid donors (cf. OECD 2005/2008). Two of these, namely partnership and ownership, are often referred to by Japanese and South Korean policymakers in the role conceptions of “Bridge”, “Model”, and “Partner”. Additionally, support for recipient’s self-reliance as a specific aspect of Japanese aid philosophy is evident in “Partner” and “Model” role conceptions. In the literature, no indicators for measuring partnership, ownership, or self-reliance were found. The definitions provided in the Paris Declaration (OECD 2005/2008) explain that adherence to and respect for recipient development policies will show whether ownership of the recipient government and
partnership with it are respected. The respect and support for recipient country measures allows determining the donors’ interest of furthering recipient self-reliance. Thus, to gain further insight, Japanese and South Korean aid philosophies are qualitatively examined in two case studies.

The collected data on the identified commitment categories of Japanese and South Korean ODA shed light on the actual disbursements undertaken by the two donors. The analysis is undertaken by comparing the quantitative data with stated commitments, which results in the identification of a variety of gaps between commitments and disbursements. This comparison shows clearly that commitments do not always correspond to actual donor behaviour.

**Case Study Approach**

In order to identify adequate recipient countries for the case studies, the two donors’ top ten recipients over the research period are compared (cf. Table 2). To prevent misleading results based on the assumption of a regional bias in aid giving, one recipient country from each of the two most prominent recipient regions—Asia and Africa—is chosen. With regard to Asia, Vietnam was the largest recipient in 2011–12 of both donors, while it was also the main recipient of overall South Korean ODA between 2005 and 2012. Even though China was the largest recipient of Japanese ODA in this time period, it did not make the top ten for South Korean aid. Thus, the case study of an Asian recipient focuses on aid projects in Vietnam.

The identification of an African recipient is more difficult due to the lack of a common African recipient in the top ten recipients of both donors. In the case of South Korea, the choice falls on Tanzania, based on the recipient’s status among the top ten recipients. A review of Japanese recipients based on overall disbursements between 2005 and 2012 showed that Tanzania was the third largest African recipient after Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo (OECD 2014). Even though the gross disbursements to these countries are rather inconsistent, Tanzania received the highest amount of the three countries in 2012. Thus, Tanzania seems a reasonable choice for the African case study of Japanese and South Korean aid projects.

The two case studies are not intended as explanations of Japanese and South Korean aid practices but serve as supporting evidence to the aggregate data, as well as to better understand ODA mechanisms on a national level. Specific attention is given to the aspects of aid philosophy, which could not be derived from the OECD CRS data. The case studies first present a short overview of the recipient country context, before providing details of Japanese and South Korean assistance based on country-specific disbursement data and the presentation of exemplary projects. Country assistance strategies are then compared to Vietnamese and Tanzanian national strategies to identify Japanese and South Korean ODA policy priorities.
Table 2 Top 10 Recipients of Japanese and South Korean ODA,
in current USD millions (averages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recipient Country</strong></td>
<td><strong>in current USD millions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 China</td>
<td>1190.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Indonesia</td>
<td>1132.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 India</td>
<td>1056.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Vietnam</td>
<td>998.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Iraq</td>
<td>872.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Philippines</td>
<td>651.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Thailand</td>
<td>357.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Afghanistan</td>
<td>350.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Sri Lanka</td>
<td>341.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Bangladesh</td>
<td>296.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Share of Gross Bilateral ODA</strong></td>
<td><strong>Share of Gross Bilateral ODA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 5 Recipients</td>
<td>37.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 10 Recipients</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD CRS (OECD 2014)

Indicators for aid philosophy are found in policy commitments with references to partnership with recipients, recipient ownership of development strategies and projects, and support for recipient self-reliance. The measurement of partnership commitments with regard to ownership and alignment are stated in the Paris Declaration. Ownership refers to respect for the recipient country’s leadership in development efforts, while alignment describes the support of donors for national strategies (OECD 2005/2008). The donor assistance strategies together with the projects presented in the case studies allows assessing Japan and South Korea’s commitments in terms of actual behaviour.

Neither Japan nor South Korea completely adhere to the principles of partnership and ownership to which they both commit. Nevertheless, Japan is found to respect recipient countries’ priorities and therefore a relationship based on partnership, especially at the project level, while recipient ownership is clearly undermined at the national level. In this regard, the Japanese commitment to self-reliance, which should support the economic development of a recipient, stands in contrast to the recipient countries’ self-defined priorities. In the case of South Korean ODA, partnership is shown in the form of Korea’s knowledge sharing activities, but is found lacking in terms of respect for recipient country initiatives and priorities. Similarly, alignment and ownership are insufficiently considered in the South Korean ODA.
policy towards the two recipients. Therefore, South Korea cannot support its political rhetoric for the category of aid philosophy other than in terms of knowledge sharing.

**Comparative Analysis of Japanese and South Korean ODA Roles**

The comparison of Japan and South Korea’s rhetoric commitments and actual disbursement data, as well as the presented case studies, show incoherence between rhetoric and behaviour. Consequently, role performances can be compared to the role conceptions identified in the qualitative content analysis. As shown in Table 3, several gaps between the role conceptions and role performances become evident in the comparative analysis. For certain indicators, the results vary between Japan and South Korea due to the different commitments made by policymakers in the role conceptions.

**Table 3 Final Assessment of ODA Roles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role conception</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bridge</td>
<td>Quality of Aid</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aid Philosophy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Overall ODA Disbursements</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distribution of ODA (Mutual Benefit)</td>
<td>No (Yes)</td>
<td>~ (~)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quality of Aid</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aid Philosophy</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respected Member of the International Community</td>
<td>Overall ODA Disbursements</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distribution of ODA</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Universal Values</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quality of Aid</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsible Leader</td>
<td>Overall ODA Disbursements</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distribution of ODA (Mutual Benefit)</td>
<td>No (Yes)</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Universal Values</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quality of Aid</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>Distribution of ODA (Mutual Benefit)</td>
<td>No (Yes)</td>
<td>~ (Yes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quality of Aid</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aid Philosophy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcomer</td>
<td>Overall ODA Disbursements</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quality of Aid</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the case of Japan, role conceptions and corresponding role performances illustrate the country’s role of “Bridge” in the international ODA regime. The donor makes an effort to co-ordinate self-interest, interest of other donors and of recipients in its bilateral program, while clearly acting upon its stated policy in the multilateral ODA field. Even though the larger share of bilateral programs compared to multilateral ODA hampers full role coherence, Japan can nonetheless be considered to be a “Bridge” in the international aid system. In contrast, South Korea cannot uphold stated commitments in any regard, leading to the conclusion that South Korea is not a “Bridge” despite policymakers’ rhetoric commitments and the role conception referring to the country as such.

The results for the role of “Model” indicate limitations for both donors. On the one hand, Japan does not perform as a model for other donors, but by referring to its own experience in the context of Mutual Benefit is found to act as a model for recipients. Japanese policymakers define win-win situations for donor and recipient with reference to Japan’s own development experience and that of other Asian economies, and thereby justify the extensive use of economic infrastructure aid. Even though the two case studies find that recipients similarly chose this sector as a priority in their development strategies, Japan’s strong influence on the creation of the Vietnamese development plan limits an overly positive assessment. Whether and to what extent mutual benefits are actually achieved and to what extent Japan acted on the interest of recipient countries has to be assessed by individual and more specific research. On the other hand, the results for South Korea are similarly ambiguous, as some aspects of the role conception are fulfilled while others are not. South Korean policymakers defined Mutual Benefit by referring to the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP), thereby linking the ODA program with the donor’s own economic development experience. By sharing this experience with recipients, both parties involved should benefit. Further, its own development experiences are seen as Korea’s comparative advantage in ODA, which results in many instances where this role conception is actually performed. Again, further research of the KSP and its implications seems necessary in order to fully understand the benefits derived from it by both donor and recipient. Neither Japan nor South Korea act as “Model” in their ODA policy based on the assessed indicators.

Both donor countries refer to three indicator categories in their role conception of “Respected Member of the International Community”, but neither Japan nor South Korea are found to fulfil this role for any category. Japanese policymakers wanted to present their country as a trustworthy donor by mentioning Overall ODA Disbursements, Distribution of ODA, and Quality of Aid as indicator categories. The analysis of aggregated data and the case studies show that commitments do not correspond to the performance, expressed in low ODA to GNI ratio and the lack of providing sector aid in a balanced way. In the context of trust, it is especially noteworthy that Japan did not fully uphold the monetary commitments it promised—neither at the
overall ODA level nor to the two case study countries. Similarly, South Korea clearly does not perform this role, as all identified indicator categories—Overall ODA Disbursements, Universal Values, and Quality of ODA—demonstrate a gap to the role conception. The implications of this role gap are noteworthy as South Korean policymakers continuously reiterated the importance of the respect of the international community for their country. Therefore, the question arises of how the role gap will reflect on South Korea’s policies in the future and how the continuing reiteration of Korea’s trustworthiness influences role expectations from the international community. Overall, the role of “Respected Member of the International Community” exemplifies the importance of considering actors’ own role conceptions and how they are defined by the actors themselves rather than by international norms and standards, as Japan and South Korea referred to different indicator categories. As a result, they can be held accountable to their own words, which in this case is the largest role gap identified in this study—all indicator categories of both donors are insufficiently fulfilled. Such a large role gap emphasises the need for further research on the sources of role conceptions or why role performance is not satisfactory.

The role of “Responsible Leader” shows weaknesses for both Japan and South Korea. Overall ODA Disbursements, Distribution of ODA, Universal Values, and Quality of Aid are the indicator categories mentioned by policymakers in the context of this role conception. Mutual Benefit is, again, the only indicator category for which coherence exists between the role conception and role performance of Japan. Further, it partially fulfils its role as “Responsible Leader” for the category of Quality of Aid. South Korea shows signs of considering Recipient Need as part of Distribution of ODA in its aid program as promised by policymakers. The indicator of Aid Fragmentation in the category of Quality of Aid is specifically important for this donor. The large aid fragmentation is interpreted as a negative factor for the assessment of this role conception—and similarly for others—due to South Korea’s small overall ODA budget. Policymakers spoke of South Korea becoming a leader by distributing ODA, however, spreading the limited financial resources over a large number of recipient countries clearly inhibits South Korea’s potential of becoming a leading donor in any country. This notion is supported by the two case study recipients, for which South Korea does not take up a leadership role. Previous studies came to the conclusion that limited aid resources call for a reduction of the number of recipients to ensure a better aid quality and impact (Kang 2008: 137; Lee and Park 2008: 122). Therefore, the question arises why South Korea spreads its ODA thinly across the globe rather than concentrating available resources. Overall, neither Japan nor South Korea fulfils the role of “Responsible Leader” in ODA policy. Particularly worth mentioning for this role conception are the differences in how Japanese and South Korean policymakers defined the indicators, suggesting that role
conceptions are constructed by policymakers based on domestic influences or the interpretation of external role expectations.

The role of “Partner” provides positive results for Japan and partially positive ones for South Korea, since most of the indicator categories are fulfilled or partly fulfilled. For instance, both donors act upon Mutual Benefit considerations within their own role conceptions, as well as adhere to some standards of Quality of Aid. While Japan does not consider regional aspects or Recipient Need in the distribution of its ODA, South Korea is found to be lacking role performance with regard to Aid Philosophy. It is however noticeable that, depending on the regional context, partnership is defined differently by policymakers of the two donors. This is specifically evident for Japan’s regional aid distribution, where policymakers emphasised aid to Africa, whereas the continuous flow of ODA to Asia was not particularly stressed. Reiterating partnership to African rather than Asian recipients might indicate the need to establish Japan as a new partner for this region, justifying the increased rhetoric commitment, while having already acted as a long-standing partner for Asia. The analysis shows that the ambitious rhetoric is not supported by actual behaviour in terms of Japan being the same kind of partner for both regions. In summary, Japan is found to act upon its role as “Partner” in more instances than South Korea does, although neither donor can entirely fulfil this role based on the comparison of role conceptions and role performances. Thus, the role of “Partner” can be assumed for Japan, but remains ambiguous for South Korean ODA policy.

The role of “Newcomer” for South Korea is clearly supported by the findings. Even though most of the indicator categories are found to be below established standards, the fact that policymakers reiterated South Korea’s efforts in increasing Overall ODA Disbursements and improving Quality of Aid indicators supports the actual role performance. South Korean policymakers referred to international standards in other role conceptions as benchmarks, from which policymakers wanted South Korea’s ODA to be assessed. Setting the goals as high as other DAC donors, it is not surprising that South Korea as a newcomer in the DAC community cannot achieve them in such a short period of time. This interpretation explains the incoherence between the other role conceptions and role performances. In this regard, it seems obvious that one cannot be simultaneously a newcomer and an established donor. Continued research on South Korean role conceptions and performances is needed in order to assess whether South Korea will act on all its role conceptions once it evolves from being a “Newcomer” and becomes an established member of the DAC community.
Conclusion

This study identifies incoherence between rhetoric and behaviour of Japanese and South Korean roles in ODA policy. 55 Japanese and 46 South Korean speeches and statements in the context of ODA policy were analysed, whereas role conceptions and aid commitments were derived and compared to actual disbursement data from the OECD CRS. The gaps that were found between role conceptions and role performance were compared between the two donors to allow for a more comprehensive understanding of their roles. Both donor countries—despite offering up to six role conceptions—only performed in coherence with two role conceptions. In the case of Japan, the roles of “Bridge” and “Partner” were assessed to have been taken up in both rhetoric and behaviour. South Korea was found having taken up the role of “Partner” to some extent while fulfilling the role of “Newcomer”. The role of “Partner” exemplifies the difference in how policymakers defined this role conception and the indicator categories for assessment of role performance. The role conception of “Newcomer” was only expressed by South Korean policymakers, making it an inherently South Korean role conception.

The inductive approach of this research in order to derive Japanese and South Korean role conceptions is the first of its kind. The results of the qualitative content analysis expand role theory by allowing for the perspectives and definitions of donor agents to be reflected in the role conceptions, rather than imposing existing role concepts on them. Thus, this research is innovative and makes a valuable contribution to the scholarship on role theory by identifying six ODA-related role conceptions. The comparison of role conceptions among the two donor countries shows differences in definitions. These differences are seen as strong evidence for the agency of policymakers in shaping foreign policy discourses. Some indicators for the role conceptions were based on international standards and norms, while others reflected the interest of the donor country. Even though the external expectations were not the focus of this study, since some definitions of role conceptions referred to international standards and norms, their influence on agents can be assumed. Similarly, the identified differences suggest the importance of the interaction between policymakers and the domestic environment or the international community. Therefore, the results of this analysis can be linked back to the theoretical framework and are a valuable contribution to role theory and FPA research.

This study further adds new insights into the research on comparative ODA policy. In addition to donor behaviour, it provides a comprehensive picture of Japanese and South Korean commitments and general rhetoric in the field. Identifying incoherence in donor rhetoric and behaviour seems to be a useful addition to the assessment of the effectiveness of aid programs. If aid is not delivered as promised in the commitments derived from role conceptions, its effects will most likely fall short of expectations. The identified role gaps have shown that, in most cases, rhetoric and
behaviour lacked coherence for Japanese and South Korean ODA. These results are valuable for recipient countries and NGOs that assess donor programs, as well as international organisations and other donors.

Despite the conclusions and implications drawn from the findings, certain limitations of this study have to be noted. While the time period for research was chosen carefully, a wider range of speech samples or a comparison of changes in role conceptions over a longer period of time could have led to more insights. This research only focuses on identifying Japanese and South Korean role conceptions on the issue of ODA policy, without looking further into the sources of role conceptions or reasons for role gaps. The interaction between agents and the domestic environment, as well as between state actors and the external environment, could help to better understand the construction of Japanese and South Korean role conceptions. Furthermore, the pillar of role expectations could not be addressed. In terms of role performance, the source for quantitative data was limited almost exclusively to the OECD CRS, which in and of itself needs to be acknowledged as a limitation. Data availability on ODA commitments and disbursements seems to be one of the most severe constraints for more detailed research on the issue. In addition, the presented case studies of Vietnam and Tanzania were only dealt with briefly for the purpose of deriving information on the Aid Philosophy indicator category. A detailed analysis of both case study recipients could provide a more comprehensive picture of Japanese and South Korean role conceptions, role performance, and role expectations in the future.

With regard to future research, applying the methodology used for this study to other donor countries, both DAC and Non-DAC donors, would allow for comparing role conceptions, role performances, and role gaps within the donor community. For the field of ODA, the role conceptions of “Bridge”, “Model”, “Respected Member of the International Community”, “Responsible Leader”, “Partner”, and “Newcomer” are identified. Five of these six role conceptions are found in both Japanese and South Korean rhetoric, which leaves the question whether other donors hold these role conceptions as well. Continuing this research would result in the identification of a specific terminology for ODA roles of donor countries, from which generalisations could be drawn. These roles could then be set in the wider context of roles found for general foreign policy or other specific issue areas of foreign policy. A more comprehensive comparison of several donor countries will be a fruitful addition not only to research on ODA policy, but also to role theory research in general. In conclusion, this study can serve as an important part of future research on role theory, ODA policy, and Japanese and South Korean policy in general.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CRS Creditor Reporting System
DAC Development Assistance Committee
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FPA Foreign Policy Analysis
GNI Gross National Income
HDI Human Development Index
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
KSP Knowledge Sharing Program
LDCs Least Developed Countries
LMICs Lower Middle Income Countries
MADCTs More Advanced Developing Countries and Territories
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ODA Official Development Assistance
OLICs Other Low Income Countries
ROK Republic of Korea
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
TICAD Tokyo International Conference on African Development
UMICs Upper Middle Income Countries
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
USD United States Dollar
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