

THE NEED TO RESPECT THE PRINCIPLES OF FORCE PROTECTION DURING PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

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ABSTRACT

The current area of military actions is different from that of the last century and constantly changing. Peace support operations are current and dominate the future actions. Therefore, attention is turning to this type of military operations, and the physical and material resources allocated are progressively increasing. Although they are operations conducted in order to achieve the peace, troops continue to face opponents with different goals and ways of thinking. Thus comes the necessity of using force to restore the security climate. The mission in Afghanistan that lasted long time enough, showed why military interventions are needed to redress the conflicts and enforce the peace. In this respect, to act as expected, the military must be provided with effective protective measures. Several areas of action were equipped with advanced systems that prevent enemy actions to alter the life and health of the military. These measures should be continuously updated, since the environment is constantly changing and the challenges are always different.

KEYWORDS: Peace support operations, force protection measures, NATO, ISAF

1. Introduction

According to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 2001) “Force Protection covers all measures and means to minimise the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, materiel, operations and activities from threats and hazards in order to preserve freedom of action and operational effectiveness thereby contributing to mission success”. Force Protection measures are designed to protect the individual and organizational elements. FP includes predefined security routines to be implemented by all nations participating in the operation. NATO members have access to a comprehensive regulatory framework already (Gell, 2005, pp. 264-265).

According to the NATO doctrines, there are two types of stability operations: Peace Support Operations and other crisis response to operations non-article 5 (NATO, 2001); NATO’s doctrines shared the types of peace operations in 5 categories and a special type, which can be use independently or in common with the others PSO. Those types are the following: peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian relief (NATO, 2001, pp. 36-38).

Support operations are those that relieve the suffering and help the civil authorities to respond effectively to crises. Also, they satisfy the requirements of the implied groups and the responsibilities to the pertinent authorities, with rapidity and

efficiency. These operations can evolve independently or as stages of the same operation, aimed at supporting peace.

Through the responsible institutions of PSOs are trying to increase the quality of life, saving human lives, reducing suffering and finally, return to normality. Operations support role is to help civil authorities, internal or external, for a response to crises or special situations by providing support, services or resources.

PSO is a response to crises and include usually, international efforts and military missions to stop the conflicts, reinstall the peace and to shape the environment so as to accept reconciliation and reconstruction and facilitate the transition to a new and legitimate government. PSO can be achieved under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) or other intergovernmental organizations they can participate in various coalitions (Gortney, 2012).

2. Principles of Force Protection

The principles of force protection are the following: (NATO, 2001, p. 1):

- “Impartiality and the associated risk. By maintaining an impartial attitude and providing transparency between parties in conflict, it may increase the vulnerability for Peace Support Forces (PSF). Commanders must understand the threats they have to face and take the appropriate measures”.
- “Force Protection measures should reflect the strategic narrative where possible. The FP risk management process must take into account the strategic narrative and strategic messaging associated with the type of peace support effort”.
- “Force Protection measures should be responsive to an escalation of threat.

Those organizing the actions must ensure that FP measures can be implemented as a response addressed to common threats”.

Using the given resources and having a ready position, allows PSO to respond to threats in a timely manner.

FP is a subject also debated in the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) of Mobility and Survivability. Survivability protects the own forces from the weapons of the enemy. FP appears also in Operations Other than War (OOTW). Here are presented two measures related to force protection measures. The first one says that the forces should “never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage”. Security is a priority for commanders who have to protect their forces in the Stability and Support Operations.

The second principle of OOTW refers to FP as a “restraint” defined as “apply appropriate military capability prudently”. This caution helps by taking measures according to ROE for the application of force specific for SASO (Quillin, 2000, p. 18).

Power struggle has 4 elements: manoeuvre, firepower, leadership and protection and offers to the units the capacity to fight. Field Manual defines the following structure comprising protection (Quillin, 2000, p. 16):

- Operational Security (OPSEC) and Deception;
- Protection Health and Maintaining Morale;
- Safety;
- Fratricide Avoidance;

The term consists of security operations (OPSEC), deception, health and morale, safety, and avoidance of fratricide. OPSEC includes areas of communication security, neutrality, photography, websites, defensive positions, sniper threats, evacuation and others.

- Communication security (COMSEC). Belligerent parties can monitor phone lines or radio during peace operations. For an operation like this, the forces must maintain the transparency.
- Neutrality. The force protection can be provided by manifesting neutrality.

- It must be ensured the security of information regarding the positions, strengths and equipment of the implied parts. If one part suspects that the other receives information about its actions, the latter can be accused of spying. This may lead to the end of cooperation between the two forces and thus affect the mission's success.
- Security. Implies that all operations personnel must be trained and equipped so as to secure maximum safety while executing the mission.
- "Photography. Prohibiting photography of local areas or people might contribute to neutrality. However, this should not impede collection efforts in support of protecting the forces" (Department of the Army, 1994).
- Sites and Defensive Positions. The units must shelter obstacles and alert procedures and develop drills to occupy positions rapidly. The camouflage and concealment must be very well developed.
- Roadblocks. They can be executed by military police forces or other forces that can assume this responsibility. The area should be as less visible to the enemy and defensible with an armed over-watch.
- "Personnel Vulnerabilities. A Peace Operation Force is vulnerable to personnel security risks from local employees and other personnel subjects to threats or compromise" (Department of the Army, 1994).
- Personal Awareness. Soldiers must be aware of unusual things and patterns preceding aggression. Commanders should ensure soldiers remain alert, do not establish a routine, maintain appearance and bearing, and keep a low profile.
- Sniper Threats. The measures consist of research, surveillance, barriers, shields and screens from observation. ROE must clearly specify the measures that have to be taken against snipers.

- Security Measures. Passive or active measures such as patrolling, reconnaissance and surveillance and use of reaction forces.
- Coordination. It is achieved through military and civilian agencies or, if it is possible, through charitable organizations.
- Evacuation. In UN operations, the UN force headquarters develops a plan to evaluate the forces. This plan should contain appropriate routes for ground, sea or air evacuation.

Deception. The requirement for transparent operations normally precludes deception measures.

Health and Morale. PSOs involve deployment to an austere theatre with limited life support systems.

Safety. Must be done according to the environment, ground, road conditions, customs of the area, access, special equipment, possession of ammunition.

Avoidance of fratricide. Measures taken during PSOs are not very different from those taken during combat operations. "Use of night vision light-intensifier devices aids units in target identification during limited visibility. ROE might prevent the use of some weapon systems and avoid the risk of fratricide. Soldiers must know the penetration, ricochet, and blast consequences of their own weapons" (Department of the Army, 1994).

3. General Facts about Peace Support Operations

One of the special events that took place in the 1990s was the use of PSOs. These operations have also been used during the Cold War, in Lebanon and Cyprus. If between 1947-1987 the number of PSOs was one per two-year run, this has changed, following that between 1988-2004 to grow to more than seven per two-year. Now, the number of peace workers is around 108,000 and will increase to around 150,000. There is no actual term to define

the concept of “Peace Support Operations”. While UN uses PSO, NATO refers to it by using the structure Crisis Response Operations (Bruijnek, 2008, p. 11).

NATO is an organization that provides security. One of the NATO’s responses to terrorist attacks, instability or states falling apart is Peace Support Operations, Non-article 5 Operations. NATO is the only organization that has created a doctrine according to the PSOs. NATO is trying to define its role through the principles of impartiality, consent and restraint in the use of force. NATO includes in PSOs peace enforcement missions with the aim to “re-establish the peace”. NATO’s doctrine is technical and detailed. It stipulates the main operational requirements for PSOs related to command, control and intelligence. NATO is primarily a military organization and must have detailed doctrines about command, control and intelligence. NATO is able to provide security, but it requires to the civilian actors to achieve the reconstruction and provide assistance (Bruijnek, 2008, p. 16). It is very important to analyse the lessons learned after the missions. In this context, NATO has a strong word to say after the experiences from Afghanistan.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was a mission with many ambitions and multiple dimensions led by NATO in Afghanistan. Its purpose is to assist in developing the Afghan National Security Forces, to provide stability and support, to assist in rebuilding the country and increase the authority of the Afghan government.

The first problem that NATO confronted in the ISAF mission was the lack of combat troops. From 4,800 soldiers, only 850 of them were combat force, because after the Somalia mission, the participating countries chose only to provide support for the troops in new missions.

The second issue was the approach of the civil population. The operation was directed primarily towards the populations,

soldiers trying to win their “hearts and minds”. The problem was the existence of insurgents, who have tried to discredit the international troops in Afghanistan.

The last problem was that the leading countries of the UN Security Council had to financial ensure the mission, while other states have not offered support for the ISAF mission. The troops tried to win the trust of local authorities and population through courtesy and respect for their customs and the Afghan culture (Bruijnek, 2008, pp. 49-50).

NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) decides whether to intervene or not in conflicts played abroad to ensure and strengthen the peace and security. PSO can take place in the context of interstate or intra-state conflict. In the future, “NATO capstone doctrine, AJP-01, asserts that intra-state conflict will be more common than inter-state conflict. Military and civilian actors will be more required to work in tandem on activities which address the causes of conflict in an attempt to secure a sustainable peace” (NATO, 2001, p. 1).

Stability and support operations are carried out in a multinational framework and imply the harmonization of doctrines after which the operations are governed, the existence of a common language and the development of common procedures for work to finish the mission with success (Mungiu, 2007).

Peacekeeping actions are special and their role is to support the diplomatic efforts in order to establish and preserve the peace. PSOs require the combined support of both military and civilian actors in order to achieve the strategic objectives. NAC is the one which determines the needs of the mission. The proportions of the military success vary in accordance with the military mission (Mungiu, 2007).

4. The use of Force Protection in PSO

Even if the armed forces do not operate as in the case of the offensive actions, their

presence is required in PSOs. Of course, this causes tension for the civilian population in the area. Compliance of the rules of action and the discipline are not enough to calm the worries of the population. The force is used only when the treaties are broken and this thing is done by using the rules of engagement (ROEs). By applying the correct treatment to the local population, it is easier to establish the peace, stability and security (Gell, 2015, p. 59).

“Peacekeeping was originally intended to be a service to the international community as a means of maintaining peace. Since the end of Cold War, peacekeeping has increasingly become applied to the traditional military and political policies of nation states. Peacekeeping itself is becoming as much a source of instability as it an attractive new label of old-style intervention. Even more paradoxically, the new peacekeeping order seems to be leading to a growing unwillingness to intervene effectively, in instances where an impartial military presence could make a difference to the fate of countless innocent civilians” (Chilton, 1994).

“The competition between «interblocking» institutions and the devaluing of peacekeeping by leading nations have, in many cases, multiplied the problems faced by individuals attempting to help, and those simply trying to survive the tragedies we see unfolding on our TV screens” (Chilton, 1994).

5. Conclusion

Definitely, force protection has clearly improved the quality of PSOs. When soldiers know they are protected, is

easier to act, to take the mission to an end. By improving these measures, the number of losses among military personnel has been reduced considerably. Although they are operations of peace, these measures are necessary in every theatre of operations, because they involve the lives of soldiers. Force protection measures not only help the military, but also the population that they must protect. Only through them, military can overcome obstacles that enemies places every time and can get closer to capture and to end the divergent.

In the past years, the army developed series of measures to protect the force, in order to ensure the completion with success of the missions. Their development also continue in the future, because the enemy attacks are becoming more and more aggressive and the need to develop increasingly more in this area. The main force protection measures are heading to the physical security of the troops, information and protection against explosive devices, but also strides are made in order to develop protection against CBRN attacks, rockets attacks, and counterterrorism. Other important areas that army currently focus on are the force health protection or survivability.

In conclusion, peace support operations is a vast field, widely debated in recent years. All future operations will be conducted in this formula and it is therefore necessary to provide adequate protection for the forces participating in the mission. Lessons learned from previous missions will provide a basis for further development of actions and the forces must understand and appropriate them in a flawless manner.

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