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## RUSSIA'S CONTAINMENT AND ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF G. W. BUSH

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### Abstract.

Traditionally, Containment and Engagement strategies are considered to be the part of the United States foreign policy during the Cold War. However, recent developments in international relations indicated that these strategies are still relevant to the contemporary foreign policy of the U.S., particularly in the U.S.-Russian relations. Contradictory presidency of George W. Bush has raised a question which of the mentioned foreign policy strategies was dominating in the U.S.-Russian relations. On the one hand, U.S. officials had declared that partnership with Russia was being pursued. On the other hand, the administration of G.W. Bush favored the expansion of NATO and did not surrender the initiative of missile defense shield. This paper intends to assess which foreign policy strategy (Containment or Engagement) dominated in U.S.-Russian relations during the presidency of G.W. Bush and to analyse reasons of such domination and the ways these strategies were implemented. The results of the research indicate that G. W. Bush administration implemented different foreign policy towards Russia on the declared and practical foreign policy levels. If on the official U.S. foreign policy level Russia's engagement strategy dominated, in the U.S. foreign policy practice, particularly influenced by the foreign policy of Russia, and to a lesser extent by the events in the international arena, the dominant foreign policy strategy towards Russia was Russia's containment strategy.

**Keywords.** United States, Russia, Containment Strategy, Engagement Strategy, G. W. Bush, Foreign Policy.

## Introduction

Containment and Engagement strategies in studies of international relations generally refer to foreign policy strategies, aimed to balance the power of great powers, and to maintain the status quo. According to Hans Morgenthau (Morgenthau, 2011, 50), Containment and Engagement are two principle ways to deal with imperialistic goals seeking countries. Containment strategy aims to limit the power of potential adversaries by all means, whereas engagement strategy seeks to change foreign (and domestic) policy of an adversary and to bring it into its sphere of influence using certain incentives. Experts of international relations suggest that Containment and Engagement strategies are 'Grand strategies': the majority of widely known other foreign policy strategies (for example, flexible response; deterrence) are considered to be the sub-types of 'Grand strategies' (Urbelis 2001). Thus, Containment and Engagement are antipodes in their essence (the instruments they apply) but are identical in foreign policy goal they are supposed to help to reach.

Traditionally, Containment and Engagement strategies are considered to be the part of the United States foreign policy during the Cold War, when administrations of U.S. presidents actively sought either to restrict the spread of influence of the Soviet Union or to create a dialogue with the Soviet Union in order to maintain the balance of power in favor of the U.S.

However, developments in contemporary international relations indicated that these strategies are still relevant to the contemporary foreign policy of the U.S. After George W. Bush became the president of the U.S., it was debated where U.S.-Russian relations were going. On the one hand, U.S. officials had declared that partnership with Russia was being pursued (these declarations represent Russia's engagement strategy). On the other hand, the administration of G.W. Bush favored the expansion of NATO and did not surrender the initiative of missile defense shield (these actions can be elements of Russia's containment strategy). Therefore, the question arises, which foreign policy strategy (Containment or Engagement) was dominating in U.S.-Russian relations during the presidency of G.W. Bush.

This paper intends to assess which foreign policy strategy (Containment or Engagement) dominated in U.S.-Russian relations during the presidency of G.W. Bush (2001-2008), and to analyse reasons of such domination and the ways these strategies were applied.

The tasks of the research are:

1. To analyse the factors that prompt the U.S. to use Russia's containment and/or engagement strategies.
2. To analyse the features of Russia's containment and engagement strategies in official rhetoric of U.S. foreign policy.
3. To analyse how Russia's containment and engagement strategies in U.S. foreign policy practice are applied.

Certain limitations were set to narrow the scope of the research: one specific region (transatlantic region) for the further analysis was chosen.

This research aims to fill the gap in scientific researches regarding containment and engagement strategies in the contemporary U.S.-Russian relations. A number of authors analyse the U.S. relations with the Soviet Union during the Cold War or trends of the U.S.-Russian relations after the collapse of the USSR (John L. Gaddis, Henry Kissinger, Thomas J. McCormick, Walter Lafeber). Trends of the contemporary U.S.-Russian relations are analyzed by Dmitri Trenin, Michael McFaul, Andrew Kuchins, John Feffer, James M. Goldgeier, Leon R. Aron, Andrei P. Tsygankov. However, there is considerable lack of attention to containment and engagement strategies in the context of contemporary U.S.-Russian relations: this issue has not been explored in a separate academic study.

## Research Methodology

A variety of methods were used to assess Russia's containment and engagement strategies in the U.S. foreign policy: document analysis, speech analysis, events data-set, comparative and descriptive research methods.

Factors that prompt the U.S. to use Russia's containment and/or engagement strategies were assessed combining several research methods: document analysis, comparative and

descriptive research methods. In the analysis, comparison and description the biggest attention has been paid to Russia's power and its proportion to U.S. power, Russia's foreign policy during specific period, events in international arena and their impact on U.S. foreign policy.

Document and speech analysis were used to explore the features of Russia's containment and engagement strategies in official rhetoric of U.S. foreign policy. In the research all the U.S. National Security Strategies (NSS) released during the presidency of G. W. Bush were analysed. Special attention was paid to the reflection of international arena in the documents, threats' assessment, approach to Russia, declared foreign policy strategies towards Russia. To increase the validity of the results analysis of U.S. president's State of the Union Addresses was included into research. National Security Strategies represent overall foreign policy vision of certain administration and do not reflect individual events related with U.S. foreign policy (that are particularly important in this research). Therefore, all the State of Union Addresses of G. W. Bush made during 2001-2008 were analysed with special focus on the events in U.S.-Russian relations that were stressed and the assessment of these events.

In an attempt to identify, which foreign policy strategy dominated U.S. foreign policy towards Russia during the presidency of G. W. Bush and the way it was implemented (the third task), quantitative analysis was made: event data-set research method was used. Event data-set is a research method measuring events that help to comprehend the phenomenon of foreign policy (Schrodt 1993). Process of creation of event-data consists of three steps. Firstly, source of news about political interactions between states is chosen. Secondly, event data-set is made. According Edward Azar, events in the context of this research method are defined as international signals between actors of international relations that have the following features: an actor commits certain act at specific time to achieve specific goal which both actors of international relations are interested in (Azar 1956, 184). Finally, events are evaluated (Veen, 2008). In the research event data-set of international signals between the U.S. and Russia was based on the results of the monitoring of „The Washington Post“ and „The New York Times“ (time-frame: 2001-2008). Assessment of dominating foreign policy strategies towards Russia was made measuring frequency of events' mentioning in the chosen newspapers and exploring events' assessment given in the newspapers. On the basis of event data-set, the most characteristic events in U.S.-Russian relations were identified and labelled as features of containment or engagement strategies. Suitable articles were selected using keywords „United States“ and „Russia“ (both of them had to be mentioned in the text). Some of the events were perceived as indicators of both containment and engagement strategies (for example, START, NATO). Research done by Gerda Jakstaite allows claiming that in certain cases the same foreign policy instrument might be applied on different purpose (Jakstaite 2012). The purpose of the usage might be estimated on basis of outcomes of applied instruments and, at times, on declared intentions of the U.S. officials.

Event data-set method was chosen instead of general overview of policy since its rare usage in European academic tradition of foreign policy analysis and a number of attractive features this methods offers for the analysis. First, this method is objective tool to assess

domination of foreign policy strategies since it takes into account all the events of certain period. Second, qualitative research methods (for example, interview) were rejected as too subjective.

### Factors that prompted U.S. to use Russia's containment and/or engagement strategies

The power asymmetry between the U.S. and Russia during 2001-2008 gave G. W. Bush administration an opportunity to choose which foreign policy strategy (Containment or Engagement) to apply towards Russia. The most important power parameters indicate that in 2001-2008 the U.S. was the most powerful country in the world, while Russia's power was limited compared not only to the power of U.S., but to other great powers as well.

**Table 1.** Power parameters of U.S. and Russia at the beginning of presidency of G. W. Bush. (m. = million; b. = billion)

	U.S.	Japan	Germany	France	Russia	China
<b>Territory</b>	9.629 m. km <sup>2</sup>	0.377 m. km <sup>2</sup>	0.357 m. km <sup>2</sup>	0.547 m. km <sup>2</sup>	17.075 m. km <sup>2</sup>	9.596 m. km <sup>2</sup>
<b>Population</b>	275.562 m.	126.549 m.	82.8 m.	59.329 m.	146 m.	1.262 b.
<b>GDP (U.S. dollars)</b>	9963 b.	3150 b.	1864 b.	1373 b.	1120 b.	4800 b.
<b>Number of nuclear warheads</b>	8876	-	-	348	9196	410
<b>Military expenditures (U.S. dollars)</b>	280 b.	37.8 b.	33.0 b.	40.4 b.	43.9 b.	23 b.

Source: made by author, using The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.

Found: <http://milexdata.sipri.org/>; Database Datamonitor360; *SIPRI yearbook 2002: world armaments and disarmament*. Oxford: Oxford university press, 2002. p. 278, 281-282, 458, 466, 469, 472, 475.

During the presidency of G. W. Bush U.S. exceeded any world country in GDP, military expenditures, military forces. At the beginning of the presidency of G. W. Bush GDP of the U.S. was 3 times bigger than Japan's and over two times bigger than China's. U.S. military expenditures comprised 36% world military expenditures (SIPRI Yearbook 2002). In the field of political influence the U.S. was more powerful than any world state as well: U.S. had significant influence in UN Security Council, NATO, IMF, G7, other international organizations and many countries around the world (U.S. has developed such influence providing financial support, training in the military and other spheres) (SIPRI Yearbook 2002). Russia's GDP, in contrast, was 9 times smaller than the U.S., four times smaller than China's, three times smaller than Japan's. Although Russia was taking the second place in the world by military expenditures, the U.S. exceeded Russia in military expenditures more than 6 times (Table nr. 1). Russia did not have such political influence as the U.S. and other

great powers: at the beginning of the presidency of G. W. Bush Russia was not a member of such important international organizations as NATO, WTO, G7; its opportunities to expand its political influence in post-Soviet space were limited. Significant advantage of the U.S. in GDP, the size of military expenditures, the number of nuclear warheads, political influence in international organizations meant that G. W. Bush administration had sufficient capacity to apply both Russia's containment and engagement strategies.

The most characteristic events in the international arena during the presidency of G. W. Bush created preconditions for both Russia's containment and engagement strategies as well. During the presidency G. W. Bush trends to balance the power of the U.S. can be noticed: China's growing power, expansionist tendencies in Russian foreign policy, anti-Americanism. A new type of threats emerged (terrorism) creating the need to transform U.S. foreign policy. Global issues, to which administration of G. W. Bush had to respond continuing global problems-solving practice started by the administration of B. Clinton, appeared as well. Therefore, the then international context conditioned the emergence of new strategies and instruments in U.S. foreign policy, critical review of the importance of U.S. allies, the change of the U.S. approach to the priority regions.

Attempt to apply Russia's engagement strategy, which was dominating foreign policy of G. W. Bush administration in 2001-2003, was induced by events of 9/11. 9/11 indicated the extent of a new threat (terrorism), important for both U.S. and Russia, and made occur the preconditions for mutual interest of U.S. and Russia: fighting terrorism (McCormick 2005, 231). Whereas G. W. Bush administration's choice to apply Russia's containment strategy was influenced by the expansionary trends in Russian foreign policy. On the official level of Russian foreign policy ambitions to restore Russia's status as a great power, opposition to unipolar international system and creation of equal status with other great powers were declared (such statements contradicted U.S. interests) (Russia's National Security Concept, 2000). Such provisions have been implemented in Russia's foreign policy practice: Russia was trying to expand its military power, started using such foreign policy instruments as energy dependence, economic and soft power in order to expand the influence of post-Soviet space (Kuchins&Zevelev 2012).

Taking into account the fact that the impact of 9/11 events on U.S.-Russian relations was short-lived, conclusion can be made that the main factor that forced the administration of G. W. Bush to give priority to Russia's containment strategy instead of Russia's engagement strategy was Russia's foreign policy at that time.

## **Features of Russia's containment and engagement strategies in official rhetoric of U.S. foreign policy**

**U.S. foreign policy towards Russia declared in the U.S. National Security Strategies (NSS).** During the presidency of G. W. Bush administration (2001-2008) two U.S. NSS were released: in 2002 and 2006. Ideas expressed in these NSS are known as G. W. Bush doctrine.

The provisions of the U.S. NSS of 2002 and 2006 indicate that, according to the administration of G. W. Bush, the *situation in international arena* was not safe since new

type of threats (terrorism) emerged. The U.S. NSS of 2002 states that “Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering.” Thus, in the U.S. NSS of 2002 it is declared that G. W. Bush administration perceives the international environment as unsafe for the U.S.

The U.S. NSS of 2006 declares even stricter position stating that „America is at war” and comparing U.S. fight against terrorism to fight against communism during the Cold War (U.S. NSS of 2006 declares terrorism as a new totalitarian ideology). These statements suggest that in U.S. NSS released during the second term of G. W. Bush international arena is perceived as posing greater threat to the U.S. than before.

*Perception of threats.* Both U.S. NSS of 2002 and 2006 stress the changed nature of threats. In U.S. NSS of 2002 it is stated that “We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few.” According to administration of G. W. Bush, the main threats to the U.S. are terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Terrorism by administration of G. W. Bush is perceived as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents”; administration stresses that it makes no distinction between terrorists and those who support them (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002).

In the U.S. NSS of 2002 a list of countries that pose the biggest threat to U.S. (harbor terrorism, seek weapons of mass destruction) is presented. It includes Iraq and North Korea (in U.S. NSS such countries are called *Rogue States*). In the U.S. NSS of 2006 the list was supplemented by Iran and Syria. Thus, Russia is not mentioned among the threat posing countries.

*The assessment Russia.* The U.S. NSS of 2002 and 2006 focus on Russia as one of the power centers in international arena. In the U.S. NSS of 2002 Russia is perceived as a potential great power in addition to such countries as India, China.

In the U.S. NSS G. W. Bush administration emphasizes that it does not consider Russia a threat and is trying to develop a new type of strategic relationship with this country. In the U.S. NSS of 2002 G. W. Bush administration declares the intention to implement strategy of realistic engagement in relations with Russia: to engage Russia into cooperation in areas where interests overlap (for example, the fight against terrorism), but not to make concessions in problematic areas such as promotion of democratic values and inadequate efforts to combat the spread of WMD.

In the U.S. NSS of 2006 perception of Russia is changing. If in the U.S. NSS of 2002 Russia was perceived as a potential great power, thus in the U.S. NSS of 2006 G. W. Bush administration recognizes that Russia has great influence in Europe and the other regions strategically important to U.S.

Officially declared U.S. *foreign policy strategy towards Russia* is changing as well. G. W. Bush administration expresses the intention to apply Russia’s conditional engagement strategy: ie to seek to engage Russia in cooperation with the condition that Russia would promote democratic trends in its domestic politics. In the U.S. NSS of 2006 G. W. Bush administration also formally declares that they are not satisfied with the political situation in Russia: the restriction of democracy. However, G. W. Bush administration

does not include Russia in the list of threat posing countries. The intention to use Russia's containment strategy is not declared.

Analysis of the U.S. NSS of G. W. Bush administration in the context of relations with Russia indicates that Russia receives attention as one of the powers in the international arena despite the fact that the main attention is paid to the fight against terrorism. Administration's officially declared statements of needed allies open up the possibility for Russia to become one of the U.S. partners. On the other hand, criticism of restrictions of democracy in Russia expressed in the U.S. NSS of 2006 indicates that G. W. Bush administration does not exclude the possibility to take strict foreign policy instruments towards Russia.

**U.S. foreign policy towards Russia declared in State of Union Addresses.** In order to provide the perception of the most important events in U.S.-Russian relations in the official rhetoric of G. W. Bush administration, all the State of Union Addresses of G. W. Bush were analyzed.

In the State of Union Addresses of G. W. Bush special attention was paid to the missile defense shield, implementation of INF and CFR treaties, Russia's engagement into cooperation. Thus, analysis of the speeches indicates that in the State of Union Addresses G. W. Bush did not focus on the key events in U.S.-Russian relations (as NATO enlargement, the political communication between high-level officials of the U.S. and Russia, spy scandal, the negotiations on START, the Russian-Georgian conflict and U.S. officials' political communication with representatives of post-Soviet countries).

Initiative of Missile defense shield was not discussed in the context of Russia on the official level of G. W. Bush administration. Initiative of the missile defense shield in State of Union Addresses of G. W. Bush was mentioned in the context of war against terrorism stressing that the main goal of the initiative is "to protect America and our allies from sudden attack" (State of the Union Address 2002). Thus, on the official level initiative of missile defense shield was not presented as an element of Russia's containment strategy.

International agreements regulating elimination of nuclear weapons and its the elements from post-Soviet states (the INF and the CFR) were presented in a neutral way, emphasizing the security of post-Soviet region (State of the Union Address 2003).

U.S. President stressed positive changes in the U.S. relations with Russia, stating that the U.S. and Russia were no longer adversaries, but cooperated like never before (State of the Union Address 2002). G. W. Bush also stressed the cooperation with Russia on international issues (Israel-Palestinian conflict, disarmament of North Korea) (State of the Union Address 2007). Emphasis on lack of competition and cooperation with Russia in the diplomatic sphere suggests that G. W. Bush in the official level declared U.S. foreign policy instruments that represent Russia's engagement strategy.

The analysis of State of Union Addresses has shown that on the official level G. W. Bush administration emphasized only some of the events in the U.S.-Russian relations that were stressed in analyzed newspapers *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* and these events were either presented neutrally (did not relating them directly with Russia), or as a part of Russia's engagement strategy.

## Russia's containment and engagement strategies in the U.S. foreign policy practice

*First term of G. W. Bush (2001-2004).* During the first term of G. W. Bush „The Washington Post“ devoted 292 articles concerning U.S. foreign policy towards Russia, meanwhile “The New York Times” – 166 (Appendix nr. 1).

The analysis of Russia's containment and engagement strategies in U.S. foreign policy practice during the first term of G. W. Bush revealed following results:

- Although the events in the U.S.-Russian relations representing Russia's containment strategy did not have a significant advantage over the events that should be considered as a part of Russia's engagement strategy, they still exceeded the latter category of events. This situation suggests that during the first term of G. W. Bush Russia's containment strategy was dominating in the U.S. foreign policy practice.
- Main features of Russia's containment strategy in 2001-2004 were the following: initiative of anti-missile defense shield and the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the use of NATO factor (NATO enlargement), spy scandal in 2001, during which administration of G. W. Bush ordered to leave the country for 50 Russian officials, and factor of nuclear weapons as an instrument of Russia's containment strategy.
- Features of Russia's engagement strategy in foreign policy practice of administration of G. W. Bush were present as well. However, this foreign policy strategy was less significant than Russia's containment strategy. The use of Russia's engagement strategy was detected in active political communication between high-rank officials of U.S. and Russia; establishment of NATO-Russian Council in 2002.
- Articles in “The Washington Post” and “The New York Times” presenting assessments of U.S.-Russian relations by international relations experts as well confirm the domination of Russia's containment strategy in U.S. foreign policy practice. In The Washington Post the number of articles stating that G. W. Bush administration was using Russia's containment strategy increased significantly comparing to number of articles during the presidency of B. Clinton: NATO enlargement, promotion of democracy in Ukraine were given as evidence by The Washington Post. Certain articles of the newspaper rather recommended using the U.S. capital (political, military, economic) to solve major U.S. problems instead of containing Russia (Rumer 2004). Assessment of U.S.-Russian relations presented by The New York Times is similar. During the first term of G. W. Bush the assessment of the U.S.-Russian relations presented in The New York Times was changing: in articles of 2001 G. W. Bush administration's foreign policy towards Russia was seen as “determined, strict, realistic, militant”. According to analysts of The New York Times, Russia's engagement strategy was not dominant in the U.S. foreign policy towards Russia at that time. Analysts expressed an opinion that US-Russia relations “reached the lowest point since the Cold War” (Perlez 2001). In 2002 assessment of U.S.-Russian relations changed significantly: articles have been focusing on bilateral cooperation (in fields of nuclear arms reduction, energy and the fight against terrorism), the bilateral dialogue. In 2003-2004 analysts returned to the opinion that US-Russia relations were deteriorating, focusing on NATO enlargement.



The New York Times voiced criticism towards Russia and highlighted the struggle for spheres of influence in Central Asia. The fact that the U.S.-Russian relations were assessed as deteriorating during 3 years of 4 during the presidency of G. W. Bush suggest that such pattern of relations dominated.

- The research indicated that data concerning Russia's containment and engagement strategies given by The Washington Post and The New York Times coincide not only by distinguished the most characteristic events in the U.S.-Russian relations, but by assessment of the US-Russian relations given by newspapers' analysts as well. Thus, the research summarizing features of Russia's containment and engagement strategies in U.S. foreign policy practice during the first term of G. W. Bush has shown that that Russia's containment strategy dominated.

*Second term of G. W. Bush (2005-2008).* During the second term of G. W. Bush „The Washington Post“ devoted 292 articles to the U.S. foreign policy towards Russia, meanwhile “The New York Times” – 166 (Appendix nr. 1).

Analysis of events in U.S.-Russian relations during the second term of G. W. Bush (2005-2008) indicates that:

- During the second term of G. W. Bush Russia's containment strategy significantly dominated in the U.S. foreign policy practice. Several trends support this conclusion. Firstly, events representing Russia's containment strategy dominated among the most characteristic events in the U.S.-Russian relations. Secondly, event data-set and analysis of selected newspapers indicate that during the second term of G. W. Bush number of events that represent Russia's containment strategy exceeded the number of events that represents Russia's engagement strategy. Thirdly, according to experts of international relations who write articles in analyzed newspapers, the basic trend in the U.S.-Russian relations in 2005-2008 was confrontation.
- Russia's containment strategy during the second term of G. W. Bush has been applied by administration's suggestion to expand NATO, active political communication with high-rank officials of post-soviet countries; initiative of missile- defense shield; administration's position in Russian-Georgian war of 2008.
- Elements of Russia's engagement strategy in G. W. Bush administration's foreign policy in 2005-2008 were present as well. Nevertheless, only one event/trend, representing Russia's engagement strategy, was among the most significant events/trends – ie active political communication between high-rank U.S. and Russian officials. Besides, according to experts of international relations, during the second term of G. W. Bush summits of U.S. and Russian officials no longer performed the function of Russia's engagement strategy because all the summits ended without significant results.
- Assertion that U.S.-Russian relations were deteriorating dominates in both articles of The Washington Post and The New York Times, presenting analysis of U.S. foreign policy, and articles, concerning particular events in U.S.-Russian relations. In the articles written during the second term of G. W. Bush this assertion was consistent. In the articles at the beginning of the second term of G. W. Bush, as well as in the end of his second term similar arguments can be found: “For all the talk of strategic partnership and even personal friendship between Mr. Putin and President Bush, the relationship

between Russia and the United States has reached what is probably its lowest point since the Soviet Union collapsed a decade and a half ago” (Myers 2007); “dialogue between Washington and Moscow is already taking the most caustic tones since the collapse of communism” (Shanker 2007). According to analyzed newspapers, it was administration of G. W. Bush itself that significantly aggravated U.S.-Russian relations: administration of G. W. Bush rationally had chosen specific foreign policy instruments (containment strategy) in relations with Russia despite knowing that such foreign policy course was not acceptable for Russia and that it would worsen bilateral relations. For example, The New York Times described foreign policy of administration of G. W. Bush in such a way: “As much as Mr. Bush has argued that the old characterizations of the cold war are no longer germane, he drew a new line at the White House on Friday morning between countries free and not free, and bluntly put Russia on the other side of it” (Myers 2008).

- Summarizing implementation of Russia’s containment and engagement strategies in U.S. foreign policy practice during the second term of G. W. Bush, conclusion can be made that research findings indicate significantly dominant Russia’s containment strategy.

## Conclusions

1. During the presidency of G. W. Bush (2001-2008) administration’s chosen dominant foreign policy strategy towards Russia was determined by power proportion between the U.S. and Russia, events in international arena, foreign policy of Russia. The U.S. advantage against Russia in various power parameters during 2001-2008 and 9/11 (the U.S. needed allies) created preconditions for the implementation of Russia’s engagement strategy. However, aggressive Russian foreign policy (active foreign policy in post-soviet space, intensification of relations with China and Iran, opposing the U.S. on various matters) determined that administration of G. W. Bush chose Russia’s containment strategy as dominant one. Thus, the biggest impact to U.S. foreign policy towards Russia was made by Russian foreign policy itself.

2. On the official level of the U.S. foreign policy during the presidency of G. W. Bush Russia’s engagement strategy dominated. In the U.S. NSS administration of G. W. Bush was declaring the initiative to use Russia’s engagement strategy (declared type of Russia’s engagement strategy was changing from realistic engagement to conditional engagement strategy that is stricter than the former type). Analysis of State of Union Addresses of G. W. Bush indicates that administration on the official level was stressing other events/trends in U.S.-Russian relations than The Washington Post and The New York Times were and declared that these events/trends represented Russia’s engagement strategy.

3. In U.S. foreign policy practice during the presidency of G. W. Bush (both during the first and the second term) Russia’s containment strategy dominated. During the first term of G. W. Bush (2001-2004) to implement Russia’s containment strategy administration of G. W. Bush gave priority to missile defence shield, NATO, spy scandal of 2001. Whereas during the second term the main features of Russia’s containment strategy were

administration's position in Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008, missile defence shield, withdrawal from ABM treaty, NATO, active political communication between the U.S. and Russian senior officials. Thus, to implement Russia's containment strategy administration of G. W. Bush gave priority to instruments of military sphere.

4. Empirical research data indicate that G. W. Bush administration implemented different foreign policy towards Russia on the declared and practical foreign policy levels. On the official level of foreign policy administration of G. W. Bush was declaring the initiative to use Russia's engagement strategy, however, in foreign policy practice Russia's containment strategy was dominating (although certain elements of Russia's engagement strategy can be noticed as well). Thus, G. W. Bush administration's foreign policy towards Russia was not consistent.

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## Appendix

Appendix 1. U.S.-Russian Events Data-set during the presidency of G. W. Bush (2001-2008), Made on the Basis of Articles in „The Washington Post“ and „The New York Times“

Table 1. U.S.-Russian Events Data-set during 2001-2008 Made on the Basis of Articles in „The Washington Post“

Events/trends	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total:
	Number of mentioning								
Missile defense shield in Europe and withdrawal from ABM treaty	45	4				1	12	8	21
NATO factor	8	10	3	3	1	4	2	6	13
Disagreements about Kosovo							1	1	2
Spy scandal (March of 2001)	18								
Political support for post-soviet states				1	1				1
Economic support for post-soviet states	1		2	1	1	1		1	3
Political communication with post-soviet leaders			1	3	8	2		2	12
Cooperation with post-soviet states in military sphere		5	5	1		1	1		2
Negotiations for the extension of START I, START II ratification, the new START	1							2	2
U.S. provides assistance to Ukraine in liquidation of biological weapons					1				1
U.S. urges Russia to withdraw troops from Moldova			1						1
U.S. criticism of Russia (for democracy, policy towards Ukraine)				6	1	4	2		7
U.S. announces a competition to create the nuclear warheads of new generation						1	1		2
Developing Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons			2						
Russian-Georgian conflict				2				69	69



Cooperation in space station	1		6	2	9			3	3
U.S.-Russia Pact Aimed At Nuclear Terrorism						1			1
Implementation of Plutonium Pact		1	4	1	6				
Support for Russia's accession to the WTO	2	1			3				
U.S. does not interfere in the situation in Chechnya	1	1	2		4	1			1
U.S. does not criticize Russia's interference in Ukraine's internal politics				1	1				
<b>Elements that should be treated as part of Russia's engagement strategy in total:</b>			<b>149</b>					<b>42</b>	

Source: made by author (Gerda Jakstaite) on the basis of articles in *The Washington Post* (period 2001 01 01 – 2008 12 31)

**Table 2.** U.S.-Russian Events Data-set during 2001-2008 Made on the Basis of Articles in „*The New York Times*“

Events/trends	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total:
	Number of mentioning								
Missile defense shield in Europe and withdrawal from ABM treaty	27	1				1	16	7	24
NATO factor	6	6	1	6	2		2	10	14
Spy scandal (March of 2001)	4								4
Political support for post-soviet states	1								1
Political communication with post-soviet leaders		1	1		8	2			10
Cooperation with post-soviet states in military sphere		2							2
Negotiations for the extension of START I, START II ratification, the new START	20	6	2	2		2	4	1	7
U.S. begins to broadcast radio broadcasts to Chechnya		1							1
Disagreements on the U.S. U-2 plane near the Georgian-Russian border			3						3
U.S. urges Russia to withdraw troops from Moldova				1					1
U.S. criticism of Russia (for democracy, policy towards Ukraine)				1	9	5	3	2	19
U.S. puts efforts to open oil pipeline from Azerbaijan to the West, which will bypass Russia					1				1
the U.S. supports radio broadcasting in Russia						1			1
U.S. announces a competition to create the nuclear warheads of new generation							1		1
Competition over the global system of satellites							1		1
Competition over Arctic								1	1
U.S. canceled a joint military exercise with Russia						1		1	2

**Instruments of containment strategy**



