Metonymy and frame integration: Interfacing between concepts and discourse

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Abstract
This article inquires into specific aspects of the relation between conceptual contiguity found in metonymic shifts and the online construction of frames, seen as a dynamic process of construal. It first reviews the theory of metonymy regarding the conceptual, lexical and contextual facets of the phenomenon. It then explores the possibility of extending the conceptual relevance of metonymy beyond the traditional typological approach of metonymic categorization, re-interpreting it as a frame-integration mechanism, or blending, whereby two frames are brought together into an extended ICM. Metonymic blending is formulated as a partial integration between two input spaces discursively driven, whereby an ad hoc identification of a referential commonness plays the role of the generic space of the blending. Subsequently, in the light of the assumption that frame-extension is not given categorically but it also includes – beyond its cognitive relevance – an interactional aspect, this analysis draws an interesting link: that between the generic space of metonymic blend, and common ground. The latter is precisely what facilitates the metonymic blend, regulating the distance between the integrated frames, at the same time remaining silent as discursively given information.

Key words
metonymy, semantic frame, blending, ICM, interactional frame, informativeness, common ground

1. Introduction
In recent years, the significance of metonymy in language and thought has been increasingly highlighted by research, and more particularly within the framework of cognitive linguistics (Panther and Radden, 1999; Panther and Thornburg, 2003; Panther et al., 2009; Benczes et al., 2011; Littlemore, 2015; Denroche, 2015, etc.). A common denominator of all analyses is the realization that metonymy constitutes a cognitive mechanism that as a ubiquitous trait of everyday speech – and not only as a figurative trope – shapes the way we conceive and express reality, in parallel with metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Dirven, 1999; Glynn, 2006).

Metonymy as a trope in rhetoric had initially been treated as a subtype of metaphor, as in Aristotle (De memoria et reminiscencia 451b). In Aristotle’s view there is a continuum of referential possibilities that stretches between the extremes of difference and sameness, whereas somewhere mid-way along the continuum lies what Aristotle calls close. The latter notion is what we would understand roughly today as metonymy proper. Closeness in current literature is interpreted as the basic characteristic that renders it a distinct expressive mechanism in its own right. It has in principle been seen as a re-adjustment of a given referential target based on its proximity to the denotation of another expression that triggers the
referential association. Closeness as a nuclear feature of metonymy lies in the very definition of metonymy as given already in *Rhetorica at Herennium* (see Koch, 1999): “Metonymy is a trope that takes its expression from *near and close things* and by which we can comprehend a thing that is not denominated by its proper word” (Her. IV: 32.43; emphasis mine).

This closeness is understood in terms of domain inclusion, in the sense that the metonymic process takes place within a single experiential region, in contrast with metaphor where any correspondence forces the meaningful parallelism of two distinct domains (Lakoff and Turner, 1989; Croft, 1993; Kövecses and Radden, 1998). The difference can be understood through the following pair of sentences:

1. *I’ve listened to this CD a million times.*
2. *This song is a dream.*

In (1), the expression ‘CD’ stands for its contents, in a relation that is formalized as “vehicle for target” relation, where the overt referent, here ‘CD’, stands for a silent referential aim, i.e. ‘songs’ (Benczes et al., 2011). Obviously, a CD and the songs contained in it pertain to the very same domain, in a relevant sense. In contrast, what we have in (2) is a correspondence between *song* and *dream* that does not present readily any link in terms of any conceivable contiguity between elements. As a rule of thumb, the phrase *is like* can be implemented as a tool to classify the type of correspondence. According to a rule that takes its most recent version in Kövecses (2010), in a phrase that identifies two elements beyond their obvious difference in terms of their referential value, if the two identified elements X and Y can be linked through the use of the phrase *X is like Y*, then the relation is metaphorical. If not, it is metonymic. As we can see in the following examples, the rule that actually reflects a difference between similarity and contiguity (Ullmann, 1962; Taylor, 1989) is born out, with (1) proven to be a metonymy and (2) a metaphor:

3. *The songs are like a CD.*
4. *The song is like a dream.*

This asymmetry between metonymy and metaphor lies at the root of the reason that metonymy had traditionally been considered as less important and less interesting than metaphor. Metaphor appears to draw unexpected connections between entities, unveiling characteristics that until the time of their explicit mention went unnoticed. Metonymy, on the other hand, was seen more as an accidental phenomenon, in the sense that there are associations that unintentionally hold between two denoted entities as an objectively identified existing link. This is the reason that in principle metaphor was classified as a conceptual whereas metonymy as a referential phenomenon (Lakoff and Turner, 1989).

Metonymy then and proximity are interlinked. Polysemy and diachronic sense differentiation rely on this interlinking, as semantic shifts from one sense to another do not usually occur in jumps, but are motivated by their contiguity. Thus, one of the polysemous meanings of the word ‘bar’ shares the senses of *PUBLIC HOUSE* and *COUNTER* (Koch, 1999). These two senses display the feature of being simultaneously present in a situation confined by the same situational frame. The former sense derives from the latter, as a counter across which food and drink are served is systematically spatially contiguous to the place wherein the bar is found.

But how is contiguity really defined? If contiguity can potentially be understood spatially in the above example, this is not always a clear-cut case. Take the following example:

5. *I heard a piano.*

In (5), ‘piano’ is used instead of ‘sound’, but contiguity though between the two entities cannot be understood strictly in spatial terms. The link is rather susceptible to a shift that can be coded through the metonymic relation that holds between PRODUCT/EFFECT and PRODUCER/CAUSER/SOURCE (cf. Kövecses and Radden, 1998). Similarly, in (6) the point made is even clearer:

6. *I have read Shakespeare.*
In (6), ‘Shakespeare’ is used instead of ‘book content’, in a shift that more clearly shows the same link between PRODUCT and PRODUCER, instantiated as AUTHOR for his WORK. Again, contiguity between the two entities cannot be understood spatially. Phenomena like these corroborate a conceptual view on the nature of metonymy, whose motivation goes beyond that of ostensive reference. Instead, Shakespeare and his plays are conceptualized as belonging to a unified domain where both the referent and the entity activated through it are understood conceptually to co-occur, in a relevant sense, contained in a frame of reference that goes beyond spatial contiguity and encompasses systematic relations between participants within a structure’s conceptual organization (Minsky, 1975; Fillmore, 1977; 1985; Lakoff, 1987). In this light, metonymy arises through highlighting a partial domain within a greater experiential unit that constitutes a domain matrix (Croft, 1993; Langacker, 2008). This conceptual co-occurrence implies a matrix of entities organized within an inclusive conceptual whole, most often culturally institutionalized, called an Idealized Cognitive Model or ICM. The importance of the existence of ICMs for the motivation of metonymic interpretation has already been pointed out in the literature (Barcelona, 2002).

This view in turn implies two things: first, that the highlighted entity is a sub-domain (Croft, 1993) within a given ICM. Second, that this ICM is a pre-determined conceptual domain socio-culturally institutionalized or otherwise cognitively entrenched, either in their elaborated version or at a more abstract level where relations like FORM for CONCEPT, ACTION for AGENT, CONTROLLER for CONTROLLED constitute themselves schematic abstractions of ICMs (Kövecses and Radden, 1998). This property leads us to a highly schematic understanding of metonymy as a PART-WHOLE relation at large. Actually, metonymic relations as cognitive models have long been analysed by Lakoff (1987) as one of the four basic types of ICM.

Attractive though it may be, this view presents us with two challenging problems: first, at a macro-level of discursive scale, metonymy is embedded into a larger conceptual unit. This unit must be in conceptual correspondence with the metonymic ICM in order for the latter to make sense as such. Here are two contrastive examples:

(7) The buses are on strike.
(8) The bus driver was parked illegally.

In (7), what surfaces is the metonymic shift CONTROLLED for CONTROLLER, whereas in (8) CONTROLLER for CONTROLLED. Hierarchical criteria like HUMAN over non-HUMAN (see Kövecses and Radden, 1998) do not work either, as NON-HUMAN has taken over in (7). Nor does perceptual prominence seem to be at stake, as BUS is presumably more prominent within the given structure. We have to conclude then that a) metonymic typology cannot be given exclusively categorically and that b) there are factors beyond the metonymic ICM, which are contextually defined as well as discursively relevant and which define in turn an ICM superimposed to the metonymic one, as shown schematically in figure 1:

![Figure 1. ICM superimposition](image)

This paper precisely sets as its aim to inquire into some specific aspects of the relation between metonymic relations and the ICM superimposed to these relations. It asks: if metonymic links cannot be given merely categorically, in what terms can we define the constitution of the ICMs superimposed to these metonymic links? If we decompose the metonymy in its primitive components, namely vehicle and target, can we find specific portions of the superimposed ICM that correspond to them? In turn, the
answers to these questions have repercussions on the notion of contiguity considered to lie between two entities: experiential or conceptual domains A and B linked through a metonymic shift. If conceptual metonymy is not given categorically, then nor is metonymic contiguity. In other words, the closeness between the constitutive parts of an ICM is not the driver for a metonymic shift but a result of a dynamic construal that brings together partial domains, what Croft (1993) calls the sub-domains of an ICM. This would have the surprising result that metonymy is actually a construal mechanism that links two domains, constructing a third more inclusive one that includes both.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2.1 looks at the more general problem of referential indeterminacy in language, of which metonymy is considered to be a subcase. Section 2.2 draws a relevant distinction between lexicalized metonymy and a contextually driven one and, within the set of contextually driven metonymy, between ostensive and semantic metonymic disambiguation. For the latter, the semantic frames evoked by the lexical context that triggers the metonymy are deemed to be crucial. Section 3.1 shows how the notion of categorial conversion can gain a richer and more explanatory analysis if treated as a semantic compression that requires intra-frame integration between semantic properties of the given frame. The next section generalizes on this possibility and looks into cases where integration between frames takes place, using metonymy as the central mechanism for building an extended ICM. 4.1. addresses the non-categorical nature of the ICM generated through the blending of frames and embeds the process of metonymic blend into the context of the distinction between cognitive and interactional meaning. It is shown how metonymy actually extends a given frame towards another one that contains discursively new information. Section 4.2 maps this idea on the architecture of frame blending, identifying the metonymic vehicle with the new information contained within the newly incorporated frame and the generic space with the common ground. Conclusions follow.

2. Variability and qualification of metonymic shifts
2.1 Indeterminacy and metonymy

The associative property between two referents encountered in metonymy is ubiquitous in language. For this reason, in Langacker’s terms (1998; 2009), metonymic function is somehow identified with the notion of indeterminacy in grammar but also in language at large, where categorical determination of linguistically relevant entities is a fallacy that insists on ignoring the fact that an expression simply cannot profile the totality of concepts that it invokes. Compare for instance the ‘bar’ example with (10):

(9) There is a bar three doors down.
(10) I can hear a piano.

In (9), COUNTER stands for PUBLIC HOUSE in the name of a spatial association that boils down to a whole-part relation, otherwise termed synecdoche (Seto, 1999; Whitsitt, 2013). Example (11) displays a similar association, as it is the sound of a piano and not the piano itself that reaches the perceptual organs of a person, the latter again metonymically expressed through the whole self and not only one’s hearing apparatus, namely one’s ears. Both examples display the problem of what Langacker (2009) calls the profile/active zone discrepancy.

Nevertheless, a vexing problem arises in this connection. How random is the distance between profile and active zone? How really indeterminate is the referential edge of a referent? In (9), although it is only a subpart of what is actually active that is explicitly profiled, it is the whole unit containing it that is overtly aimed at, somehow constituting a natural limit. In (10), on the other hand, the whole entity that has been chosen to be referentially profiled, here ‘piano’, contains much more than what is actually active in the specific situation. In this light, compare (10) with (11), where the discrepancy between active zone and profile is cancelled:

(11) This piano is huge.

2 Nevertheless, broadly interpreted, (11) can also be seen as an a-typical kind of metonymy, what in Barcelona (2003) is called schematic metonymy. According to this view, it is not actually the piano itself that is huge but a specific attribute of it, namely its size.
One issue then that clearly emerges as an all-pressing question in metonymic studies has to do with the ubiquity of all sorts of referential mismatching. It has been rightly said (Barcelona, 2003; Littlemore, 2015) that reducing metonymy to a referential profile-active zone issue would remove all credit from metonymy as a shifting mechanism proper. This is obviously true, if we compare the following examples, where it is only (12) that invokes an understood referent different from the profiled one:

(12) I heard a piano.
(13) I saw a piano.

What the comparison between (12) and (13) tells us constitutes two equally important facts: first, metonymic activation needs to be constructed through the co-occurrence of lexical elements: it is not given in conceptual isolation. Second, the possibility that ‘piano’ in both (12) and (13) evokes concepts related to the concept of PIANO which frame it as a conceptual whole, e.g. ORCHESTRA, MUSIC, PIANO PLAYER, etc., is distinctly a different phenomenon to that of metonymy. In other words, neither conceptual nor even spatial association entails by any means metonymical activation. Added to this connection, there is an onomasiological facet in the use of metonymy (see Geeraerts 2006; 2018, also Glynn 2014 for a similar comment on metaphor and metonymy as relevant to onomasiological studies), where a challenge for a given speaker is unconsciously posed: what term to use so that a conceptual connection that makes discursive sense is established. In this light, metonymy is not established readily within an ICM or frame but exploits the latter’s conceptual potential, so that this becomes informative. Taking then the framing of a concept the field wherein metonymic jumps take place, we must ask: how are the boundaries of the domains over which metonymic jumps take place demarked and what are the exact processes involving lexical co-occurrence that regulate them?

2.2 Entrenchment vs. conceptually constrained metonymy
Another important difference between (9) and (10) above has to do with the stability of metonymic associations over time. In (9), the metonymic shift has been stabilized into a lexically legitimized connection, with a bond that has gained its entry into the English lexicon as a separate sense. In contrast, in (10) the bond drawn appears to be relevant for the specific moment in the context of referential identification, but it dissolves as soon as the discursive need for reference has turned its attention elsewhere. The relevant schemas in figure 2 depict the asymmetry:

![Figure 2. Lexicalized vs. discursively driven metonymy](image-url)
We may then say that we encounter two types of metonymic closeness: one is validated systematically as a constant association, so that it somehow hijacks the denotational possibilities of a phonological unit, becoming an entrenched symbolic unit in its own right (cf. Langacker, 2008); the other is relevant only to a temporary packaging of information. An important question though that arises concerns the motivation of the latter type. Does the fact that the association dissolves without yielding any lexicalized effect mean that the association is random? Or are there conventionalized ways of metonymic construal that – although conceptually conventional – do not yield a phonologically anchored entrenched shift (for the difference between entrenchment and conventionalization see Handl, 2012)?

2.3 Contextually driven metonymy

We have been led to assume two important premises: metonymies are co-textually determined and discourse-relevant. Frame-linked association is not sufficient to adjust a metonymic shift. On the other hand, contextually driven metonymy does not exhaust the range of non-lexicalized metonymy. It was seen above that most definitions of metonymy make use of the notion of domain. Taking an example from Langacker (2008), we see that somebody can referentially identify themselves in a restaurant with the dessert they have ordered:

(14) *I’m the tiramisu.*

What does a tiramisu have in common with a person? In this case they share the same pragmatic context, where the metonymic shift has to operate. It seems that there is nothing that systematically would lead to the inference *person → dessert.* This systematicity in Jackendoff (1990) actually means lexical predictability. For a similar example like the following (see also Nunberg, 1978; 1979), Jackendoff argues that there is nothing in the lexical meaning of ‘ham sandwich’ that enables the denotation of a person:

(15) *The ham sandwich over in the corner wants some more coffee.*

What there exists is only an exo-lexical and exo-phoric process (Littlemore 2015) based on some contextual or characteristic association between two referents. What we thus have in examples like (15-18) is referent tracking through some association that – similarly as the depicted process in figure 1 above – dissolves as soon as the need for referent tracking ceases to exist. Additionally, referent identification can use virtually whatever characteristic that can obtain an indexical function within a situationally demarked context:

(16) *The green hat over in the corner wants some more coffee.*
(17) *Table thirteen over in the corner wants some more coffee.*
(18) *The red tulip over in the corner wants some more coffee.*

A plausible hypothesis then that appears to emerge is that unconstrained metonymy betrays lack of systematicity in the organization between the senses of the expressions that can alternatively substitute for the original sense. Concretely, ‘green hat’, ‘table thirteen’ and ‘red tulip’ do not hold any systematic semantic relation either to the original referent “customer” or to each other. Obviously, this a-systematic way of referential association does not have many chances of lexicalization.

Nevertheless, as has been anticipated above, the distinction between lexicalized metonymic shifts and non-lexically motivated referential identification through metonymy is not a sufficient criterion for metonymy’s characterization. In other words, whereas a lack of systematicity readily leads to few chances of lexicalization, lack of lexicalization does not automatically lead to lack of systematicity.

Further distinctions are then needed, which may be able to make reference both to conceptual structuring of domains as well as to the semantics of discursively controlled conditions. This further qualification intends to address the possible constraints underlying metonymic shifts whose motivation does not give rise to lexically coded polysemy, but is nevertheless conceptual in nature. Take the following example in (19), compared to (20):

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(19) *What does a tiramisu have in common with a person? In this case the* in figure 1 *dissolves as soon as the need for referent tracking ceases to exist.*

(20) *Nevertheless, as has been anticipated above, the distinction between lexicalized metonymic shifts and non-lexically motivated referential identification through metonymy is not a sufficient criterion for metonymy’s characterization. In other words, whereas a lack of systematicity readily leads to few chances of lexicalization, lack of lexicalization does not automatically lead to lack of systematicity.*
(19) *I can hear a piano from very far.*
(20) *I can hear a pianist from very far.*

In (19), ‘piano’ is not lexicalized in place of the concept that it presumably conveys, namely SOUND. In that respect, ‘tiramisu’ and ‘piano’ would be metonymically equated as similar cases – as not lexicalized. But interestingly, ‘piano’ cannot be replaced by ‘pianist’, a seemingly small referential step to take. I suggest then what may be at stake is some constraint underlying the referential alternatives substituting for the expression ‘sound’. This constraint must be of a semantic sort, given that the spatial distance between the actual object producing the sound and the hearing apparatus of the person neutralizes the relevance of pragmatic indexation for both (19) and (20).

### 3. Metonymy and semantic integration

#### 3.1 Metonymic conversion as predicative integration

Dirven (1999) formulates metonymy as a process not exclusive to word level but also relevant to the argument-predicative one. His analysis intends to accommodate the phenomenon of categorial shift, what he calls *conversion*. In his analysis, he accommodates adjective-to-verb shifts like ‘clean’ → ‘to clean’ as a converting process that takes place within a linguistic figuration mapping onto a conceptual one. The two conceptual figurations relevant to the conversion are the following, with (a) converting into (b), as in (21):

(21)

(a) X makes the table clean

(b) X cleans the table

Dirven (1999) argues that CLEAN in (a) conceptualizes a resultant state. Because of its salience within the given conceptual figuration, it takes over the nucleus of the predicate-argument, transforming itself from a peripheral element into one that represents the action itself.

This process of incorporation of an adjective within the core of a predicative figuration can be very plausibly seen as an argumentative compression process where a chain of metonymies takes place, leading to the verbalization of the adjective ‘clean’. The process does not seem to take place in one fell swoop but through a more elaborate sequence of steps. To be more precise, I suggest that what actually occurs is a two-step conversion. First, what takes place is a “hijacking” of the nucleus through identification of CLEAN with the resultant state of the verb ‘make’ within a chain of sub-events e₁…eₙ, with eₙ being the resultant state of ‘make’. The process takes advantage of the similarity of construal between adjectives and resultant states, manifest in the case of perfective-form adjectives like ‘broken’ as in ‘broken heart’ (see Langacker, 2008):

(22) X MAKE[e₁…e₂…eₙ] Y CLEAN

The second step involves an identification of the last sub-event eₙ with the whole chain, through a metonymic relation that holds between a sub-part of an event with its totality, a relation identified in Radden and Kövecses (1998), specified more regarding its directionality through the metonymic shift END-OF EVENT for EVENT (op. cit.):

(23) X MAKE[e₁…e₂…eₙ]

The two steps in (22) and (23) in conjunction give rise to a *predicative compression* that, making use of two metonymic shifts, converts an adjective into a verb. What then is called categorial shift in Dirven (1999) can be seen as a composite process, better classified as a categorial *mapping*. More interestingly,
this mapping displays the organization of a network, where the conception of a STATE plays the role of mediator between an adjective and a verb, as in figure 3:

![Figure 3. Verb-to-adjective compression network](image)

Very interestingly, this network in many aspects is reminiscent of what is suggested to be a conceptual integration called *blending* in Fauconnier (1997) and Fauconnier and Turner (2002). Many aspects of blending theory seem to correspond to the architecture of the network depicted in figure 3. According to Fauconnier and Turner, conceptual integration is a general and dynamic cognitive operation that takes place unconsciously at the moment of thinking and underlies the output of a synthetic process between at least two conceptual wholes. This synthesis results in the projection of a third structure, understood as output, the *blend*. Crucially, the integration is selective, in the sense that the input spaces do not project into the blend in their entirety. Instead, the projection is partial. In the same light, the outputting structure contains elements that are not present in the inputs in first place. Instead, through completion and elaboration, the blend conceptually extends into an *emergent structure* that is exclusively proper to the blend. Finally, the licensing of blending in first place is given by a common structure that schematically underlies both, namely the *generic space*, thus providing a conceptual substrate in the name of which the integrating operation starts off in first place, as shown in figure 4:

![Figure 4. Conceptual blending network](image)
The parallelism between figures 3 and 4 is obvious and displays a fruitful way of understanding metonymy as a link between two spaces.

A field where blending has traditionally been considered to be operative is metaphor (Fauconnier and Turner, 2008). The latter, understood as a mapping between a conceptual source and a target, can be formalized as an integration process. The metaphor, for example, in (24), displays various correspondences between elements of the two input spaces, making use of a common schematic conceptual substrate and resulting in a structure that displays unique emergent properties (op.cit.):

(24) This surgeon is a butcher.

More concretely, there is in first place a generic space that justifies the motivation of the mapping between the two input spaces, namely SURGEON and BUTCHER. This includes the schematic relations between an AGENT and an UNDERGOER; INSTRUMENT of ACTION that takes place in a WORKSPACE, interpreted as a PROCEDURE; as well as the GOALS and MEANS of this procedure. The first input space maps onto these elements, instantiating them as SURGEON, PATIENT, SCALPEL, SURGICAL OPERATION, OPERATING THEATRE, HEALING and SURGERY, respectively. The second space on the other hand instantiates the same generic elements as BUTCHER, ANIMAL, CLEAVER, ABATTOIR, SERVING FLESH and BUTCHERY. Finally, the emergent structure resulting from the blend includes the elements projected from the input spaces, but it also extends into an emergent scenario that includes the scene of a surgeon who performs an operation using the skills of butchery. The effect that follows is one of mismatching that comfortably at the same time fuses the frames of BUTCHERY and SURGERY but also looks back into the input spaces recognizing the paradox of the merge. The concept of INCOMPETENCE is highlighted then as an emergent property, central to the very purpose of the metaphor that precisely makes use of the feeling of the mismatch.

Two characteristics that pertain to the process of blending are selectivity and emergence. The former refers to the range of features that make it to the output space. It is not the totality of all characteristics in both input spaces that pass into the blended space but only a subset of them. For example, it is only the HUMAN PATIENT in the first space that is selected and not the ANIMAL in the second. The latter characteristic pertaining to blending, namely emergence, refers to the presence in the output of characteristics that are not found in first place in either of the input spaces. For instance, CARELESSNESS and LACK OF SUBTLETY that appear in the blended space are not characteristics inherent to any of the input spaces. A butcher can very well be careful and precise in cutting meat.

Returning now to the case of predicative conversion, we can see how the notions of generic space, selectivity and emergence apply in the analysis of the aforementioned example of metonymy. The adjective CLEAN maps onto the final sub-event of MAKE, in the name of the latter’s state-status that appears to play the role of what in the theory of blending is a generic space. Here, a STATE as a schematization of the adjectival concept CLEAN – but also of the final sub-event of the concept MAKE that holds the character of a STATE – plays the role of the generic space between the input spaces of MAKE and CLEAN, as shown above. The output is a structure that integrates the event properties of the former and the state properties of the latter. Essentially, the whole network would not converge, if \( e_o \) were not able to metonymically take over the whole sub-eventive chain. Additionally, in accord with blending theory, a) the blending process is selective and b) the output has emergent properties. More concretely, we see that MAKE does not qualify as being present in the output but is just the underlying schematic structure of the eventive chain that does. On the other hand, the emergent properties of the output include clearly the verbalization of the adjective. Both properties can be reflected in subtle adjectival scope differences, as in the following example:

(25) He made the room clean for two days.
(26) He cleaned the room for two days.

In (25), ‘for two days’ refers to the resultative state of cleaning, not to the process of making it clean. In contrast, in (26) the adverbial prepositional phrase is allowed to be co-extensive to the duration of the accomplishment of making the room clean. This is essentially a matter of emergent properties arising from blending.
Summarizing then, we have seen that at a predicative level metonymic shifts that can be understood as predicate-internal networking operate, parallel to the conceptual integration networks postulated by blending theory. A consequential question that arises then is the following: interpreting metonymy not simply as a process of getting conceptual access but as a networking process between concepts, how can we reshape non-lexicalized metonymic shifts in the new terms?

3.2 Metonymy as frame blending
We have seen that metonymy’s driver, although frame-relevant, is not directly linked to a pre-determined existence of frames, but rather it constitutes an adjustment projected from co-textual information. The question then that this analysis wants to further address is the following: what is the mechanism behind metonymic shifts that enables them to regulate the distance towards a given a new frame-limit?

In this context, I argue that it not just cases of obvious categorial conversions, what I have called above predicative compressions, which make reference to the argument-predicative level as a conceptual integration, but also metonymies that manifest sense conversion within two predicative units or between two semantic frames in their narrow definition (Fillmore, 1977; 1985), for that matter. Examples like (19), repeated here, are precisely instances of this type of conversion:

(27) *I can hear a piano from very far.*

At a predicative level, the verb ‘hear’ is selectionally constrained to taking as a complement a direct object that bears the semantic features of what we can call a “hearing percept”, which is usually lexically realized as “sound”:

(28) $X$ hears $Y \Leftrightarrow X$ hears *sound*

What $Y$ instantiates then is the categorial type to which the sound belongs. This is evident in sentences like the following, where “of $Y$” prompts for a typological inclusion:

(29) *$X$ hears the sound of $Y$* (meaning: sound of type $Y$)

We then have the following schematic figuration, where SOUND now represents the conceptual counterpart of the underspecified expression, whatever value this happens to take:

The schema below then is precisely a further elaboration, where SOUND is metonymically denoted by PIANO, the latter being potentially instantiated by various alternatives:
According to the metonymic typology elaborated by Radden and Kövecses (1998), the SOUND-PIANO relation detected here may fall under the conceptual relation PRODUCT-PRODUCER, RESULT-CAUSER or more generally PART-WHOLE relation. But whatever of the above possibilities we choose, in the light of the reanalysis of metonymy as integration networking, the typological characterization of the metonymy that holds here is only one facet of the problem. This is so because – beyond the conceptual characterization of the shift – in the above example we have an additional predication relation that does not surface as such but is inferred and contains the following:

(32) SOUNDS (PIANO).

The two predication relations then that interact are the following, giving a single one as in (33):

(33) HEAR sound \(\rightarrow\) HEAR piano
\(\uparrow\) piano SOUNDS

We see that, in both predications, SOUND is the key-concept that figures as the common element. Alternatively, we can understand the relations HEAR PIANO and PIANO SOUNDS as partially overlapping, with the sector of their superimposition being the generic space, as shown in figure 5:

![Figure 5. SOUND as generic space](image)

Figure 5. SOUND as generic space

Analysing then this partial conceptual overlapping in the light of understanding metonymy as integration networking, we see that HEAR (SOUND) and SOUNDS (PIANO) involve SOUND as a generic space and HEAR and PIANO as inputs. The outputting blended space in figure 6 emerges as a new predication relation that elaborates a schematic Predicate-argument relation \(P(A)\), with \(P\) being HEAR and \(A\) being PIANO:

![Figure 6. Blending network for “hear a piano”](image)

Figure 6. Blending network for “hear a piano”
In accord with the assumptions of a projection’s selective character and the outputting structure’s emergent properties, the concept of SOUND, although common in both input spaces, does not surface in the blend.

An obvious question that arises, however, concerns the selective character of blend. What is selected and what not? As depicted in figure 6, it is the generic space represented by SOUND that is left out. But nevertheless, this is precisely the concept that sanctions the integration between the two spaces. I suggest then that the commonly evoked space between two conceptual figurations displays an interesting dual behaviour: although it gets silenced, at the same time it constitutes the very conceptual link that implements blending. I come back to this interesting matter later on.

For the moment, let’s ask what the possible mechanism is present in the network above that licences the conversion of a predicate into an argument, as shown in (34):

(34) HEAR
  *PIANO*
  \textbf{metonymy}
  \textbf{SOUND}
  \textbf{SOUNDS}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\node (hear) at (0,0) {HEAR};
\node (piano) at (1,0) {PIANO};
\node (sound) at (1,1) {SOUND};
\node (sounded) at (2,0) {SOUNDS};
\draw[->] (hear) -- (piano);\node at (0.5,0.7) {metonymy};\node at (1.1,0.7) {\textbf{SOUND}};
\draw[->] (sound) -- (sounded);
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

In the case of CLEAN, we saw that a categorical conversion takes place that relies on the verbalization of the adjective. On the other hand, the verb ‘sound’ has been classified as a so-called un-ergative verb, as opposed to un-accusatives (Burzio, 1986) like ‘arrive’. The difference between the two lies in the fact that, although they are both intransitive, meaning they syntactically do not take an object, it is only the latter that does not require an agentive subject. This is manifested in the following contrast, where existential ‘there’ co-occurs with intransitive verbs like ‘appear’ but not with un-ergative ones like ‘sound’ (Comrie, 2013):

(35) There appeared a piano from nowhere.
(36) *There sounded a piano.

The observations above converge to the conclusion that verbs like ‘sound’ actually conceptualize a semantic complement too, even if the latter is not overtly profiled. This may be attributed to the following possibility: the verb, either instigated/ caused by an agentive or non-agentive causer, is construed at the same time as if it gets an object. For that matter, the relation profiled by an un-ergative verb is at the same time the object itself. This is also the reason that un-ergative objects do not represent objects external to an agent’s interactive force. Instead, they are conceptualized as a reification of a relation internal to the subject as stemming from it, as the following asymmetry shows:

(37) Something was sounding.
(38) Some sound was sounding.
(39) Something was sounding a sound.

This reification is precisely what is needed for the link between SOUND as a verb and SOUND as a noun to be established. Profiling the reified relation inherent to the un-ergative predicate SOUND enables the latter’s identification with the semantically selected complement of HEAR, namely the noun ‘sound’. In figure 7(a), we can see how an intransitive un-accusative verb (without object) would be schematically represented (see Langacker, 2008), whereas in 7(b-c) we see how an intransitive but at the same time un-ergative verb can be differentially represented, respectively. What in (b) is profiled is the relation, whereas in (c) the object that itself is understood as a reification of the relation:
The generic space then is itself an output of a profile-shift that converts a predicate into an argument, a necessary step towards the blending process between the frame of HEAR and the frame of SOUND:

Thus, what is at stake in examples like “I hear a piano” but also in apparently simpler ones like “I cleaned the room” is not explicable simply through a metonymic shift that exploits some standard metonymical sub-type of a PART-to-WHOLE or WHOLE-to-PART relation. Instead, a more elaborate and intricate integration takes place that takes the form of what Fauconnier and Turner understand as mental space integration. Additionally, in accord with the assumptions of a projection’s selective character and the outputting structure’s emergent properties, the concept of SOUND, although common in both input spaces, does not surface in the blend.

There have to be stressed two points here. The first has already been pointed at, in connection to the unconstrained character of blending. As has already been mentioned, metonymic integration does not generate ICMs or semantic frames. This may very well happen in the case of a lexicalized metonymical shift. Nevertheless, between totally unconstrained metonymy – Jackedoff’s (1990) case of *ham sandwich* – and lexicalized metonymy that entrenches metonymic construal of a frame as a lexicalized part of it – the case of *bar* in Koch’s (1999) PUBLIC HOUSE-COUNTER relation – there is an onomasiologically motivated and discursively embedded metonymic mechanism that regulates the referential extension of a given ICM and the conceptual synthesis of sub-domains of it. The second point refers to the irrelevance of spatial contiguity as an exclusive driving force behind the postulated mechanism. Although, to some certain extent, all conceptual metonymies may be also reduced to some spatial contiguity too, the mechanism is not limited to these cases. For instance, the aforementioned example of *the buses are on strike* can also be analysed through the same mechanism, a brief account of which is given right below. Two predicative relations, these of ON_STRIKE (DRIVER) and DRIVE (X, BUS) can be seen as the input space for the blend. The generic space as a mediator between the input spaces is the predicative DRIVE, that instantiates in two flavours: the verb itself and the DRIVER as argument of the predication DRIVE (X, BUS). Identification of X with DRIVER facilitates the blend.
between the two spaces, that results in a new fused predicative relation, that of ON_STRIKE (BUSES). A schematic diagram of the process is given below in figure 9:

![Blending network for "buses are on strike"](image)

**Figure 9.** Blending network for “buses are on strike”

4. **Metonymy in an interactional frame**

4.1 **Metonymic integration and informativeness**

Frames can be distinguished in two types: *cognitive* and *interactional* (Fillmore, 1982). The former refers to the conceptual categories evoked by the presence of elements that belong to the frame, independently of the discursive, pragmatic or other context. The latter broadly refer to a specific type of conceptualization that has as a point of reference the actual communicative situation between the speaker and the addressee. This may include illocutionary force, speech-event routines, understanding of text-type and register, etc. There has been a late increase of interest in interactional-frame topics, as can be seen in the work of Halmari and Östman (2001), Östman (2005) and elsewhere.

What about informativity? The latter can be understood as a discourse-regulated adjustment of speech in correspondence with old and new information (cf. Atlas, 2005). Topicalization, Focus, Ellipsis, Co-reference are all phenomena that to greater or lesser extent are linked to facilitating information flow from old to new, from known to noteworthy (Esser, 2009). By all means, speaker’s intention is the driver in the context of this process, pertaining to the interactional contextualization of speech.

Matsumoto (2013) discusses an interesting case where noun heads of a referentially “light” charge can be used with a clause modifying it, propagating clause-internal and contextual information in the form of inferences enriching its underspecified semantic meaning. Matsumoto calls this *compression* and gives various interesting examples, such as the one that follows:

(40) *[atama no yoku-naru hon]*

head NOM good-become book

‘the book (by reading which) (x’s) head gets better (i.e. x becomes smarter)’

Matsumoto points out (op. cit. 174) the fact that the head noun *hon* ‘book’ is not presented as an argument of the subordinate clause predicate *yoku-naru* ‘get better’, as *yoku-naru* is an intransitive verb. The compression is understood in the sense of incorporating information represented by a book as a
physical entity but also as a participant in the purposeful action of reading (Pustejovsky, 1993). In this light, the clause triggers features associated with book, not overtly present, but nevertheless part of a network of relations present in the concept of book. What surfaces then in the above case is the meaning “reading”, signalling a condition inferentially associated with the overt verb *yoku-naru*. Interestingly, Matsumoto analyses this phenomenon as integration of semantic with pragmatic information supplied by the noun, the modifying clause and the discourse context. Parallel phenomena have been analysed in various frameworks, such as the analysis of relative pronouns in Greek (Nikiforidou, 2005).

The aforementioned analysis essentially assumes integration of interactional-frame relevant information into the level of cognitive-linked frame, in the name of referential under-specification of head nouns at a lexical level. This could generate a schematization as in figure 10, where the blended space contains selective information of the wide range of referential possibilities of a given lexical item, elaborated through pragmatically determined information:

![Figure 10. Interactional-conceptual frame integration](image)

Relevantly, we may want to consider if there are any interactional aspects of metonymy’s function, in the light of the present analysis where frame integration holds a central position. What I want to argue for is the possibility that a more intricate relational schema is at stake, where metonymy as a frame-integration operation interfaces not only between two frames but also between old and new discourse information, with the generic space being the content that is silenced as *common ground*.

I have alluded to the significant attempt of Kövecses and Radden (1998) to construct a metonymic typology. There, shifts are understood as belonging to specific conceptual leaps from one concept to another, like CONTAINED-CONTAINER, CONTROLLER-CONTROLLED or more general PART-WHOLE relations. Moreover, they identify general principles that regulate the directionality of the shift, like HUMAN over NON-HUMAN, FUNCTIONAL over NON-FUNCTIONAL, GOOD GESTALT over BAD GESTALT, etc. But as has been noted in the literature (see Littlemore, 2015 for a review), these principles do not constitute a clear-cut criterion of classification, for the simple reason that they are very often overridden by some other principle that, in turn, can be overridden by another one. Thus, as already said, when someone says “the buses are on strike”, someone applies the principle FUNCTIONAL over NON-FUNCTIONAL, inevitably overriding HUMAN over NON-HUMAN. The same uncertainty holds of the typology of metonymic shifts itself. When someone says “I carried wine in my bag”, someone goes by the shift CONTAINED for CONTAINER. In contrast, when someone says “I will drink a glass”, what takes over is the metonymy CONTAINER for CONTAINED, instead.

In examples like the ones under analysis, repeated below as (41), similar concerns arise. What is the type of the metonymic shift that takes place? This may be PRODUCT for non-animate PRODUCER, possibly susceptible to the principle CONCRETE over ABSTRACT and GOOD GESTALT over BAD GESTALT. But this reasoning does not tell us why the sentence does not, normally, surface as (42):

(41) *I can hear a piano from very far.*
(42) *I can hear a pianist from very far.*
The obvious answer would tell us that either there must be a spatial contiguity between the speaker and the pianist or there must be some quality attributable onto SOUND, stemming from the pianist’s agency, as in (43):

(43) Very rarely can someone hear a pianist of great talent.

Here too, the animate PRODUCER for PRODUCT principle holds, and for that ANIMATE over non-ANIMATE too. In contrast, it is not immediately obvious that PIANIST represents a better gestalt than PIANO, as the former exceeds the limits of a concrete and perceptually conceivable whole. Consequently, the detailed parameters underlying this process are not a trivial matter and are not exclusively attributable to cognitively driven concerns, in accord with Fillmore’s distinction. How is then the extension of the frame that defines contiguity calibrated as co-extensive to the metonymic leap taking place?

As Warren notices (2006), in examples like (43) we evidence a mismatch between the explicit syntactic head of the sentence and the implicit semantic head of it. This would take the semantic form $X$ of $Y$, where $Y$ is the overtly expressed noun and $X$ the semantically inferred one. In (44) ‘piano’ is actually the complement of an implicit head, namely $X$, which presumably would be ‘sound’:

(44) I can hear [the sound of] a piano from very far.

Taking into account the fact that nominal heads are the indispensable argument components in a sentence, it is then actually (45) and not (46) that should be licensed:

(45) I can hear the sound from very far.
(46) I can hear a piano from very far.

Why is it (46) then that discursively speaking is more felicitous than (45), if no other discursive support is given from context (e.g. prior mention of ‘piano’)? I argue that the answer can be given if, in the light of the reanalysis of metonymy as integration networking, we actually take the latter to be a process of frame extension, driven by a criterion of informativity.

I said above that there is a theoretical need to go beyond a characterization of a metonymic typology, which, although descriptively valid, constitutes only one facet of the problem. This was deemed to be so because the process of metonymic shift from A to B displays an additional covert component of predicative short that – although not surfacing – is inferred. For the case of (45) that was found to be the following:

(47) SOUNDS (PIANO).

SOUND then was found to be the key concept that figures as the common element that links the two spaces, as an inter-section of their superimposition, which plays the role of generic space. As mentioned, the concept of SOUND itself, although common in both input spaces, does not surface in the blend, remaining covert:

![Figure 11. Generic space silenced as common ground](Unauthentifiziert | Heruntergeladen 03.09.19 12:42  UTC)
This relation between the coveryness of the generic space and its linking function may point at something much more essential within the system of metonymy. The latter can be seen as an interface that lies between the semantic frames and information structure.

This is the reason why a sentence as depicted in (48) approximates a tautological interpretation, with SOUND being the default and minimal conceptual characterization of what was named above Y:

(48) X heard SOUND “I heard a sound”

Instead, in the sentence I hear a piano, PIANO lies at the first superimposed conceptual layer that cannot be lexically predicted, and for that matter, syntagmatically instantiated.

4.2 Metonymic shift and informational threshold

Above, I referred to the problem of metonymy as essentially an issue of profile. Another notion relevant to understanding that of profile is that of base. The relation between base and profile is largely identified with that of figure and ground. The terminological pair, systematically used first in Langacker (1987), emphasises the relationship between a concept and the domain in which the latter is found. Always, the profile stands at a part-whole relation with its base. It represents a portion of conceptual knowledge that holds a relation of presupposition with it. Additionally, the base represents the background knowledge that is always necessary in order to support the highlighted concept. The latter, without this background of presupposed knowledge, simply cannot be understood (Clausner and Croft, 1999). Typical examples include the conceptualization of CIRCLE against the base of SPACE and that of a CHORD against a CIRCLE, as in figure 12:

The organization above implies two things: first, the induction of a base is a continuous characteristic of any unfolding discourse, taking place at any point an expression is uttered; second, base and profile are not categorically defined or given once and for ever. As is evident, in (a) CIRCLE takes over the role of profile, only to give it up when another expression, i.e. ‘chord’, profiles against CIRCLE, this time evoking the latter as its own base. Critically, the concept of a CHORD cannot be defined directly in terms of SPACE. This jumping of the immediate scope within which the concept is confined is illicit precisely because a concept further up in its “vertical inclusion” cannot sustain it conceptually.

Here is precisely where the most relevant point to our discussion arises: what is understood as a referential shift between two contiguous entities, like PIANO and PIANO SOUND, is actually regulated by what must be understood as the counterpart of immediate scope in a discourse space.

For Koch (1999), metonymic shifts constitute a type of inversion of contiguous components within a gestalt figuration. He says that every concept designated by a lexical item is conceived as a figure in relation to at least another concept that “for the time being – remains the ground within the same frame. But at some moment, while we are using the same lexical item, certain pragmatic, conceptual or
emotional factors may highlight the ground concept so that the figure and ground become inverted. That is what we call metonymy” [italics mine] (Koch, 1999, pp.151-152).

Nevertheless, Koch supposes that this inversion regards the same frame. That means that the pair PIANO-SOUND where an operation of conceptual inversion takes place belongs to the same gestalt as SOUND-PIANO. This is an obvious starting point as nothing changes in their conceptual content. But as we have seen, a metonymic shift can be more felicitously formulated as a core operation of a wider space, where the generation of a blended ICM takes place. Furthermore, what happens in terms of discourse, namely in the light of the concerns that were raised above insofar as informativeness is regarded? In a clause that semantically predicts specific participants, a vertical extension over a horizontally defined frame element achieves a threshold of new information. Understanding selectional constraints defined by a verb as an operation of inclusion within a semantic frame, we get the following schematic picture in figure 13, where hear a sound actually brings to the surface an underlying metonymic shift from SOUND to its SOURCE:

Figure 13. Metonymy as paradigmatic extension

In the example of the metonymic shift that holds between SOUND and PIANO, SOUND holds the status of partial structure, when measured against PIANO, namely its SOURCE. The latter sustains the former, as a comprehensive conceptual organization that holds SOUND as a proper part of it. In this light, lexically projected semantic features susceptible to metonymic extension can be seen as the interface between syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations, an issue that has been a long-term concern in the context of metonymy (see Holenstein, 1975 and Koch, 1999 for review). The constraint then that regulates the scale of metonymic shift is not taxonomically given solely by a lexical-internal typology but is identified through the computation of a level that sets onto paradigmatic extension a threshold of new information, as shown in figure 14:

Figure 14. Paradigmatic extension transcending new-info threshold
Metonymy, then, extends the default referential value predicted by the syntagmatic relations instantiated within a sentence, so that it enriches the informational charge of it.

In this connection, it is easier for someone to understand the contrast between (49) and (50):

(49) I can hear a piano from very far.
(50) Very rarely can someone hear a pianist (on the radio/on the road).

The problem boils down to the following assumption: if metonymy involved a kind of reversal between figure and ground, a widespread assumption that relies on identification of metonymy’s driver with perceptual or conceptual prominence, then it is not easy at all to explain the syntagmatic organization of (49). This is so because what would be expected to surface is the concept of SOUND and not that of PIANO, the latter being less prominent than the former. In contrast, (50) may surface as such either with a pianist perceptually prominent or not. It is obvious then that it is necessary to take into account factors that – although making reference to prominence – are not exhausted there, a matter in need of further analysis. The answer comes precisely from an informativeness-based account that, although it does not deny the importance of prominence, does not identify the latter with what a metonymy profiles.

If we take a rough upward scale of metonymic shifts that includes SOUND, PIANO and PIANIST, depicted in (51), we interestingly see that what (49) and (50) invoke is a conceptual level that lies one step lower than the profiled entity along the scale:

(51)

We can observe that by no means is prominence the critical factor, as in (49) PIANO is not present and in (50) its presence looks irrelevant. In contrast, what seems to be at stake is what someone takes for granted as the discourse base over which profiling functions. It seems that there are two conditions that must be satisfied for its construction:

a) some conceptual gap between two predicative structures
b) some partial commonness between them.

I contend that these conditions initiate a searching procedure for a common ground. The latter is precisely the incarnation of what Fauconnier and Turner (2002) call “generic space”. I furthermore tentatively argue that (a) and (b) minimize the searching bulk that somebody would normally have to go through in order to identify the active component invoked by a profiled concept. We are facing then an intricate process with an intriguing architecture. Importantly, the key factor that regulates the metonymic shift is not the mere prominence of a figure but the relation between a covert conceptual common ground and some focal new information. The former mediates between two frames effecting the function of a generic space, resulting in an integrated frame. The latter can be understood as extension of the space that includes the metonymic target.

We saw that, in (49), SOUND is entailed by the selectional restrictions of the verb ‘hear’ and the predicate entailed by the causer argument ‘piano’. In this case, PIANO and HEAR are equidistant to SOUND in some relevant sense. In a similar fashion, in (50), the frames that are integrated are represented by the verb ‘hear’ and ‘pianist’. I summarize then the process, with the following postulates in (52):
(52) (a) Metonymic shifts as co-extensive to a two-frame blend are regulated by the threshold of new information generation.
(b) The generic space, partially sanctioning both input spaces, functions as common discursive ground that remains non-overt.

Metonymy then, although retaining its cognitive-frame relevance, may very well be a mechanism that regulates the balance between old and new information. There remains very much work to be done in the direction of empirically testifying the claim, but it is a direction worth investigating.

5. Conclusions
This paper had as its aim the revelation of some aspects of the theoretical and analytical possibilities that follow a frame-theoretic approach to metonymy. Metonymic shifts, treated as a conceptual phenomenon within the cognitive-linguistic tradition, were shown to present us with a number of challenges that concern the mismatch between the domain profiled and the domain referentially activated.

A metonymic-typological analysis was shown to be – albeit conceptually revealing – only part of the architecture of metonymic mechanism. It was argued that metonymy may be more felicitously treated as a frame-adjusting mechanism, with frame extension being one possibility. In turn, the latter can gain a more inclusive analysis if, instead of being identified as a referential shift, it is analysed in the framework of frame integration, or otherwise blending. This move gains plausibility in the light of the observation that, when metonymy takes place, the metonymic vehicle and the metonymic target belong to different frames.

In accordance with with Fauconnier and Turner’s (2002) seminal work on the construal of integration networks, the present analysis showed that, beyond the mismatching relation between profile and active domain, there is a third factor at stake: that of generic space. The latter is essentially identified with the metonymic target, whose role within the metonymic network is to glue the frames under integration.

In turn, asymmetries between sentences like I hear a sound, I hear a piano or I see a pianist indicate that beyond the cognitive dimension of frame integration – which nicely corresponds to a typology-based account of metonymy – the relevance of what Fillmore interprets as interactional domain must be taken into account too. Re-interpreting then metonymy in the context of interactional relevance, it was tentatively suggested that the metonymic vehicle signals an informational threshold that has been surpassed. Interestingly, a correspondence of identification can be envisaged between new information and metonymic vehicle. On the other hand, the correspondence between target and generic space leads us to a second surprising identification: that between generic space and common-ground. It is in total accord with communication and relevance-based theories that the generic space as metonymic target remains in silence. It is its identification with common ground that justifies it.

Another challenge that remains open to further research follows from the assumption that when metonymy takes place, the metonymic vehicle and the metonymic target belong to distinct frames.3 This assumption would theoretically bring metonymy much closer to metaphor than it is generally supposed to be, as a long-standing premise holds that metaphorical mapping takes place between distinct frames, whereas metonymy within a single one (cf. Kövecses, 2006). Nevertheless, according to the present analysis, although metonymy does not actually create frames from scratch, it regulates the extension of an ICM through the blend of extant frames. This implies that metonymic blend does not presuppose a common domain, but the latter is a discursively defined as an ad hoc blend. It follows that the difference between metonymy and metaphor may not boil down to the distinctness of mapped frames, but to the degree of the overlapping of the mapped inputs. Possibly, in metaphor, the generic space representing the commonness – the “like” relation – between the inputs is a schematic gestalt immanent to the totality of both inputs, thus generating a total overlapping between the two. In metonymy, in contrast, the commonness is an element that cannot encompass the totality of the inputs. This results only in a partial overlapping between the inputs. Hence, blending between them does not result in their fusion but rather in a partial union that generates an ICM greater than its component parts.

3 This point has been raised to me by an anonymous reviewer.
Although still tentative, the model proposed displays promising aspects for a more inclusive treatment of metonymy drawing theoretical plausibility from various sources. It remains to see the extent to which it can be confirmed empirically.

References


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